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Abstract
This thesis studies two important aspects of labour market earnings dynamics:
the post-displacement earning losses experienced by high-tenure workers, and the
evolution of the gender wage gap within firms linked to export activity.
The first two essays aim at understanding and quantifying the forces behind
the post-displacement earning losses observed in the data. I first introduce
the main empirical and theoretical works in the literature. Then, I propose
a structural model of the labour market with on the job search, in which
firms are heterogeneous in productivity and workers accumulate both general
and specific skills while employed. Jobs are destroyed at an endogenous rate
due to idiosyncratic productivity shocks and workers’ skills depreciate during
unemployment. The model is estimated via simulated method of moments using
matched employer-employee data on Germany. By matching moments related
to workers’ mobility and wage dynamics, the model reproduces the size and
persistence of the earning losses observed in the data. The key driver of the
post-displacement earning losses is the interaction between the loss in specific
(mostly) and general human capital and endogenous separation.
Finally, the third essay studies the effect of firms’ export activity on the
gender wage gap among its workers. Using matched employer-employee data from
Germany for the period between 1993 and 2007, we show that an increase in a
firm’s export widens the wage gap between male and female blue collar workers,
while it reduces it between male and female white collars. In particular, the former
effect is stronger for workers in routine manual tasks, while the latter is driven
by employees performing interactive tasks. This evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that serving foreign markets relies more on interpersonal skills, which
reinforces female comparative advantage and reduces (widens) the gender wage
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Introduction
This thesis combines three essays that explore two important aspects of labour
market earnings dynamics. It first focuses on one important source of earning
risks, specifically the post-displacement earning losses experienced by high-tenure
workers. Then, it looks at the evolution of the gender wage gap within firms and,
in particular, at its links to firms’ export activity.
Both topics are investigated empirically, using a rich administrative matched
employer-employee panel dataset on Germany, provided by Research Data Centre
(FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB). The nature of this dataset is crucial to understand
the sources of individual earnings dynamics. By reporting complete individuals’
labour market histories, as well as detailed information on workers and firms,
it allows to separately identify the contribution of both individuals’ and firms’
characteristics, and to isolate them from the role of search frictions which prevent
similar workers from finding equally productive job matches.
Workers and firms characteristics, together with search frictions, are in fact
relevant for both the topics covered in this thesis. In the case of post-displacement
earning losses for high-tenure workers, the literature suggests that the main driving
forces are the loss of a productive and secure job and the loss of workers (general)
skills. As for the evolution of gender wage gap, the recent literature has put
forward several explanations to this phenomenon, including sorting into different
type of firms for male and female workers, the presence of search frictions in
the labour market that prevent female workers from finding equally productive
matches as their male colleagues, as well as differences in productivity and
bargaining power (Card, Cardoso, and Kline, 2015).
In light of these considerations, I devote the first two chapters to the
investigation of the role played by search frictions and their interaction with
workers’ human capital accumulation in the explanation of post-displacement
earning losses experienced by high-tenure workers.
In Chapter 1, I provide a survey of some of the main empirical and theoretical
works that focus on this topic. The empirical literature shows that workers
that experience displacement suffer from very high and persistent earning losses.
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For example, Davis and von Wachter (2011) estimate that in the United States
displaced male workers with more than three years of tenure suffer losses equal
to 12% of the present value of earnings in the absence of displacement. The
main recent works in the theoretical literature have stressed the role of the job
ladder and search frictions for the qualitative explanation of these earnings losses.
The job ladder captures the idea that jobs are heterogeneous in productivity and
that it takes time for workers to find the most productive jobs. Therefore, it
helps explaining the slow recovery in earnings after displacement as unemployed
workers enter relatively poorer employment relationships and search for better
matches while employed. However, given the high frequency of job-to-job
transitions in the data, the job ladder alone is not able to explain the observed
persistence of post-displacement earning losses. Therefore, additional forces have
been considered. For example, the observed increase in job separation rates at
re-employment for displaced high-tenure workers hints at the importance of losses
in job security (some examples are the works of Jarosch, 2015; Krolikowski, 2017
and Jung and Khun, 2018). Additionally, the fact that most of the persistence of
earning losses is due to the sluggish recovery of wages (rather than employment),
stresses the importance of workers’ decrease in productivity upon displacement
(Jarosch, 2015; Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela and Coles, 2020).
Starting form these observations, in Chapter 2 I propose a general framework
to account for the causes of post-displacement earning losses. Specifically, I build
and estimate a quantitative, structural search model of the labour market with the
following elements: heterogeneous firms, on-the-job search, specific and general
human capital accumulation and endogenous job loss. The model is estimated
by simulated method of moments using matched employer-employee data on
Germany, and by matching moments related to both workers’ mobility and wage
dynamics, it is able to reproduce the size and persistence of the earning losses
observed in the data. The key contribution of this work is that it provides a
measurement framework to account for the relative contribution of the drivers of
the post-displacement losses. It does so by including specific and general human
capital accumulation in a model of job search and by pinning down the relevant
parameters using returns to tenure and experience in the data. The results of the
counterfacutal analysis show that the key driver of the post-displacement earning
losses is the loss in specific (mostly) and general human capital and its interaction
with the mechanism of endogenous separation. More precisely, by transitioning
into unemployment, high-tenure displaced workers lose a good job and specific
human capital. The time spent in unemployment makes them more likely to
accept lower productivity jobs, which are less stable because less likely to survive
negative productivity shocks. This increases their probability of falling again into
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unemployment and prevents them to rebuild the lost specific and general skills,
slowing down the earnings recovery.
Chapter 3, co-authored with Alessandra Bonfiglioli, studies a different aspect
of individual earnings dynamics. It looks at the effect of firms’ export activity on
the gender wage gap among its workers. In spite of the growing attention on the
role of globalisation in widening income inequality, and on the persistence of wage
differentials between men and women, this theme has received little attention in
the literature so far. We contribute to filling this gap by investigating the role of
firms’ export activity on the gender wage gap, using matched employer-employee
data on Germany for the 1993-2007 period. The structure of the dataset allows
us to observe the changes throughout time in export sales of a single firm and the
evolution of wages of all the workers employed by that specific firm. We exploit
this feature of the data to only focus on variation within worker-firm matches,
which allows to look at the changes in relative wages of a female-male pair of
workers as the firm expands its export activity. This specification is likely to
reveal the causal effect of export on the gender wage gap because it takes into
account the possible sources of bias related to individual and firm characteristics,
sorting of workers in particular firms and reverse causality issues: it is in fact
unlikely that any single worker may affect firm’s sales abroad. Our results show
that an increase in a firm’s export widens the wage gap between male and female
blue collar workers, while it reduces it between male and female white collars. In
particular, the former effect is stronger for workers in routine manual tasks, while
the latter is driven by employees performing interactive tasks. Additionally, this
result is robust also to controlling for firm’s sales, whose effect on the gender wage
gap is quite muted relative to that of export. The fact that the gender wage gap
reacts more to export than domestic sales suggests that selling to foreign markets
may require the firm to change the intensity in the use of certain skills in a way that
makes women relatively more demanded in non-production tasks. This is in line
with the existing evidence that women tend to have a comparative advantage in
performing white collar tasks, especially those intensive in interpersonal relations
and in the use of computers, while they have a disadvantage in blue collar,
“brawn”-intensive occupations (see for example Spitz-Oener, 2006; Black and
Spitz-Oener, 2010; Borghans, Weel and Weinberg, 2014; Ngai and Petrongolo,
2017; Cortes, Jaimovich and Siu, 2018). If export requires a more intensive use
of “male” skills in production (e.g., because it changes the production line in a
way that calls for more “brawn”), and of “female” skills in non- production tasks
(e.g., because it takes more ability in interpersonal relations to deal with foreign
customers), an expansion in foreign activities will increase (decrease) the demand
for females in white-collar (blue-collar) occupations and their wages.
11
Chapter 1
The Consequences of Job Loss in
the Economic Literature
1.1 Introduction
Numerous studies have documented the large negative impact of job loss events on
several aspects of individuals’ life. Workers that experience layoff are confronted
with worse labour market outcomes, e.g. lower re-employment opportunities and
productivity losses, reduced consumption and health conditions (see Gruber, 1997;
Sullivan and Wachter, 2009; Davis and Wachter, 2011, among others).
In particular, most of the works in the labour economics literature show that
displaced workers with at least three years of job tenure experience severe losses
in earnings, that persist for over twenty years after the event. Furthermore, there
is consensus about the fact that the bulk of the earning losses is explained by
a reduction in workers’ re-employment probabilities, while their persistence is
attributed to a stagnant growth in workers’ re-employment wages.
Building on these stylised facts, researchers have looked at the possible causes
of the post-displacement earning losses. The main theoretical channels highlighted
so far have been i) the loss of a productive match, ii) the loss of a secure job, and
iii) the drop in workers’ productivity, mostly in terms of general skills.
This chapter is dedicated to reviewing and discussing the main contributions
in this field. Specifically, Section 1.2 surveys the literature that focuses on the
quantification and causal estimation of the post-displacement earning losses, and
on the empirical decomposition in employment and wage losses. Section 1.3 covers
the most recent works that propose theoretical mechanisms for the explanation of
the observed post-displacement earning losses. Section 1.4 concludes.
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1.2 Empirical Evidence on the
Post-Displacement Earning Losses
The modern literature on the cost of job loss goes back to the early 1990s, when
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) first documented the presence of large
and long-lasting earning losses following job displacement events. The paper
contributed significantly to the literature, both in terms of empirical methodology
and data used for the estimation. It is, in fact, the first paper to develop the
event-study approach still used today to analyse the consequences of a layoff on
workers’ current and future earnings. It is also the first empirical work in which
administrative worker-level data are combined with firm-level data on employment
flows. This enabled the authors to identify workers’ separations due to mass
layoff events and use them as exogenous events in the context of a quasi-natural
experimental analysis.1
1.2.1 Methodology
The empirical framework developed in Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993)
is motivated by the challenge of estimating the causal earning losses suffered
by displaced workers. Specifically, they define earning losses as the “difference
between the workers’ actual and expected earnings had the event that led to their
displacement not occurred”. This definition formally translates into:
E(yit|Di,s = 1, Ii,s−p)− E(yit|Di,s = 0, Ii,s−p) (1.1)
where, yit represents earnings of worker i at time t, Di,s is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if individual i is displaced at time s and 0 otherwise, and Ii,s−p represents the
information set on individual i, p periods before separation.
This definition comes with the empirical challenge of approximating the term
E(yit|Di,s = 0, Ii,s−p), which represents the counterfactual expected earnings at
time t of individual i displaced at time s in case the displacement event had not
occurred and, as such, is not directly observable in the data. Jacobson, LaLonde,
and Sullivan (1993) tackle this issue by comparing the average earnings of two
groups of workers selected only among male, prime age, high-tenure workers
employed in Pennsylvania during the late 1970s and 1980s: a treatment group
of workers displaced in a mass layoff event and a control group of continuously
1A separation due to a mass layoff event is defined as a separation from a firm (with at least
50 employees) that in the year of displacement experiences a decline in employment at least
equal to 30% of its maximum level of employment.
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employed workers. Assigning to the treatment group only workers that experience
separation for exogenous reasons helps mitigate any bias due to individual selection
and uncover the causal effect of job loss on workers’ earnings.
In practice this approach is implemented by estimating the following
difference-in-difference regression model:





it + εit (1.2)
where yit represents the real annual earnings for individual i at time t; αi is an
individual fixed effect that absorbs workers’ heterogeneity and γt represents a year
fixed effect. The vector Xit is a quadratic polynomial in age for individual i at
time t, and Dkit are dummy variables indicating if the worker was displaced due
to a mass layoff k = (−m,−m+ 1, ..., 1, 2...) year before or after t. The estimated
coefficients δ̂k capture the difference in earnings between the treated and control
groups k periods after separation.
Applying this methodology, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) document
that high-tenure workers who were laid off in 1979 from firms in distress
suffered earning losses equal to 40% of their pre-displacement earnings during
the displacement year, and 25% six years after separation.
External Validity One of the main concerns about the work by Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) is about the external validity of the study. This was
first raised by Couch and Placzek (2010) who, by applying the same methodology
on data on workers in the state of Connecticut in years 1993-2004, estimated much
smaller earning losses. The different economic conditions of the two states seemed
to matter significantly for the difference in the results of the two papers. In 1980
and 1982, Pennsylvania was in fact hit by two important recessions, that likely
affected the recovery of post-displacement workers’ earnings, while Connecticut
was growing at stable rates and exhibiting much lower unemployment rates in
1993-2004.
Davis and Wachter (2011) confirm the importance of the economic conditions
in the determination of the size and persistence of post-displacement earning losses
by estimating them separately for periods of recession and expansion for workers
employed in the United States in the 1974-2008 period.2 Their results are in line
with Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) for displacement events occurring in
2Periods of recession are identified as years in which national unemployment rate is below
6%, while periods of expansion are considered as years in which the national unemployment rate
is above 8%.
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recession years and with Couch and Placzek (2010) for workers displaced during
times of favourable economic conditions (see Figure 1.1).
The size and persistence of earning losses suffered by high-tenure workers can
be affected not only by economic conditions but also by the specific institutions and
social security systems. To this effect Schmieder, Wachter, and Bender (2010) and,
more recently, Schmieder, Wachter, and Heining (2018) study whether workers in
countries with more generous social security systems and less income inequality,
like Germany, show significant differences in post-displacement earning losses in
comparison to workers in the United States.
Both studies are based on German administrative employer-employee data with
the difference that the first paper focuses only on workers displaced in recession
years 1981-1985 and follows them from 1975 to 2005, while the second one focuses
on a longer time span ranging from 1975 to 2014 and includes displacement events
occurring both in recession and expansion years. The conclusions are that German
workers suffer from earning losses similar in magnitude and persistence to those
suffered by workers in the United States. Additionally, Schmieder, Wachter, and
Heining (2018) confirm the findings in Davis and Wachter (2011) and document
pro-cyclical earning losses, which are double in size when displacement occurs
in periods of recession relative to expansion. This further reveals important
similarities with the previous research on the United States.
Large and long lasting earning losses similar in size to the ones discussed above
have been also documented for other countries, such as Portugal (Portugal and
Carneiro, 2006) and the UK (Hijzen, Upward, and Wright, 2010). This highlights
that job loss episodes have sizeable lifelong consequences on workers’ earnings
independently on the countries’ institutions, and understanding their sources is
important for designing appropriate labour market policies.
1.2.2 Earning Losses Decomposition
An important starting point to understand what drives large and persistent
earning losses is to account for the relative contribution of employment and wages.
This has been done by Schmieder, Wachter, and Heining (2018) for Germany, due
to the rich information provided in matched employer-employee data, that include
both daily wages and days of work.
The authors show that working days drop by almost 25% in the year of
displacement, but show a much faster recovery compared to earnings in the
following years, almost reaching the pre-displacement levels after ten years.
Contrastingly, wages never reach their pre-displacement values, remaining about
8% below their counterfactual path fifteen years after displacement (see Figure
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1.2). Therefore, the reduction in employment opportunities after job loss events
seems to explain most of the size of the initial earning losses, while the sluggish
recovery of re-employment wages appears to be responsible for the persistence of
the earning losses.
A similar decomposition has been conducted by Huckfeldt (2018) using PSID
data on workers employed in the United States. Qualitatively, the findings are
close to those of Schmieder, Wachter, and Heining (2018), with post-displacement
wages being accountable for the persistence of earnings. However, quantitatively,
the decomposition shows substantial differences in the recovery of employment
between the two countries. While employment in the United States fully recovers
after two years, it shows much higher persistence in the German data (see Figure
1.3).
These empirical findings represent a crucial starting point for a deeper
understanding of the drivers of the post-displacement earning losses. In countries
like Germany, where the reduction in employment seems to play an important role
in the overall cost of job loss, a focus on mechanisms slowing down re-employment
in the years that follow a layoff event seems necessary. For countries more similar
to the United States, where workers recovery in working hours is fully reached
in two years, a closer look at the sources of workers’ losses in productivity at
re-employment seems more relevant.
Several papers have investigated the theoretical channels driving the
post-displacement earning losses by applying structural estimation techniques
that allows to quantify the relative contribution of each of the considered
sources. The next subsections are dedicated to describe the main contributions
in the field.
1.3 The Sources of the Cost of Job Loss
Models of the labour market with search frictions and on-the-job search à la
Burdett and Mortensen (1998), in which workers climb a job ladder in wages (or
firm productivity), with higher rungs reached with experience, provide a suitable
framework to study the causes of the cost of job loss.3
In this framework, both unemployed and employed workers can engage in
on-the-job search activity and receive offers infrequently as a result of random
sampling from a wage (or firm) productivity distribution. Unemployed workers
3The standard version of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model does not consider
heterogeneity in firm productivity, but it has been extended to include it to match better the
data on wage distribution.
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accept wage offers that represent an improvement upon the unemployment status,
while employed workers accept to switch job only if it entails a higher payoff. This
implies that newly employed workers (hired from unemployment) are more likely
to occupy the lowest rungs of the job ladder, while (long-term) employed workers
are positioned on the higher rungs of the ladder and receive higher wages, having
accumulated search capital during the course of their career.4
Therefore, through the lens of this model, high-tenure workers that experience
a displacement event will most likely lose a well paid job at the top of the ladder
and, by transitioning into unemployment, will have to restart the search activity
from the bottom. It follows that, at re-employment, these workers receive lower
wages compared to their high-tenure colleagues that have not been displaced.
This mechanism can explain the presence of substantial post-displacement earning
losses, whose size depends on the job offer distribution and whose persistence on
the frequency of job offers sampling process.
This explains why qualitatively the job ladder model represents a natural
framework to justify the observed post-displacement earning losses. However,
when matched to the data on workers’ mobility, it only predicts transitory
post-displacement earning losses. More precisely, given the high frequency of
job-to-job transitions observed in most countries, the activity of on-the-job search
implies a strong mean-reverting process for wages and, taken on its own, fails to
mimic the persistence of job displacement earning losses.
Starting from this observation, the recent literature has extended the basic job
ladder framework to take into account several additional mechanisms that help
slowing down the recovery in earnings. Some of the most relevant contributions
in this field have included the dimension of job stability to the job ladder,
either exogenously (Jarosch, 2015) or endogenously in the spirit of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) (Krolikowski, 2017; Jung and Kuhn, 2018), to make the
bottom of the job ladder more “slippery” and the top more stable, as well as
skill accumulation during employment and skill loss during unemployment as
in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) to create an additional channel of persistence
(Jarosch, 2015; Huckfeldt, 2018; Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles, 2020).
4Notice that this model is able to account for returns to experience and tenure observed in
the data. In fact, experience is seen as accumulation of search capital that allows workers to
climb up the ladder and accept better offers with higher wages. Tenure is interpreted as a sign
of a good match that pays high wages and survives counter-offers from other firms, preventing
workers from quitting for a better opportunity.
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1.3.1 Job Ladder and Endogenous Separation
In Krolikowski (2017) the recovery in workers’ post-displacement earnings is lower
as the job ladder becomes harder to climb after a transition into unemployment.
Specifically, his work takes inspiration from the empirical observation that
unemployment spells are serially correlated, that is workers that come out of
unemployment face a high probability of losing their job again. To rationalize this
stylized fact, Krolikowski (2017) writes a structural model of the labour market
with on-the-job search, heterogeneity in match productivity and idiosyncratic
productivity shocks modelled as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) which deliver
endogenous separation.
In this model, workers sample job offers during unemployment and employment
from an exogenous distribution of match productivity Fy(y), that generates a job
ladder which workers climb over the course of their career. When the match is
formed, the realization y of Fy(y) becomes the fixed component of the match
productivity, which stays constant over time. Additionally, in each period every
match can be hit by an idiosyncratic productivity shocks with realization x drawn
from the exogenous distribution Fx(x). Each match is then characterised by a
productivity value which is a function of the fixed component y and the stochastic
component x, specifically f(xy) = xy.
Featuring a stochastic component in the match productivity delivers endoge-
nous transitions into unemployment. When the realization x is negative enough to
make the match no longer productive, firm and worker consider more profitable to
destroy it and, respectively, to shut down and go back into unemployment. This
mechanism generates repeated unemployment spells, since matches with lower
fixed component y (likely to originate from unemployment) are more frequently
destroyed after a bad realization of x. It follows that when a high-tenure worker
(at the top of the ladder) gets displaced, he or she loses both a good and well
paid job and a stable match. This additional loss in job stability that follows
displacement slows down the process of climbing the ladder and helps increasing
the persistence of earning losses.
By matching moments related to workers’ separation rates profile by tenure,
the model does a good job in replicating the pattern of post-displacement earning
losses computed in Davis and Wachter (2011) for the Unites States using PSID
data. However, it counterfactually generates too persistent employment losses,
which give rise to large and persistent gaps between earning and wage losses. The
reason is that the job ladder model with endogenous separation, by generating
repeated job loss episodes, mainly acts through the employment margin of the
losses and contradicts the decomposition results that documents a very fast
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recovery of working hours in the Unites States (Huckfeldt, 2018).
In spite of this, the model still underestimates the persistence of the earning
losses compared to the data. Specifically, it predicts annual earnings losses of
around 40% in the year of displacement, in line with what Davis and Wachter
(2011) estimate for periods of recession. However, after ten years the model
generates earning losses of around 8%, which is lower than the 18% estimated
in for period of recession and the 10% in expansion. This confirms that the job
ladder induces a strong mean-reverting process for wages that cannot fully account
for the high persistence of post-displacement earning losses, even when the channel
of endogenous separation is taken into account.
1.3.2 The Role of Human Capital
In Jung and Kuhn (2018) the persistence of post-displacement earning losses
is achieved by considering a life cycle model with a job ladder, endogenous
separations and workers’ human capital accumulation.5 The authors stress that in
order to replicate the high persistence of earning losses, the model has to be able
to reproduce the substantial heterogeneity in both job stability and separation
rates observed in the data. Specifically, they highlight two strong sources of
heterogeneity in job stability and separation rates among workers in the CPS data
for the United States. The first one is induced by workers’ age, with older workers
on average being less likely to switch jobs and to transition into unemployment.
The second one is captured by workers’ tenure, with high-tenure workers being
employed in more stable matches. These two sources of heterogeneity imply that
workers in the same age group can exhibit very different separation rates and,
vice-versa, that workers with the same tenure (e.g. zero tenure) exhibit declining
separation rates with age. For example, from the authors’ calculation on CPS
data it results that on average fifty years old workers separate from their firm
with probability equal to 2% per month. If transition rates were uniform among
this group of workers, the average tenure would be roughly equal to four years.
However, their average tenure in the data is eleven years. This implies that the
economy is characterised by a significant share of workers that separate from their
firm (within the same cohort), but also by a large share of workers in very stable
matches, that contributes to push up the average tenure in the aggregated data.
The job ladder and skill accumulation represent the two main tools that deliver
this heterogeneity. As in Krolikowski (2017), the job ladder with endogenous
separation helps justifying the declining profile of transition rates by tenure. It
5In this section I use the term human capital and skills interchangeably.
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triggers a selection mechanism such that better matches last longer, given their
higher probability of surviving both adverse productivity shocks and poaching of
workers by other firms. Additionally, the accumulation of skills over the course of
the career makes older workers more productive and less likely to separate after
negative productivity shocks, independently on their tenure. These two forces,
selection and skill accumulation, generate very stable jobs at the top of the ladder,
where matches are more productive and workers are older.
Notice that in this model with endogenous separation, workers’ skills are non
neutral with respect to separation. This is due to the specific assumption of
non full transferability of workers’ skills into unemployment, which is modelled
considering unemployment income as a fixed amount, independent from workers’
pre-displacement accumulated skills.
The model implies that, when high-tenure workers lose their job they lose a
particularly good job at the top of the ladder, even if the activity of on-the-job
search allows them to eventually reach the average job in the economy, convergence
does not happen because jobs at the top of the ladder are characterised by
very high stability and very high wages. In other words, the mean reversion
mechanism from the bottom triggered by search does not compensate the lack of
mean reversion from the top due to high job stability.
Through this mechanism, this model is able to reproduce the large and
persistent earning losses observed in the data for U.S. workers. Additionally,
by running counterfactual simulations, Jung and Kuhn (2018) show that the
selection mechanism induced by the job ladder plays the biggest role (85%) in
the explanation of post-displacement wage losses. Workers’ skills, on the other
hand, play a marginal role.
In this work, the separate identification of the contribution of the job
ladder and human capital strongly relies on the assumption of independence of
unemployment income from workers’ pre-displacement accumulated skills. As
explained above, in a model of endogenous separation, this assumption implies
that workers’ skills are non neutral with respect to separation and therefore
allows the identification of the skill process by matching the separation-age profile
for workers with the same tenure in the data. This creates two issues. First,
the assumption contradicts the fact that unemployment benefits are linked to
workers’ pre-displacement wages. Second, it implicitly assigns a connotation of
firm specificity to the human capital accumulation process, which is challenging
to identify in absence of matched employer-employee data. As workers lose both
a good firm and human capital upon transitioning into unemployment, it is not
feasible to separately identifying the two channels without information on the
pre-displacement employing firm.
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The two main works that rely on matched employer-employee data to identify
the forces behind the cost of job loss and consider general fully transferable human
capital are Jarosch (2015) and Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020).6 The
first stresses the role of losses in job stability paired with skill decay during
unemployment for displaced workers, while the second highlight the importance
of the forgone general human capital after displacement events.
Jarosch (2015) starts from the observation that job separations into unemploy-
ment are serially correlated and that jobs differ in terms of stability in addition
to productivity. To account this empirical fact, he extends a model for the
labour market with on-the-job search and matching of outside offers à la Cahuc,
Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), to include job heterogeneity in both productivity
and job security. He allows more productive jobs to be also more stable for
exogenous reasons. This creates a job ladder in both dimensions of productivity
and stability, which workers climb during their career via job-to-job transitions to
eventually reach more stable and productive positions.
Modelling a job ladder in both productivity and job security implies that
when workers are displaced involuntary they are set back to the bottom of the
ladder, where jobs are less productive and less paid, but also less stable, leading
to repeated job loss episodes. This generates more persistence in earning losses by
slowing down the recovery of the employment component of the losses in the first
years after displacement. This channel seems to be particularly appropriate for
Germany which, as opposed to the United States, where employment completely
recover almost after two years from displacement, registers slow employment
convergence.
The employment component of the losses, however, recovers much faster than
earnings, revealing that wages are responsible for most of the persistence in
the earning losses even in Germany. In light of this evidence, Jarosch (2015)
augments the model to allow for general human capital accumulation in the style
of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). This additional channel is crucial to capture
the slow recovery of wages after displacement.7 Specifically, during employment,
6A third important example is Huckfeldt (2018) who, however, mostly focuses on the
cyclicality of post-displacement earning losses in the United States. He attributes the more
sever earning losses observed in periods of recession to the higher workers’ occupation mismatch
rates recorded in these times, which lead to slower accumulation of general human capital.
7 Jarosch (2015) also considers the sequential auction wage setting mechanism of Cahuc,
Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006). This implies that during the activity of job shopping, if workers
decide to quit the current employer to join a more productive firm, they can use the value of
the old match as a benchmark to negotiate the new wage. Therefore, by climbing up the ladder,
they not only gain better positions, but also build up negotiation rents. This mechanism creates
persistence in post-displacement wage losses, since after a lay-off workers lose negotiation rents,
more than just a good job. The counterfactual simulation shows, however, that this channel
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workers stochastically gain general human capital, which is fully transferable to
other firms and to unemployment. However, during unemployment, workers’
general human capital can depreciate with a certain probability. The general
human capital channel can increase the persistence of post-displacement wage
losses through two margins: 1) the direct depreciation of general human capital
due to the transition into unemployment for displaced workers (in the treatment
group), which is reflected into lower workers’ re-employment wages, and 2) the
increase in general human capital of non-displaced workers (in the counterfactual
group) during employment, which widens the wage differentials between the two
groups after displacement. The relative importance of the two margins is an
empirical matter, and depends on the estimation of the general human capital
accumulation process.
Jarosch (2015) estimates the general human capital accumulation process by
targeting the relation between initial re-employment wages (after unemployment)
and the length of unemployment spell in the data. This directly informs about the
parameter governing decumulation rate of human capital during unemployment.
The rate of accumulation of general human capital during employment is, however,
derived indirectly by imposing the following equilibrium condition, which ensures
that unemployed workers lose human capital as often as employed workers
accumulate it:
(1− ψe)u/(1−u) = (1− ψu) (1.3)
where u represents the unemployment rate, ψu the rate of decay of human capital
during unemployment and ψe the accumulation rate of general human capital
during employment.
The estimated parameters imply a yearly accumulation rate of general human
capital of roughly 2% and a yearly rate of skill loss during unemployment of
roughly 23%. This implies that the decumulation of general human capital during
unemployment is responsible for most of the sluggish post-displacement wage
growth, explaining 52% of the present discounted value of post-displacement wage
losses.
The importance of human capital for the explanation of the high persistence of
long term earning and wage losses is also highlighted in Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela,
and Coles (2020). As Jarosch (2015), Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020)
use German matched employer-employee data to estimate a model of on-the-job
search, accumulation of general human capital during employment and skill loss
during unemployment to identify the causes of the cost of job loss. However,
only accounts for a small portion of the present value of post-displacement earning losses.
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in contrast with the papers discussed so far, they assume an exogenous and
homogeneous separation rate along the job ladder and hence don’t take into
account the job stability channel which delivers serially correlated unemployment
spells for workers hired from unemployment. They mostly focus on job ladder and
human capital process to explain the cost of job loss.
The model is based on the framework developed in Burdett and Coles (2003),
which considers on-the-job search and optimal wage contracting with risk averse
agents, and it’s extended to consider workers’ skill accumulation. The assumption
of on-the-job search implies that workers quit for better paid jobs, so firms
design optimal wage contracts with backloading of wages in order to reduce
quitting incentives. This implies that optimal wages grow with workers’ tenure
and also that the slope of wage-tenure profile is firm specific, since high-paying
firms, by facing less competition, are less in need to link wages to tenure.
The wage-experience profile is explained by job shopping and learning-by-doing:
employed workers can receive job offers and move to more productive firms which
pay higher wages, and accumulate skills every period at a constant rate that
increase their productivity and translate into higher wages.
According to this model, high-tenure workers suffer from significant earning
losses after displacement because of 1) the loss of a well paid job (represented
in this case by a good contract), 2) general human capital depreciation during
unemployment, and 3) the lack of general human capital accumulation during
unemployment in comparison with non-displaced workers, who instead keep
accumulating it while employed.
The quantification of the relative contribution of this three channels is obtained
empirically. Specifically, matched employer-employee data help quantifying the
role of job ladder, by allowing the estimation of the firm-specific wage-tenure
profile. The wage-experience profile over the course of workers’ career is used
to obtain information on the process of general human capital accumulation
during employment while, as in Jarosch (2015), the slope of the re-employment
wage-unemployment length relation gives information on the decumulation of
workers’ general human capital during unemployment. The estimated parameters
imply a rate of accumulation of general human capital during employment equal
to 4.5% per year, and a rate of skill decay during unemployment equal to 1.7%
per year.8
8Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020) calibrate their model for three different groups of
workers, classified according to their education level. They find an accumulation rate of general
human capital equal to of 4.9% for low educated workers, 4.1% for medium educated workers
and 4.8% for high educated workers. The decumulation rate is equal to 1.7% for workers with
medium and high education, and 1.2% for those with low education.
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The estimation results imply that forgone skill accumulation during unem-
ployment plays the biggest role in explaining the persistence of post-displacement
earning losses. Specifically, the fact that individuals in the counterfactual group of
non-displaced workers keep accumulating skills at a constant rate, while workers
in the treated group do not, can explain roughly 80% of the present discounted
value of the earning losses.9
It is interesting to notice that both works of Jarosch (2015) and Burdett,
Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020) are able to match the size and persistence
of the post-displacement earning losses experienced by German workers, while
attributing them to different mechanisms. In Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and
Coles (2020), constant accumulation rates of human capital for workers in the
control group, paired with long permanence into unemployment for workers in the
treatment group, prevents the convergence of wages after displacement. In Jarosch
(2015), when high-tenure displaced workers fall off the ladder, they lose job security
and experience repeated unemployment spells which, given the high depreciation
rate of skills during unemployment, hinder wages and earnings recovery.10
The difference in the role given to general human capital in both papers
highlights that the choice of modelling separations and the implied estimation
strategy significantly matters. As explained above, the identification strategy of
Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020) is in fact mainly based on targeting
moments related to wage dynamics, such as workers’ (firm-specific) returns to
tenure and returns to experience. In contrast, Jarosch (2015) focuses on the
heterogeneity of job stability along the job ladder, and consequently mostly
targets moments related to workers’ separation rates into unemployment by
tenure, to mimic the serial correlation of unemployment spells observed in the
data. The estimation of the parameters governing the evolution of human capital
accumulation during employment is indirect and obtained through the equilibrium
condition reported in equation (1.3).
Both strategies have shortcomings. In Jarosch (2015) the effect of general
human capital on wages is ignored in spite of a vast amount of literature that
explains the wage-experience profile observed in the data with theories of human
9Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles, 2020 estimate the model separately for low and middle
skill workers to identify which channel is more important for each category. They find that
forgone skills accumulation is still the main source of earning losses for both type of workers.
10The different lengths of the unemployment spells in the two papers is given by the choice of
different targets to estimate the parameters governing the exit rate from unemployment. Jarosch
(2015) uses the unemployment rate, which is equal to 9% in the period considered, delivering a
average unemployment spells of 11 months. Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020) uses the
average non employment-employment rate, which includes all the episodes that are different from
regular full-time employment spells, and is equal to 4.5%, which implies average non-employment
spells of roughly 22 months.
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capital accumulation (see for example Topel, 1990; Dustmann and Meghir, 2005;
Lazear, 2009; Yamaguchi, 2010; Altonji, Jr., and Vidangos, 2013; Bagger,
Fontaine, Postel-Vinay, and Robin, 2014, among others). Ignoring returns to
experience in a model with general human capital accumulation may provide
distorted estimates of the accumulation and decumulation process. In fact, both
rates of general human capital accumulation during employment and decumulation
during unemployment play a role in the reduced form estimation of the returns to
labour market (actual) experience. The first plays a direct role: the longer is the
workers’ actual experience, the higher the accumulated skills, which translate into
higher wages. The second plays an indirect role: labour market actual experience
is correlated with labour market potential experience, which includes periods of
unemployment. The loss of human capital during unemployment reduces workers’
re-employment productivity and wages, negatively affecting the estimated returns
to actual experience. Therefore workers’ wage-experience profile represents an
important feature of the data that gives relevant information on the human capital
process.
Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020) acknowledge this and obtain
information on the general human capital process using the observed returns to
experience in the data, in addition to the relation between re-employment wages
and length of unemployment spell. As mentioned above, by matching returns to
experience in the data on average equal to 4% per year, they calibrate a yearly
accumulation rate of general human capital equal to 4.5% and a depreciation rate
equal to 1.7%, which are respectively twice higher and more than ten times lower
than those calibrated in Jarosch (2015).
However, the returns to experience estimated in Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela,
and Coles (2020) are higher than those documented in the literature. For
example, using the same matched employer-employee dataset on German workers,
Dustmann and Meghir (2005) find that skilled workers’ wages grow by 6% in the
first years of work and decline to 1.2% after five years of experience and unskilled
workers’ wages grow by 8.2% in the first years of work and become zero after three
years of experience.11
The estimation of high returns to experience in Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and
Coles (2020) translates into high accumulation rates of general human capital
which, paired with the assumption of constant accumulation rates, entails the
11The difference in the estimation in the two works is due to the fact that Burdett,
Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020) compute returns to experience without taking into account
the possible biases arising from workers’ tenure and firms’ productivity (e.g. firms’ fixed effects),
while Dustmann and Meghir (2005) use a control function approach and focus on displaced
workers only to isolate the effect of experience.
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risk of overestimating the role of general human capital accumulation in the
explanation of post-displacement earning losses. This is particularly relevant in
this context since post-displacement earning losses are computed on high-tenure
workers which, as Dustmann and Meghir (2005) show, exhibit even lower returns
to experience (equal to 1.2% and 0 for skilled and unskilled workers with more
than five and three years of experience, respectively).
1.4 Conclusions
The goal of this chapter has been to review the main contributions to the literature
on the long term consequences of job loss events. The empirical literature
provides an established framework to causally estimate the post-displacement
earning losses. Additionally, the empirical decomposition of the earning losses into
employment and wages provides supporting guidance for the correct understanding
of the possible mechanisms that could possibly drive them in countries with
different institutional settings. It hints at the fact that in countries like the United
States, where the rate of convergence of post-displacement employment is fast, the
persistence of earning losses may be more attributable to losses in productivity,
while in countries like Germany, where some persistence in employment losses is
also observed, job security could also play a significant role.
The main works in the theoretical and structural literature have highlighted
the importance of the job ladder in the qualitative explanation of the earnings
recovery path after displacement. For the quantitative explanation of the earning
and wage losses, some papers have stressed the role of job security, as well as
the importance of human capital accumulation during employment and of skills
depreciation during unemployment.
This review shows the presence of an important gap in the literature. The
works analysed so far are in fact able to explain the post-displacement earning
and wage losses by either taking into account the changes in job separation rates
after job loss events for high-tenure workers (see for example Jarosch, 2015;
Krolikowski, 2017) or by matching wage dynamics, such as returns to experience
(Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles, 2020). However, both set of moments
represent key stylized facts of the data that can be explained by heterogeneity
in separation rates along the job ladder and human capital evolution, which are
both likely to play an important role in the persistence of earning losses.
Therefore, a framework that considers both these channels and is able to match
moments on separations and wage dynamics - in line with the features of the
sample of workers used to estimate the post-displacement earning losses - would
help clarify their relative quantitative importance in explaining this stylized fact.
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In light of these considerations, the work presented in the next chapter makes
a step forward in this literature and represents an attempt to reconcile the works
on the cost of job loss with those on earning dynamics.
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1.5 Figures
Figure 1.1 – Earning Losses in Expansion and Recession.
Source: Davis and Wachter, 2011
Figure 1.2 – Earning Losses Decomposition in German IAB data.
Source: Schmieder, Wachter, and Heining, 2018
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Chapter 2
Job Ladder, Human Capital and
the Cost of Job Loss
2.1 Introduction
A vast amount of empirical evidence has documented the presence of large and
persistent earnings losses following a job displacement (i.e. involuntary job loss)
event for high-tenure workers. For example, Davis and Wachter (2011) estimate
that in the United States displaced male workers with more than three years
of tenure experience losses equal to 12% of the present value of earnings in the
absence of displacement. Schmieder, Wachter, and Heining (2018) estimate even
larger losses of 15% for Germany.
Workhorse search models of the labour market with search frictions, on-the-job
search and firm heterogeneity imply that earnings losses just reflect the loss of a
good job (see, for example Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Postel-Vinay and Robin,
2002). These models feature a job ladder that workers climb over the course of their
career, which captures the idea that it takes time to find a suitable job. Specifically,
unemployed workers have lower reservation productivity and therefore start their
career by accepting less productive and lower paying jobs. Once employed, they
can reach better positions that pay higher wages through the activity of on-the-job
search. Therefore the positive association between employment tenure and wages
(and therefore post-displacement earnings losses) just reflects the fact that workers
search among heterogeneous jobs until they settle in high productivity jobs that
both pay more and last longer.
An alternative view with a long tradition in labour economics is that the
positive association between tenure and earnings losses reflects the accumulation
of skills that are productive (and therefore reflected in wages) only with the current
but not future employers (firm-specific human capital) (see, for example Topel,
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1990; Lazear, 2009). In this framework, earnings losses reflect the loss of the
firm-specific skills accumulated during the job spell. Additionally, if workers’
general skills increase during employment and deteriorate during the time spent in
unemployment (as for example in Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998), earning losses can
mirror the workers’ losses in general human capital accumulated while employed.
This work provides a framework that encompasses these three mechanisms
to quantify their relative contribution to the size and persistence of earnings
and wage losses for high-tenure workers. To this effect I build and estimate a
quantitative, structural search model of the labour market with the following
ingredients: heterogeneous firms, on-the-job search, specific and general human
capital accumulation and endogenous job loss. The model is estimated by simu-
lated method of moments using matched employer-employee data on Germany. It
can reproduce the size and persistence of post-displacement earning and wage
losses observed in the data. Counterfactual simulations reveal that the main
mechanism that generates such post-displacement earning losses is the divergence
in the evolution of specific (mostly) and general human capital paths of displaced
workers relative to their non displaced colleagues.
More specifically, in this model both unemployed and employed workers
sample job offers infrequently from an exogenous firm productivity distribution.
Unemployed workers have a lower reservation productivity than employed workers,
but once they become employed they climb the job ladder by accepting subsequent
offers from more productive employers. Employed workers accumulate general
human capital, which follows them through the course of their career when moving
to other employers or to unemployment, and specific skills that, in contrast, are
only valuable within the current match. The model features endogenous match
destruction. Therefore, as they climb the job ladder, workers sort into more
productive jobs that are also more stable, meaning that they are less likely to
be destroyed following adverse productivity shocks.
In this framework, high-tenure workers that experience a displacement event
lose a relatively more productive and stable job and, in addition, specific skills
acquired on the job. Furthermore, during unemployment, they are subject to
depreciation of their generic skills, thereby exacerbating their losses. Upon
re-employment, they are more likely to accept a low productivity job which, by
also being less stable, does not favour the skill acquisition process, hindering the
recovery in earnings and wages.
This model further predicts that, controlling for firms’ heterogeneity, (i) wages
increase with workers’ experience and tenure, due to general and specific skill
growth, (ii) job switching rates fall with job tenure, due to the accumulation of
specific skills. This is a key innovation compared to the standard workhorse search
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model, which implies that the only source of wage growth is workers receiving
alternative employment offers, and that the job switching rate is decreasing in
job tenure unconditionally and only due to the selection effect implied by the job
ladder.
Therefore, I use these moments calculated in the German matched
employer-employee data - in addition to standard others - as primitives to
retrieve information about the parameters governing the accumulation process of
general and specific human capital. The model is able to replicate the (targeted)
within firm returns to tenure and experience and the fall in the job switching
rate with tenure within firm observed in the data. Additionally, it delivers large
and persistent earning and wage losses that mimic the (not targeted) data
counterpart. Specifically, it generates an initial drop in earnings equal to 35%
relative to the counterfactual in the year of displacement, and subsequent losses
of around 10% that persist for 10 years after the event. Just like in the data,
most of the persistence in earning losses is due to wages, which drop by 10% and
stagnate even upon re-employment. Additionally, the counterfactual analysis
reveals that 47% of the present discounted value of the wage losses is due to the
loss of specific human capital, 34% to general human capital and the remaining
19% to the loss of a good job.
The key contribution of this work is that it provides a measurement framework
to analyse the relative contribution of the possible drivers of the post-displacement
earning losses. It does so by considering specific and general human capital
accumulation in a model of job search with endogenous separation, and by pinning
down the relevant parameters using both moments on separation and within firm
wage growth, computed in a sample that is consistent with the one used for the
estimation of the earning losses.
This paper is related to a number of contributions: one that focuses on
post-displacement earning losses (Jarosch, 2015; Krolikowski, 2017; Jung and
Kuhn, 2018; Huckfeldt, 2018; Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles, 2020) and
one that looks at the determinants of labour market earnings dynamics (see Topel,
1990; Dustmann and Meghir, 2005; Yamaguchi, 2010; Postel-Vinay and Turon,
2010; Altonji, Jr., and Vidangos, 2013; Bagger et al., 2014, among others).
The idea of modelling a job ladder in firms’ productivity with endogenous
separation is also present in Krolikowski (2017) and Jung and Kuhn (2018). Both
papers are able to explain large and persistent earning losses for the Unites States
by matching mostly moments related to workers’ mobility, and deliver very close
estimates of wage losses for the first five years from the event. In both papers the
job ladder plays the biggest role in explaining post-displacement earning losses.
Human capital does not feature in Krolikowski (2017) and in Jung and Kuhn
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(2018) workers’ skills count marginally. In the work of Jung and Kuhn (2018)
wage dynamics are mainly driven by search and the job ladder, and the parameters
that govern the process of human capital accumulation are estimated by matching
moments on separation rates by age for workers with the same tenure, under the
assumption that skills endogenously reduce workers’ probability of separation by
increasing match productivity. What sets apart this paper from Krolikowski (2017)
and Jung and Kuhn (2018) is that I consider specific and general human capital
as main drivers of wage growth alongside search, and use within firm returns to
tenure and experience to directly learn about their evolution overs workers’ career.
This results in specific and general human capital playing the most important role
in the explanation of wage losses.
The importance of workers’ skills for understanding the long term consequences
of job loss is also highlighted in other papers. For example, Huckfeldt (2018)
stresses the role of occupation-specific skills and skill obsolescence during unem-
ployment, Jarosch (2015) shows that the loss in job stability paired with skill loss
during unemployment is responsible for most of the sluggish post-displacement
wage recovery, and Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020) highlight the
importance of forgone skill accumulation after displacement events.
The current work shares several similarities with Jarosch (2015). Both papers
feature a job ladder with heterogeneous separation rates into unemployment and
stochastic general human capital accumulation (decumulation) during employment
(unemployment). One main difference between the two papers is that Jarosch
(2015) models exogenous heterogeneous separation rates along the job ladder
which are negatively correlated with match productivity, while this paper delivers
mutually efficient match destruction events for low productive matches endoge-
nously. Furthermore, this paper considers specific human capital accumulation as
an additional channel to explain both wage dynamics and post-displacement wage
losses for high-tenure workers, and links the process of human capital accumulation
directly to returns to tenure and experience observed in the data.
Similarly, Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020) estimate a model of
on-the-job search, accumulation of general human capital during employment and
skill loss during unemployment to identify the causes of the cost of job loss. In
contrast with the rest of the papers mentioned above, heterogeneity in separation
rates along the job ladder is not taken into account.
In both the works of Jarosch (2015) and Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles
(2020), general human capital plays the biggest role in the post-displacement wage
losses explanation. The underlying mechanisms, however, are different. In Jarosch
(2015), high-tenure workers that fall off the ladder lose job security and experience
repeated unemployment spells which, paired with a high estimate of depreciation
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rate of skills during unemployment, hinder wages and earnings recovery. In
Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020), fast and constant accumulation rates
of general human capital for workers that do not experience layoff, paired with long
permanence into unemployment for displaced workers, prevents the convergence
of wages after displacement.
These results show that the estimated parameters governing the general human
capital accumulation process play a crucial role in the determination of the
sources of the cost of job loss. The importance of skill decay in the wage losses
decomposition in Jarosch (2015) is driven by the estimated general human capital
decumulation rate during unemployment, equal to 23% per year, and accumulation
rate during employment, equal to 2.4% per year. As remarked in Chapter 1,
these estimates are obtained without explicitly matching moments related to
wage-experience profile. This approach is likely to deliver distorted estimates
of the parameters governing general human capital, given its fundamental role
in explaining wage dynamics, which is not accounted in this work but heavily
stressed in the literature (see for example Topel, 1990; Dustmann and Meghir,
2005; Lazear, 2009; Yamaguchi, 2010; Altonji, Jr., and Vidangos, 2013; Bagger
et al., 2014, among others).
Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020), on the other hand, by targeting
returns to experience, obtain a much lower skill decay rate during unemployment
(equal to 1.7% per year) and higher skill accumulation rate during employment
(equal to 4.5% per year). One shortcoming in their approach is that returns to
experience are computed on the whole sample of male workers - rather than on
the sample of workers compatible with the earning losses estimation (e.g. those
with more than three years of experience) - and without taking into account firm
and tenure effects. As stressed in Chapter 1, this delivers higher estimates of
returns to experience compared to the literature (for example to Dustmann and
Meghir, 2005) which, paired with their assumption of constant accumulation rates
of general human capital, entails the risk overestimating the role of general human
capital.
Starting from these considerations, the current paper uses within firm returns
to experience and tenure, estimated on a sample which is consistent with the
estimation of post-displacement earning losses, as key information on the evolution
of general and specific human capital. In this way, this work provides a general
framework to understand wage dynamics, heterogeneous job stability along the
job ladder and to have a better understanding of the relative contribution of the
different drivers of post-displacement earning losses.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
model in detail. Section 2.3 describes the data, the identification strategy and
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the estimation results. In Section 2.4 I focus on the analysis of the long term
consequences of job loss and on the counterfactual analysis. Finally, Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 The Model
The theoretical framework is based on the seminal work by Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002). It is a partial equilibrium model of the labour market with on-the-job
search and bargaining, and is enriched with workers’ human capital accumulation
and endogenous separation.
2.2.1 Ingredients
Agents Time is discrete and infinite and the economy is populated by risk
neutral workers and firms. Firms are heterogeneous in productivity θ. Realizations
of firms’ productivity are drawn from an exogenous distribution F (θ) and constant
throughout time.
In every period a fraction κ of the labour force is replaced by an equal mass
of unemployed new entrants. New entrants are all identical. While employed,
workers can accumulate both general and specific human capital. General human
capital is accumulated at rate φe and is vested in the worker upon separation.
However, it decays at rate φu during unemployment. Specific human capital is
accumulated at rate γ during employment and, in contrast with general human
capital, is completely lost upon transiting into unemployment or to other firms
during employment.
Matching and Production The labour market is characterised by search
frictions and there is on-the-job search. This implies that unemployed and
employed workers can sample job offers from the exogenous distribution F (θ)
at rates λ0 and λ1, respectively. The on-the-job search assumption induces a job
ladder in productivity that workers climb over the course of their career.
When a worker and a firm meet and decide to form a match, they produce
output equal to y = f(θ, s, g, ε), that depends on the fixed firm-productivity
component θ, on the level of accumulated specific and general human capital,
s and g, and on a time varying stochastic productivity component, ε. The initial
realization of ε is equal to ε0 in all new matches, and its subsequent realizations
are drawn from a distribution H(ε) in each period of a surviving match. As in
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the presence of the time-varying component of
a match productivity ε leads to endogenous destruction events. In particular,
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when the realization of the shock is low enough, worker and firm agree to dissolve
the match. Additionally, the match faces a probability δ of being exogenously
destroyed.
Timing of the events within one period All workers start every period
inheriting state variables from the previous period. The timing of events for
unemployed and employed workers is summarised in Figure 2.1 and 2.2.
Unemployed workers
At the beginning of the period, an existing unemployed worker with accumulated
level of general human capital g dies with probability κ. If this happens, he/she
is replaced in the next period by one newborn unemployed worker, endowed with
the lowest level of general human capital, denoted by g0. If the κ-shock is not
realised, the worker stays in the labour market and faces the possibility of seeing
the previously accumulated general human capital g depreciate with probability
φu.
After the worker’s general human capital level for the following period is
realised, he/she can receive a job offer with exogenous probability λ0, from a firm
with productivity drawn from F (θ) distribution. If the match is profitable, the
following period the worker is employed in firm θ and produces output y(θ, s, g, ε)
is realised and the worker receives a fixed wage w, set following the bargaining
protocol, explained in Section 2.2.2.
Employed workers
A worker employed with specific human capital s and general human capital g in a
match with a firm of productivity type θ and time-varying productivity component
ε, can exit the labour market in the following period with probability κ and be
replaced by a new born unemployed worker with lowest level of general human
capital, denoted by g0. If the κ-shock does not realise, the employed worker stays
in the labour market, and can see the level of general human capital increase
with probability φe. After this, an exogenous separation shock can occur with
probability δ, causing the destruction of the match and the transition of the worker
into unemployment in the following period. If, however, the match continues, the
following events can realise.
First, the worker accumulates specific human capital with probability γ.
Second, the time-varying component of the match productivity ε is realised. And,
finally, with probability λ1 the worker can receive outside offers from the firm
distribution F (θ). In this case, the worker can move to the poaching firm or
stay with the incumbent. If he/she stays with the incumbent employer, the wage
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may be renegotiated following the rules explained in Section 2.2.2. Notice that
in the decision of quitting to a new firm or to stay and renegotiate the wage, the
new values of s, g and ε are taken into account, together with the value of the
productivity of the current firm, and the poaching firm. If no offers are received,
the worker and firm decide whether to continue the match or destroy it, given the
new observed values of s, g and ε.
2.2.2 Workers Mobility and Bargaining Protocol
As we have seen in the previous section, at the end of the time period, after all
the shocks are realised, unemployed and employed workers face several decisions.
Unemployed workers have to decide whether to stay in unemployment or to accept
a job offer at hand. Employed workers decide whether to continue the match at
the offered wage under complete information.
The wage setting mechasism used in this model is based on the model of
efficient rigid wages first pioneered in MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and
formalized in the context of a structural job search model in Postel-Vinay and
Turon (2010).1
Unemployed workers that receive a job offer above their reservation produc-
tivity negotiate their wage according to the standard Nash-bargaining surplus
sharing rule. As for employed workers, their wage is given by the current contract
wage unless it is renegotiated by mutual consent, which means that one of the
party has a credible threat to leave the match. Specifically, the contract can be
renegotiated for two reasons: contact from another firm, which leads to a trilateral
renegotiation between the worker, the incumbent and the poaching firms, and a
significant change in the time-varying component of match productivity, which
leads to a bilateral renegotiation between the worker and the firm.
Below, I explain in detail the workers’ mobility decision and wage determina-
tion process for unemployed and employed workers in both cases of trilateral and
bilateral renegotiation.
Unemployed workers An unemployed worker with level of general human
capital g enjoys unemployment continuation value U(g). When he/she samples a
job offer from a firm with productivity θ, both parties observe the total value of
the match. This is defined as the sum of the value of the match to the worker, net
of the value of unemployment, and the value of the match to the firm. Specifically
1In a parallel work, Yamaguchi (2010) uses the same wage setting rule to explain wage
dynamics.
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the total surplus of the match is given by:
S(θ, s0, g, ε0) =
(
W (θ, s0, g, ε0, w0)− U(g)
)
+ J(θ, s0, g, ε0, w0) (2.1)
where
(
W (θ, s0, g, ε0, w0)− U(g)
)
and J(θ, s0, g, ε0, w0) represent the net value of
the match to the worker and to the firm, respectively. Notice that, since this is
an initial match, the values of ε and s are fixed to ε0 and s0.
The possible outcomes for this scenario are:
1. S(θ, s0, g, ε0) < 0: the match is unproductive. In this case the worker stays
in unemployment and enjoys (net) continuation value equal to 0.
2. S(θ, s0, g, ε0) ≥ 0: the match is productive. In this case the worker and
firm form the match, production takes place and the worker is paid a salary
w0 determined by the Nash bargaining surplus splitting rule, which assigns
continuation value to the worker (firm) equal to a share α ((1 − α)) of the
total value of the match. Specifically, the initial wage w0 is set following
equation (2.2):
w0 : W (θ, s0, g, ε0, w0)− U(g) = αS(θ, s0, g, ε0) (2.2)
Employed workers and trilateral bargaining When a worker with level of
general human capital g and specific human capital s, employed in a firm with
fixed productivity θ and time-varying productivity ε, is contacted by a firm with
productivity θ′, there can be two situations that can arise:2
1. S(θ′, s0, g, ε0) > S(θ, s, g, ε): the surplus of the match with the poaching
firm is higher than the current surplus. In this case, the worker will move to
the poaching firm and the initial wage is set such that the worker extracts
the whole surplus from the incumbent (least productive) firm and a share of
the net surplus of the poaching (most productive) firm, proportional to his
or her bargaining power, α. Specifically, w0 is such that condition (2.3) is
satisfied:
w0 : W (θ
′, s0, g, ε0, w0)−U(g) = S(θ, s, g, ε)+α(S(θ′, s0, g, ε0)−S(θ, s, g, ε))
(2.3)
2For brevity of exposition I am assuming that the values of the surplus for both poaching and
incumbent firms are positive, and that the value of the match to the firm and to the worker are
always positive. However, these conditions can be violated and the rules of bilateral bargaining
should be applied. This will be clearer in the exposition of the value functions.
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The implied (net) payoffs for the worker and the firm are, respectively,
{S(θ, s, g, ε)) + α(S(θ′, s0, g, ε0) − S(θ, s, g, ε)); (1 − α)(S(θ′, s0, g, ε0) −
S(θ, s, g, ε))}.
2. S(θ′, s0, g, ε0) ≤ S(θ, s, g, ε): the surplus that is generated from the match
with the poaching firm is lower than or equal to the surplus generated from
the match with the incumbent. In this case, the worker will decide to stay
in the current match. The possible outcomes that arise from this situation
are the following:
(a) W (θ, s, g, ε, w) − U(g) < S(θ′, s0, g, ε0): the workers’ net value of the
match with the incumbent firm is lower than the total value of the
match with the poaching firm. In this case the worker has a credible
threat to leave the match and the wage contract is revised upward, such
that the worker extracts the whole surplus from the poaching (least
productive) firm and a share α of the net surplus of the incumbent
(most productive) firm. Specifically, the new wage w′ satisfies equation
(2.4):
w′ : W (θ, s, g, ε, w′)−U(g) = S(θ′, s0, g, ε0)+α
(
S(θ, s, g, ε)−S(θ′, s0, g, ε0)
)
(2.4)
The worker and the firm, respectively, enjoy a (net) payoff equal to
{S(θ′, s0, g, ε0) + α(S(θ, s, g, ε) − S(θ′, s0, g, ε0)); (1 − α)(S(θ, s, g, ε) −
S(θ′, s0, g, ε0))}.
(b) W (θ, s, g, ε, w)−U(g) ≥ S(θ′, s0, g, ε0): the worker’s value of the match
with the current firm is higher than the surplus generated with the
poaching firm. In this situation the wage remains unchanged.
Employed workers and bilateral bargaining. The worker and the firm can
also decide to terminate the match or renegotiate the wage without being contacted
by a third party. This can happen following a significant change in the payoffs of
worker and firm, due a innovation in the time-varying component of the match
productivity. Specifically, the scenarios that may arise from this situation are the
following:
1. S(θ, s, g, ε) < 0: if the match becomes unproductive, the worker and the firm
decide to destroy it. Their (net) payoffs of worker and firm in this situation
are equal to 0.
2. W (θ, s, g, ε, w) − U(g) < 0, and S(θ, s, g, ε) > 0: if the workers’ net value
of the match is negative, but the match is still productive, then the worker
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has a credible threat to leave and the wage is revised up to w′, such that
condition (2.5) is satisfied:
w′ : W (θ, s, g, ε, w′)− U(g) = 0 (2.5)
This means that the worker is indifferent between staying and going into
unemployment. In this situation, the (net) payoffs enjoyed by the worker
and the firm are, respectively, {0;S(θ, s, g, ε)}.
3. J(θ, s, g, ε, w) < 0, and S(θ, s, g, ε) > 0: if the value of the match to the firm
is negative and the surplus is still positive, the firm has a credible threat
to leave the match and so the wage is revised downward up to w′, so that
condition (2.6) is satisfied:
w′ : W (θ, s, g, ε, w′)− U(g) = S(θ, s, g, ε) (2.6)
This means that the firm is indifferent between staying and destroying the
match, In this situation, the (net) payoffs enjoyed by the worker and the
firm are, respectively, {S(θ, s, g, ε); 0}.
2.2.3 Value Functions
Having presented all the key elements of the model, I can now present the formal
recursive equations.
The present value of unemployment for a worker with general human capital
g, is denoted by U(g), and is determined by the following asset pricing equation:








where β denotes the discount factor. Equation (2.7) states that an unemployed
worker enjoys today a flow of income proportional to the accumulated level of
general human capital, z(g), and tomorrow, conditional on remaining in the labour
market, which happens with probability (1 − κ), the discounted expected value
of remaining in unemployment (second term in the equation) plus the expected
value of being in contact with a firm (third term in the equation).3 Notice that
the expected value of remaining in unemployment depends on the evolution of
3The stream of income received during unemployment, z(g), can be interpreted as
unemployment benefit or home productivity.
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general human capital.
The present value of employment satisfies the following asset pricing equation:
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Equation (2.8) states that in the current period an employed worker enjoys a wage
equal to w. In the following period, conditionally on staying in the labour market,
which occurs with probability (1−κ), the worker faces different scenarios. All the
payoffs associated to these scenarios are discounted by β.
First, the worker can be hit by an exogenous δ-shock and transition into
unemployment (second term in the equation). Notice that the timing of the events
imply that the general human capital shock hits first, so the worker’s continuation
value of unemployment is Eg′|g,eU(g′).
Second, following an innovation in the time-varying component ε of the match
productivity, the worker and the firm decide whether to destroy or continue the
match, taking into account the new levels of specific and general human capital. If
the match continues, worker and firm can decide whether to renegotiate the wage,
following the rules described in the bargaining protocol section (third term of the
equation).
Third, the worker can be contacted by a poaching firm with probability λ1. If
the match with the poaching firm is more productive than the current one, the




S(θ, s′, g′, ε′)
)
captures this outcome. Notice that timing implies that the new
values of s′, g′ and ε′ are taken into account in the choice of staying or joining
the poaching firm.4 If, on the other hand, the match with the poaching firm is




4Notice that, since the timing assumption implies that the shock ε occurs and is observed
before the offer, the value of the current match is the Max
(




S(θ, s′, g′, ε′)
)
, multiple scenarios open:
1. S(θ, s′, g′, ε′) < 0, the current match may become unproductive after a bad
realization of ε and the worker transitions into unemployment.
2. S(θ, s′, g′, ε′) ≥ 0, W (θ, s′, g′, ε′, w) ≤ U(g′) + S(θ, s′, g′, ε′) and U(g′) +
S(x, s0, g
′, ε0) > Max(U(g
′);W (θ, s′, g′, ε′, w)). The match is productive
and the worker has a credible threat to leave the match to join another firm.
The wage is renegotiated upward, as described by equation (2.4).
3. S(θ, s′, g′, ε′) ≥ 0, W (θ, s′, g′, ε′, w) ≤ U(g′) + S(θ, s′, g′, ε′) and U(g′) >
Max(U(g′) + S(x, s0, g
′, ε0);W (θ, s
′, g′, ε′, w)). The match is productive
and the worker has a credible threat to leave the match to transition into
unemployment. The wage is bid up following equation (2.5).
4. S(θ, s′, g′, ε′) ≥ 0, and W (θ, s′, g′, ε′, w) > U(g′) +S(θ, s′, g′, ε′).5 The match
is still productive, but the firm has a credible threat to leave the match. The
wage is revised downward as shown in equation (2.6).
5. In all other cases, the worker enjoys continuation value W (θ, s′, g′, ε′, w) and
the wage is unchanged.
The present value of the match to the firm is determined by the following asset
pricing equation:


























The first term on the right hand side of equation (2.9) is the value of the output
produced in the match net of the wage paid to the worker. The second term is
describes the payoff of the firm in case of no contact from a poaching firm. In this
case, if the match is productive and the firm has a credible threat to leave, it can
force a downward renegotiation of the wage to the point in which it is indifferent
from staying and leaving. The continuation value of the firm in case of negative
5Notice that this condition is equivalent to J(θ, s′, g′, ε′, w) < 0.
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match productivity is 0. The third term reports the payoffs of the firm in case the
worker is contacted by a poaching firm. If the worker leaves the match, the firm’s
continuation value is 0. If the worker stays and the offer is relevant, there is wage
renegotiation, where the firm gets a share (1− α) of the net match surplus.
Combining equation (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9), I arrive to the following expression
for the present value of the match surplus.
S(θ, s, g, ε) = y(θ, s, g, ε)−[








β(1− κ)Eg′|g,eU(g′) + β(1− κ)(1− δ)Es′|sEg′|g,e
{
(1− λ1)∫
Max(0;S(θ, s′, g′, ε′)dH(ε)) + λ1
∫ ∫
Max(0;S(θ, s′, g′, ε′);S(θ, s, g, ε′)+
α(S(x, s0, g
′, ε0)− S(θ, s, g, ε′))dH(ε)dF (x)
}
(2.10)
The first term on the right hand side of equation (2.10) represents the value of
match productivity. The second term in square brackets is the option value of an
employed worker, that is the forgone home productivity and the search technology
accessible during non employment. The third term is the value of unemployment.
The fourth term represents the value of the surplus in case of no outside offer, in
which the match can either continue or be destroyed following a bad realization
of the ε component of the match productivity. The fifth term represents the value
of the surplus in event of outside offer, in which the worker can either move to
the poaching firm or stay with the current one. Notice that the value of the joint
surplus does not depend on the wage, since it only affects its redistribution and
not its size.
The Surplus equation (2.10) can be solved as a contraction mapping, given the
value of U(g). Similarly, the unemployment value equation (2.7) can be solved as
a contraction mapping given the value of the Surplus. Thus, U(g) and S(θ, s, g, ε)
are solved numerically and jointly, on a discretized space for the state variables
(θ, s, g, ε). The equilibrium wage is uniquely determined so that the continuation
value of the worker equals the payoffs obtained through bargaining following the
rules described in Section 2.2.2. However, the derivation of an explicit solution
for the equilibrium wage seems to be intractable, therefore, I follow and derive it
numerically as explained in Appendix 2.A.1.
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2.2.4 Model Mechanisms
This model can reproduce the large and persistent post-displacement earning losses
suffered from high-tenured workers for several reasons.
First of all, the model features a job ladder in firm productivity. This is
generated by the on-the-job search assumption. Each period, both unemployed
and employed workers receive job offers. Unemployed workers accept job offers
above their reservation productivity, while employed workers accept to move to
the poaching firm only if this entails a career improvement. This implies that
newly hired (from unemployment) workers are more likely to be employed by lower
productivity firms, which pay lower wages, while continuously employed workers,
having accumulated search capital during the course of their career, are more
likely to be matched with higher productivity firms, which pay higher wages and
are subject to less workers turnover. Therefore, through the lens of this model, a
high-tenure worker that experiences displacement will be more likely to lose a good
and well paid job at the top of the ladder, and by transitioning into unemployment,
will have to re-start the search activity from the bottom. This gives rise to large
earning losses following a single displacement event, whose persistence depends on
the frequency of job offers.
Second, the wage setting mechanism of renegotiation by mutual consent
described above represents an additional channel of persistence of the
post-displacement earning losses for high-tenured workers. The fact that worker,
incumbent and poaching employers engage in a trilateral bargaining game, in
which the worker can use the less productive firm as outside option to
renegotiate the wage implies that, by climbing the job ladder, workers not only
gain better positions but also build up renegotiation rents. This particular
bargaining protocol, pioneered in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and extended
in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), implies that high-tenure workers lose
negotiations rents more than just a good job after a layoff event. Notice that this
wage setting mechanism also implies the presence of returns to experience and
tenure, not only because of the selection mechanism generated by the job ladder,
but also because of the accumulation of specific and general human capital,
which increase the value of the surplus and therefore of the negotiation
benchmark, which rises wage growth following a renegotiation.
Third, the model features endogenous separations. A bad realization of the
time varying component of the match productivity, ε, can make the match no
longer productive and induce worker and employer to destroy it and, respectively,
to transition into unemployment and shut down. In a canonical job ladder model,
jobs originating from unemployment are more likely to be characterised by a low
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value of the fixed component of match productivity θ, and therefore to become
unproductive after a bad realization of ε. This gives rise to multiple correlated
unemployment spells, and contributes to making earning losses more persistent.
Finally, the presence of specific and general human capital further hinders
the recovery of earnings and wages after a job loss event for high-tenure work-
ers. The higher stability of high-θ matches, which means lower job-to-job
and job-to-unemployment transitions, favours the worker’s accumulation of both
specific and general human capital. Specific human capital can in fact only be
accumulated and kept if the worker stays within the firm, while it is completely
lost upon job-to-job and job-to-unemployment transition. General human capital
is accumulated only during employment, while it is subject to depreciation during
unemployment. Hence, workers in high-θ matches, are more likely accumulate
specific and general human capital, that makes the match even more stable, further
favouring the accumulation of skills.
Altogether, these features allow the model to generate large and persistent
post-displacement earning losses, whose relative importance is explored in the
quantitative analysis in the next section.
2.3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section I discuss the details of the quantitative analysis of this work. First,
I describe the data used to estimate the model, then the empirical strategy and,
finally, I present the results of the model estimation.
2.3.1 Data Description and Sample Selection
This study is based on the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB)
provided by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment
Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). The SIAB dataset
covers a random sample of 2% of individuals that were employed subject to social
security in Germany any time between 1974 and 2014, excluding only civil servant
and self-employed workers.
The dataset contains detailed day-to-day information for 1,618,337 individuals
on employment status (employed, unemployed), type of contract (full-time,
part-time), occupation category and (daily) wages. Basic biographic information,
like gender, age and education level of the workers, are also included. Additionally,
the dataset reports the record of the workers’ establishment identifier, along with
some general information on the geographic location, sector of activity, median
wage and basic employment structure characteristics (e.g number of full-time
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workers, part-time workers). The raw dataset comes in spell episodes of different
length, with a maximum length of one year, because of the notification rules in
the German statutory pension system.
For the empirical analysis, I drop all the spells that are shorter than a month
and all the workers that are not observed for longer than a year. In case of
multiple identical employment spells for the same worker, I keep the episode with
the highest wage, and drop spells with daily wages below 10 Euros (in 2010 prices).
Then, I convert the data from spell to monthly frequency, as described in Appendix
2.B.1.
Additionally, I apply the following sample selection criteria. I focus on male
workers between 19 and 65 years old, employed only in West Germany. Since
there is no information on working hours, I restrict the analysis only to full time
workers. Employment histories are left censored, which means that workers can
only be observed from 1975 onwards. I deal with this problem by keeping in the
sample only workers that can be tracked from the beginning of their career, which
is assumed to start only after completion of their studies. Specifically, I keep in
the sample workers with no high school degree that are 19 years old when I first
observe them. Workers that hold a high school degree have to be at most 22 years
old; those that graduated from a technical college have to be at most 28 years old,
and those that hold a university degree have to be at most 30, when they first
enter the dataset.6
After applying these selection criteria, I end up with 153,996 workers in 247,903
firms, during the 1975-2014 time span.
2.3.2 Model Implementation
The model is solved numerically under the following assumptions.
I assume that output per period, Yt, in a match between a firm with fixed
productivity θ, and a worker that has accumulated specific and general human
capital, st and gt, that is hit by a productivity shock with realization εt, is given
by:
Yt = exp(θ + st + gt + εt) (2.11)
I make the following parametric assumptions on the distributions governing
firm level heterogeneity θ and the time-varying productivity component ε. The
sampling distribution of firm level heterogeneity is Normal with mean 0, θ ∼
6The variable schooling in the SIAB dataset has the problem of many missing values and
inconsistent reporting. I deal with this issue using the imputation procedure suggested in
Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Völter (2005).
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N(0, σθ). The idiosyncratic component of the match productivity ε is assumed to
follow a AR(1) process:
εt = ρεεt−1 + ut,
u ∼ N(0, σε)
(2.12)
The value of ε0 in every initial match, coming from employment and unemploy-
ment, is denoted as ε0 and it is set to the median value of the unconditional
distribution of ε. Both θ and ε are discretized using the Rouwenhorst (1995)
method, respectively to 15 and 7 grid points.
The grid for general human capital, g, is made of 5 equidistant points within the
values [g0, g], where g0 is normalised to 0. Both processes of accumulation during
employment and de-cumulation during unemployment of general human capital
are state-dependent, and have transition matrices Pg|e and Pg|u listed below:
Pg|e =

1− φe φe 0 0 0
0 1− φe φe 0 0
0 0 1− φe φe 0
0 0 0 1− φe φe




1 0 0 0 0
φu 1− φu 0 0 0
0 φu 1− φu 0 0
0 0 φu 1− φu 0
0 0 0 φu 1− φu

Similarly, the grid for specific human capital s is made of 5 equidistant points
within the values [s0, s], where s0 is normalised to 0. The process of accumulation
of specific capital throughout the duration of a match is state dependent and has
transition matrix Ps. The matrix Ps looks like:
Ps =

1− γ γ 0 0 0
0 1− γ γ 0 0
0 0 1− γ γ 0
0 0 0 1− γ γ
0 0 0 0 1

Furthermore, I assume that the income received during unemployment is
proportional to the level of general human capital accumulated by the worker,
specifically:
Z(gt) = exp(pz + gt) (2.13)
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Finally, I set the frequency of the time period to one month.
Given this set of assumption, I am left with 13 parameters to calibrate. These
are summarised and listed in Table 2.1.
2.3.3 Calibration and Identification Stategy
In order to calibrate the parameters of the model I use a mix of moments from
the data and estimates from reduced form regressions as empirical targets. For
this reason the approach is closely related to indirect inference. In total, I target
16 over-identifying restrictions to calibrate 13 parameters. It is important to keep
in mind that the model parameters are calibrated jointly. This means that, even
if it can be argued that some moments are more informative to pin down certain
parameters, all the parameters indirectly play a role in the determination of each
moment.
Transition parameters and workers’ bargaining power. The parameter
κ, that governs the entry/exit from the labour market, is calibrated to match the
observed average age in the dataset. Specifically, it is set equal to 0.006, to obtain
a average age in the simulation of the model close to 31 years old, which is the
one observed in the data.7
In order to inform about the parameters governing job transitions to another
job and to unemployment, λ1 and λ0, I follow Jarosch (2015) and use the
observed rate of job-to-job transition (E–E) and the average unemployment rate in
Germany in the 1975-2015 years - this last one computed using national accounting
data -, respectively. An increase in the contact rate during employment should
in fact increase the probability of job switching, and a higher contact rate during
non-employment should be associated to a lower unemployment rate.8
The observed average probability of separation into non-employment (E–N)
among workers with more than three years of tenure informs us about the
parameter δ that governs exogenous separation (a more detailed explanation is
given in the next paragraph).
I follow Jarosch (2015) and use the ratio between average wages of people
exiting non-employment and average wages (w0/w) to inform about α. As α gets
bigger the disadvantage of newly hired workers diminishes, implying a higher w0/w
ratio.
7To be clearer, I set κ = 0.006 since (1÷ κ)× 12 = 13.8. If we normalise the starting age to
be 18 years old, the average age in the simulated dataset becomes 31.
8The unemployment rate in the model is computed using the flow balance equation for
employment: u = (EN + κ)/(EN + κ+NE).
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Idiosyncratic component of match productivity distribution. In the
model, more productive matches last longer and are more likely to survive negative
idiosyncratic ε-shocks and to not get destroyed. This implies that the model
generates declining probabilities of separation into non-employment by tenure. For
this reason, I use the unconditional average separation rate into non-employment
(E–N) for all workers and its (yearly) tenure profile to identify the parameters
governing the distribution of the idiosyncratic component of match productivity
H(ε).9 Specifically, I use the position of the E–N tenure profile to inform about the
volatility of the ε-shocks, σε, with higher volatility implying higher level of E–N
average probability for any given level of tenure, while the slope helps identifying
the persistence of the AR(1) process for ε, with higher steepness indicating higher
persistence of the shock.
The fact that workers in high-tenure matches (with high productivity) face a
non-zero probability of separation into non-employment in the data is explained
by considering exogenous separation in the structural model.
Fixed component of match productivity distribution. The variance of
wages helps identifying the parameters relative to the fixed component of the firm
productivity, σθ.
10 The firm fixed component of match productivity plays in fact
an important direct role in determining the wages, jointly with workers’ human
capital.
General and specific human capital. The parameters related to general and
specific human capital are identified using both moments on wages and separation.
Matched employer-employee data play a fundamental role in this case, allowing
to separately identify the role of specific and general human capital from the job
ladder in workers transition probability and wages.
As in standard on-the-job search models with matching of counter offers à la
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), the
model predicts wage growth with experience and tenure. Specifically, wages grow
with experience because of the on-the-job search assumption, which allows workers
to move towards better and higher paying matches throughout their career.
Additionally, wages grow within the match due to the assumption of matching of
counter offers, which allows workers to renegotiate their salary with the employer
following relevant alternative job offers. In this theoretical framework, the presence
9Krolikowski (2017) uses the same identification strategy to inform about the parameters
relative to the idiosyncratic component of the match productivity distribution.
10Specifically, I use wage residuals from a regression of log wages on tenure, experience
controlling for year and individual fixed effects.
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of general and specific human capital provides additional channels, alongside the
job ladder, to explain the returns to experience and tenure. The longer the worker
is employed, and also the longer the worker is employed within the same firm, the
more likely it is that he/she acquires generic and specific skills that increase the
match productivity. Being in a match with higher productivity implies a higher
negotiation benchmark, and consequently a higher wage growth in case of relevant
counter offers.
In light of this, within-firm reduced form estimates of returns to experience
and tenure enable to retrieve information on the accumulation of human capital,
net of the role of the job ladder. Specifically, I estimate the reduced form model
presented in equation (2.14):
lnwijt =αi + γ1Expt∈[1,12] + γ2Expt∈[12,24] + γ3Expt∈[25,36]+
β1Tenureijt + β2Tenure
2
ijt + χ1Expi,t−36 + χ2Exp
2
i,t−36 + ψj + yt + εijt
(2.14)
where the log-wage of individual i in firm j at time t is regressed on an individual
fixed effect αi, a series of dummies for experience in the first three years (expressed
in months), a quadratic polynomial in tenure and experience for experience greater
than three years (expressed in months), a firm fixed effect ψj computed as in
Lamadon, Manresa, and Bonhomme (2016) and a time fixed effect yt. The term
εijt represents the error term. I then use the estimated parameters β̂1, β̂2, χ̂1, χ̂2,
as moments to target.
To convey information about the speed of accumulation of specific human
capital, γ, I estimate equation (2.15) by OLS:
EEijt = αi + β3Tenureijt + χ3Expit + ψj + yt + εijt (2.15)
where EEijt represents the average monthly job-to-job transition probability of
individual i employed in firm j at time t; αi is an individual fixed effect; ψj
represents a firm fixed effect computed as in Lamadon, Manresa, and Bonhomme
(2016); yt is a year fixed effect and, finally εijt represents the error term. In
the spirit of indirect inference, I use the estimated β̂3 as a target and run the
same regression on model-generated data. In this model, workers can in fact
increase their productivity as they stay longer within the firm by accumulating
specific human capital, which - in opposition to general human capital that
is fully transferable - is completely lost when transitioning into another firm
or non-employment. This implies that the incentive of switching jobs declines
with workers’ tenure within the firm, even once we take into account firm’s
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tome-invariant component of match productivity (using firms’ fixed effects). The
steeper (flatter) is the E–E - tenure relation, the fastest (slowest) will be the
accumulation rate of specific human capital.
I use firms fixed effects computed as in Lamadon, Manresa, and Bonhomme
(2016) for two reasons. First, because of the issue of limited mobility bias, which
makes the estimates with standard firms fixed effects inaccurate. Second, in the
SIAB-7514 dataset I only observe 2% of the total population of German workers.
Therefore using the standard firm fixed effects would inaccurately control for firms’
time invariant characteristics. Specifically, I use k-means algorithm to classify
firms in five groups, based on the information on average wages by firm provided
by the establishment side of the dataset, and use the obtained groups identifiers
as firm fixed effects. The procedure is explained in detail in Appendix 2.C.
Finally, to have information on the parameters that govern the rate of decay
of general human capital during non-employment I estimate equation (2.16) by
OLS:
lnw0it = αi + πdur
NE
it + yt + εit (2.16)
where the (log) of re-employment wages after non-employment spells (w0) is
regressed on the length of the non-employment spell (in months), controlling for
individual and time fixed effects. The estimated coefficient π̂ is used as a target.
Notice that this set of moments is computed only on the sub-sample of workers
that have been in the labour market for more than three years. This is done to be
consistent with the sample used in the estimation of the empirical job displacement
earning and wage losses, which is based on job loss events for high-tenure workers
only, that are those with more than three years of tenure and consequently with
minimum three years of experience (see Section 2.4).
The model aims in fact at explaining the observed post-displacement earning
and wage losses and at quantifying the relative importance of the channels of
the job ladder with endogenous separation, general and specific human capital.
We know from the literature that the first years in the labour market are
generally characterised by more frequent job-to-job transitions and higher returns
to experience. This is confirmed in the SIAB 7514 dataset. In fact, the average
rate of job-to-job transition on the overall sample is equal to 0.103, while in the
sub-sample of workers with more than three years of experience it is equal to
0.0087. As for returns to experience, Figure 2.3 reports the estimates obtained
considering both workers’ total experience and workers’ experience truncated at
year three of their career.11 As we can see, returns to experience are much higher
11In practice, in order to avoid positive selection bias, I obtain the estimates for returns to
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and more concave if we consider the total workers’ career. As such, by targeting
average job-to-job transition rates and returns to experience including the first
three years of workers’ career, I would face the risk of overestimating the role
of the job ladder and/or general human capital, given that earning losses are
computed on workers with more than three years of tenure (and experience).
Calibration Method The model parameters are calibrated using Simulated
Method of Moments. Specifically, the parameters are chosen so that the distance
between a vector of data-moments and a vector of model-generated moments is




− (m̂− m̃(b))′W (m̂− m̃(b)) (2.17)
where m̂ represents the vector of data moments, m̃ represents the vector of
model-generated moments, W is a weighting matrix and b indicates the vector
of parameters.
The model-generated data are obtained by simulating the model to create an
artificial dataset of employment histories and wages series, which resembles the
true dataset.
The optimization is implemented using a global optimization algorithm that
is suggested in Guvenen Computational and Empirical Methods for Dynamic
Economics. The procedure is explained in detail in Appendix 2.A.2.
2.3.4 Model Fit
In Table 2.2 I report the values of the moments discussed in Section 2.3.3
estimated on the SIAB data, together with their model generated counterpart.
The calibrated parameters are shown in Table 2.3.
The model fits the data reasonably well. It is able to replicate the estimates of
employment-employment transition and unemployment rates. It also reproduces
the declining employment to non-employment separation rates with tenure esti-
mated in the SIAB-7514 dataset. Specifically, I find that workers with up to one
year of tenure face a probability of exiting employment close to 3% per month in
the first year, while workers with two years of tenure see this probability more than
halved, and declining further if they stay longer with the firm. This is possible
experience truncated at year three of workers’ career, by including dummies for the first three
years of job experience, and fitting a second order polynomial in experience for the rest of the
time spent on the labour market as explained in equation (2.14).
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because I model endogenous separation, by taking into account the idiosyncratic
component of the match productivity, that follows the distribution of H(ε). It is
worth mentioning that the calibrated parameters that govern H(ε) (σε and ρε) are
in line with Krolikowski (2017), who reports values of 0.53 and 0.79 respectively
for standard deviation and persistence of H(ε), versus 0.62 and 0.73 calibrated in
this work.
The model slightly over-estimates the variance of wages, delivering a value of
0.069 versus the 0.042 estimated in the data, and also of min-mean wage ratio with
a value of 0.881 versus 0.739 in the data. The calibrated value for the standard
deviation of the fixed component of the firm productivity distribution, F (θ), is
equal to 0.06. This is much lower than the estimate of Krolikowski (2017), due to
the fact that in this work general and specific human capital are taken into account
as sources of wage dispersion and wage growth in addition to firms’ productivity.
The model also captures the negative relationship between E–E and tenure
fairly well. When equation (2.15) is estimated on the model generated data, I find
a negative coefficient β̂3, which implies that staying with the firm for one additional
year reduces the average E–E rate by 0.03%, versus the 0.05% estimated in the
data.12 This prediction of the model, confirmed by the data, sets further apart
this work from the rest of the literature on the cost of job loss. Krolikowski
(2017), for example, would imply a coefficient β̂3 statistically non different from
zero. This is because tenure only represents a proxy for the selection process
induced by the job ladder, which in this regression is absorbed by firm fixed
effects. Similar conclusions can be deduced from Jung and Kuhn (2018), who also
consider tenure as a proxy for the selection mechanism implied by the job ladder,
and labour market experience as a proxy for general human capital accumulation.
Additionally, they assume that general human capital is not neutral for workers’
separation decision, since it is partly lost upon workers’ transition. Therefore their
model implication for the estimation of equation (2.15) would be a β̂3 coefficient
non statistically different from zero, since firm fixed effects now explicitly account
for selection, and a negative coefficient for χ̂3, since general human capital is
non neutral with respect to separation. This, however, contrasts with the data
evidence that shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient for β̂3, and
χ̂3 non statistically different from zero.
The model delivers an almost exact fit for the returns to experience and tenure
(see Figure 2.4). The coefficients estimated in the SIAB-7514 dataset imply,
12Even though the parameter estimated in the data is small it is economically relevant. Given
that the average E–E rate is equal to 0.0087, the estimated β̂3 implies that staying with the
firm for one additional month reduces the average E–E rate to 0.0082.
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respectively, a 2.2% and 0.51% increase in (log) wages for each additional year of
experience and tenure. The model counterparts are respectively 1.8% and 0.49%.
Finally, the structural model reproduces the negative relationship between entry
wages and time spent in non-employment estimated in the data. Specifically, in the
data one more year spent in non-employment is associated to a reduction in (log)
wages equal to 2.3%, versus the 2.8% that is produced by the model. Targeting
these moments delivers calibrated values of the model parameters that imply a
yearly accumulation rate of general and specific human capital equal to 2.2% and
0.4%, respectively, and a depreciation rate of general human capital equal to 5.5%
per year.
These estimates differ from the ones obtained in Jarosch (2015) and Burdett,
Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020). Jarosch (2015) estimates a (yearly) rate of
general human capital accumulation of 2.4% and a decumulation rate equal to 23%
(per year), while Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020) calibrate a (yearly)
accumulation rate of general human capital equal to 4.5% and a depreciation rate
equal to 1.7%.13
As discussed in Chapter 1, the different calibration values depend on the
different empirical strategies adopted in each paper. Jarosch (2015), for example,
obtains a higher depreciation rate and a lower accumulation rate of general human
capital compared to what is found in this work, because returns to experience are
not explicitly taken as a primitive to inform about the learning by doing process.
The correlation between initial wages (at re-employment) and length of the
previous unemployment spell is used to calibrate the depreciation rate, while the
appreciation rate is obtained indirectly, by imposing an equilibrium condition that
ensures that unemployed workers lose general human capital as often as employed
workers accumulate it.14 However, ignoring returns to experience in a model with
general human capital may provide distorted estimates of the accumulation and
decumulation processes. In fact, both rates of general human capital accumulation
during employment and decumulation during unemployment play a role in the
reduced form estimation of the returns to labour market (actual) experience. The
13More precisely, Jarosch (2015) estimates a value of monthly accumulation (decumulation)
rate for general human capital equal to 0.014 (0.131), on a grid of 7 equidistant point with
maximum value equal to 2 and minimum equal to 1. Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles
(2020) calibrate their model for three different groups of workers, classified according to their
education level. They find an accumulation rate of general human capital equal to of 4.9% for
low educated workers, 4.1 for medium educated workers and 4.8% for high educated workers.
The decumulation rate is equal to 1.7% for workers with medium and high education, and 1.2%
for those with low education.
14The equilibrium condition imposed by Jarosch, (2015) is the following: (1−ψe)u/(1−u) = (1−
ψu). Where u represents the unemployment rate, ψu the rate of decay of human capital during
unemployment and ψe the accumulation rate of general human capital during employment.
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first plays a direct role: the longer is the workers’ actual experience, the higher
the accumulated skills, which translate into higher wages. The second plays an
indirect role: labour market actual experience is correlated with labour market
potential experience, which includes periods of unemployment. The loss of human
capital during unemployment reduces workers’ productivity and wages, negatively
affecting the estimated returns to actual experience.
On the other hand, Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020) target directly
returns to experience in addition to the relation between re-employment wages and
length of unemployment spell, and obtain accumulation rate of general human
capital which is more than twice faster than what is found in this work and a
significantly slower decumulation rates of general human capital. This discrepancy
can be explained by the fact that Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020)
target higher returns to experience in the data (on average equal to 4% per year
compared to the 2.2% estimated in this work). This is because they estimate
returns to experience using a Mincer regression framework in which (log) wages
are regressed on a second order polynomial in actual experience and year fixed
effects, omitting controls for tenure and firm fixed effects, and including early
career workers. Their strategy delivers returns that are higher even compared to
other works in the literature. For example, Dustmann and Meghir (2005), using
a control function approach and focusing only on workers in new jobs after a
displaced event, find that skilled workers’ wages grow by 6% in the first years
of work and decline to 1.2% after five years of experience and unskilled workers’
wages grow by 8.2% in the first years of work and become zero after three years
of experience. This is particularly relevant since post-displacement earning losses
are computed on high-tenure workers which, as Dustmann and Meghir (2005)
show, exhibit even lower returns to experience (equal to 1.2% and 0 for skilled
and unskilled workers, respectively).
From this discussion it follows that taking into account returns to experience
and tenure within a framework that aims at explaining the sources of wage growth
in the years that follow a job loss event is extremely important. The main
contribution of this paper in this sense is twofold: (i) it uses estimates of returns
to experience, obtained by controlling for firms’ fixed effects and focusing only
on wage growth from year three of workers’ experience, which coincides with the
sample of workers used in the estimation of the earning losses, and (ii) it draws
conclusion of general and specific human capital accumulation based on these
estimates.
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2.4 The Cost of Job Loss
This section presents the estimated earnings and wage losses for displaced workers
computed on the SIAB-7514 dataset. I then compared them to the losses generated
by the model, which are not targeted in the calibration. Finally, I perform a
counterfactual analysis to identify the forces driving the wage losses.
2.4.1 Reduced Form Analysis
To compute earning and wage losses of displaced workers on the SIAB-7514 data,
I first aggregate the frequency of time observations in the dataset from monthly
to yearly as explained in Appendix 2.B.3. Then, I apply some further selection
criteria to the yearly panel following Jarosch (2015). Specifically, I define a
separation year y and I only consider workers that are between 25 and 54 years old
in y and that are continuously employed within the firm recorded in y for at least
years y − 1, y − 2 and y − 3. Finally, I split the sample in treatment and control
groups. The treatment group is made of workers that experience a separation into
non-employment from the long-term employer in year y, and that return employed
in a different firm by year y + 3. The control group is made of workers that did
not experience a separation from the long-term employer in year y.
On this sample, I then use the same specification as Davis and Wachter (2011)














where y indicates the displacement year, t is the time variable, i the indicator for
the individual. The outcome variable eyit represents the real annual earnings for
individual i at time t, the fixed effect αyi absorbs workers’ heterogeneity, while γ
y
t
represents a year fixed effect.15 The vector Xit is a quadratic polynomial in age
for individual i at time t, and Dkit are dummy variables indicating if the worker
was displaced k years before or after y. More explicitly, for displacement year y:
Dkit =
1, if t− y = k and ENi,t=y = 1.0, if t− y 6= k or ENi,t=y = 0 . (2.19)
I follow Jarosch (2015) and define k = 0 as the last year of positive earnings with
15The outcome variable eyit is replaced by wages w
y
it and employment h
y
it when estimating the
post-displacement wage and employment losses.
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the pre-displacement employer, and k = 1 as the first year with zero earnings from
the pre-displacement employer.16
I estimate equation (2.18) for each displacement year y ∈ [1985, 2005] and
obtain coefficients δ̂yk , that inform about the evolution of earnings k = (−4, ..., 10)
years before and after separation in year y. I then follow Jarosch (2015) and divide
the coefficients by the corresponding counterfactual earnings for the treatment
group in the corresponding year.17 Then, I take the series of estimated coefficients
as percentage of their counterfactual earnings and average them across all years
y ∈ [1985, 2005] to obtain an estimate for the post-displacement earning losses.
I plot the results for earnings, employment and wage losses estimated on the
SIAB-7514 data in Figure 2.5. The results are in line with the ones found in the
literature for Germany (Jarosch, 2015, Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles, 2020):
earnings of displaced workers drop in the year after separation by 40% relative the
counterfactual and recover fast in the first years after displacement, getting to 20%
after two years and to 10% after five years, but remain very persistent even after
10 years from the separation event. The decomposition of earnings into wages and
employment shows that most of the size of the losses in the initial period is given
by the losses in employment, while most of the persistence is attributable to wages.
Wages drop initially by 10% and never recover, remaining almost 7% below their
counterfactual path even after 10 years from the separation event. Employment
losses show a substantial drop in the year after separation, but recover much
faster than earnings. In fact, two years after the separation event employment
losses reach 15% and from year four they stabilise at 5%.
From this picture it emerges that, compared to the results for earnings, wages
and employment losses in the United States (see for example Huckfeldt, 2018), the
German data exhibit a slower recovery of employment losses. This motivates the
choice of modelling a job ladder with higher separation rates at the lower rungs,
that implies serially correlated job loss events.18
2.4.2 Model versus Data
In this section I compare earnings, wages and employment losses estimated in
the data with the theoretical counterparts obtained using the model generated
16For example, when estimating earning losses for displacement year y = 1985, D0i,1985 is equal
to 1 in year t = 1985 if worker i experiences displacement during this year, and equal to 0 in all
other years.
17The counterfactual earnings are obtained as the predicted values of the regression results
for the treatment group after imposing all Dkit = 0.
18This is in line with the work of Jarosch (2015), with the difference that in this work
separations are endogenous.
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data. The theoretical losses are estimated by applying the same sample selection
and estimation method used for the empirical ones, with the only difference that
individual fixed effects are omitted since the model does not consider individual
heterogeneity.19
The results of the comparison are shown in Figure 2.6. The model generates
estimates of earning losses close to the data counterparts and is also able to
replicate the decomposition into employment and wages components. In the
model, as in the data, the high peak in earning losses in the year after separation
from the long term employer is given by losses in employment, while the persistence
is mostly due to wages.
2.4.3 Structural Decomposition of Wage Losses
As shown in the previous subsections, the persistence of the earning losses
experienced by workers after the separation event is mostly given by the losses
in wages. This feature of the data is also very well replicated by the model.
According to the model, job search, general and specific human capital are the
three forces that can jointly explain the divergent path of wages of workers that
experience a separation. To quantify the relative contribution of each of these
forces, I use the calibrated model to build counterfactual wage series for workers
who experience a separation event.
I proceed according to the following steps.
Step 1. I select workers in the treatment group for each separation year
y and artificially set the exogenous separation event to 0 to compute the
counterfactual series of wages, specific and general human capital for years
t ∈ (y, y + 10).
Step 2. I assign the counterfactual paths of general human capital obtained
from Step 1, to the workers in the treatment group and compute the series
of average wages for ten years after the separation event. The percentage
deviation of this series of wages from the the counterfactual series computed
in Step 1 represents the post-displacement wage losses not attributable to
the loss in general human capital.
Step 3. I assign the counterfactual paths of both general and specific human
capital obtained in Step 1 to the workers in the treatment group and compute
the series of average wages for years for ten years after the separation event,
19I have also performed the estimation of the theoretical losses including individual fixed
effects, and it does not affect the results.
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to obtain the post-displacement wage losses not attributable to loss in general
and specific human capital.
Figure 2.7 reports the results of this decomposition exercise. It is worth
noticing that the counterfactual exercise produces wage losses very similar to the
ones obtained with the regression framework, further validating the reduced form
estimation approach. The blue, green and red areas in the graph respectively
show the contributions of general human capital, specific human capital and job
ladder to the total wage losses. The decomposition implies that 33.59% of the
present discounted value of the wage losses is due to the loss in general human
capital, 47.19% is due to the loss in specific human capital and the remaining
19.22% due to the loss of a good job. Interestingly, the exercise shows that all
the three channels play an important and balanced role in explaining the peak in
wages at the time of displacement. However, it is mostly the divergence in the
evolution of specific and general human capital paths between the treated and the
counterfactual groups that determines the persistence in the wage losses.
In light of these results, the mechanism behind the observed post-displacement
wage losses is the following. When a high-tenure worker experiences displacement
for exogenous reasons, he/she immediately loses a good job and specific human
capital with probability 1 and, by spending time in non employment (on average 6
months given the estimated parameters) faces general human capital depreciation
with probability 5.5% per year. At re-employment, the worker is more likely to
end up in a low productive firm with no specific human capital. This makes
the new match less stable and increases the worker’s probability of falling into
non-employment again. Eventually, given the frequency of job-to-job transitions in
the data, the displaced worker climbs the job ladder and reaches a stable position:
this is reflected in the role of the job ladder that shrinks through time and reaches
the level of zero at year 10. However, after ten years the displaced workers do not
fully recuperate specific (mostly) and general human capital compared to their
colleagues in the counterfactual group, and this induces persistent losses in wages.
2.5 Conclusions
The economic literature documents two main empirical stylized facts: i) substan-
tial returns to tenure and experience; ii) large and persistent post-displacement
earning losses for high-tenure workers.
From a theoretical perspective, both facts can be explained by workers’ job
search activity and accumulation of specific and general human capital. In light
of these considerations, I build a theoretical framework that includes these three
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channels to provide some insights on the drivers of both workers’ earnings dynam-
ics and post-displacement earnings losses. I use matched employer-employee data
to compute moments related to job mobility and wage dynamics to obtain direct
information on the process of job search and accumulation of general and specific
skills. I use this evidence to simulate complete workers’ job histories, which allow
to replicate wage dynamics, post-displacement earning losses and their breakdown
into the wage and employment components. The results of the counterfactual
experiments document that the wage recovery of German workers that experience
job loss is hindered by, in order of importance, a significant loss in specific human
capital (47%), general skill decay during unemployment (34%) and the loss of a
good job (19%).
Through the lens of the theoretical model presented in this paper, by tran-
sitioning into unemployment, high-tenure displaced workers lose a good job and
specific human capital. The time spent in unemployment deteriorates their general
skills. Being unemployed, they are more likely to accept lower productivity jobs.
Being these jobs less stable because less likely to survive negative productivity
shocks, they see their probability of falling again into unemployment increasing.
This prevents them to rebuild the lost skills, slowing down the earnings recovery.
The major contribution of this work is to provide a measurement framework
that can quantitatively account for the relative contribution of the forces driving
the cost of job loss. It does so by taking as primitive information both moments
on workers’ separation and within firm wage growth, computed using matched
employer-employee data and on a sample that is consistent with the one used for
the estimation of the earning losses.
Understanding the sources of post-displacement earnings losses is of funda-
mental importance for designing efficient labour market policies aimed at reducing
the impact of job loss without distorting the efficient reallocation of workers from
contracting to expanding firms. The findings in this paper suggest that, in addition
to unemployment benefits that help mitigate the loss of a good job by allowing
workers to search longer for a good match, policies that favour retraining and
long lasting job placements (e.g., by means of subsidies for retraining workers and
work-sharing) can be effective tools to minimize the loss in skills and therefore in
wages that follow job loss events.
An important feature that is missing in this work is the consideration of
workers’ heterogeneity. We know from the literature on earning dynamics that
the sources of wage growth can differ for workers in different education groups.
For example, Dustmann and Meghir (2005) show that specific capital can be more
important for unskilled workers, while general human capital is more reflected in
wages of high skilled workers. Therefore, the next step in the research agenda is to
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estimate the model separately for each education group and identify the specific
drivers of wage growth and earning losses for different type of workers. This would














































Figure 2.3 – Returns to Experience in the SIAB-7514 dataset
Source: Author’s calculation on the SIAB 7514 data
Notes: Returns to experience for workers’ total career (continuous line) are computed fitting
a fourth order polynomial in experience, controlling for tenure, and including individual, time
and firms fixed effects, calculated as in Lamadon, Manresa, and Bonhomme, 2016. Returns to
experience for workers’ career truncated at year 3 (dashed line) are computed similarly, but
including dummies for the first three years of experience, to capture the different slope of the
returns in the two time periods (before and after year three). The lines in the plot are obtained
by fitting the fourth order polynomial functions in the two cases.
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Figure 2.4 – Returns to Tenure and Experience: Model VS Data
(a) Returns to Experience
(b) Returns to Tenure
Source: Author’s calculation on the SIAB 7514 data.
Notes: Returns to experience and tenure in the model and in the data are obtained estimating
equation (2.14). For the data counterpart of returns to experience, only the slope starting from
year three of workers’ career is considered.
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Figure 2.5 – Post-displacement earning and wage losses in the SIAB-7514 dataset
Source: Author’s calculation on the SIAB-7514 data
Notes: Post-displacement losses in the data are obtained estimating equation 2.18, using
earnings, employment and wages as dependent variable.
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Source: Author’s calculation on the SIAB-7514 data.
Notes: Post-displacement losses in the model and in the data are obtained estimating equation
2.18, using earnings, employment and wages as dependent variable.
68
Figure 2.7 – Wage Losses Decomposition
Notes: The counterfactual analysis is computed in the following way:
Step 1. I select workers in the treatment group for each separation year y and artificially
set the exogenous separation event to 0 to compute the counterfactual series of wages,
specific and general human capital for years t ∈ (y, y + 10).
Step 2. I assign the counterfactual paths of general human capital obtained from Step
1, to the workers in the treatment group and compute the series of average wages for ten
years after the separation event. The percentage deviation of this series of wages from
the the counterfactual series computed in Step 1 represents the post-displacement wage
losses not attributable to the loss in general human capital.
Step 3. I assign the counterfactual paths of both general and specific human capital
obtained in Step 1 to the workers in the treatment group and compute the series of average
wages for years for ten years after the separation event, to obtain the post-displacement
wage losses not attributable to loss in general and specific human capital.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1 – Model Parameters
Parameters Description
λ0 Contact rate during unemployment
λ1 Contact rate during employment
δ Exogenous rate of job destruction
σε Variance of H(ε) distribution
ρε Persistence of H(ε) distribution
σθ Variance of the F (θ) distribution
s Max level of specific human capital
γ Accumulation rate of specific human capital
g Max level of general human capital
φe Appreciation rate of general human capital
φu Depreciation rate of general human capital
α Worker bargaining power
pz Unemployment payoff
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Table 2.2 – Targeted Moments
Targeted Moments Data Model
average E–E monthly transition rate 0.009 0.010
(2.13e-05)
unemployment rate 0.08 0.09
average E–N monthly transition rate 0.010 0.013
(2.35e-05)
average E–N monthly transition rate 0.021 0.036
for 1 year of tenure (4.78e-05)
average E–N monthly transition rate 0.011 0.014
for 2 years of tenure (6.22e-05)
average E–N monthly transition rate 0.0084 0.0076
for 3 years of tenure (7.28e-05)
average E–N monthly transition rate 0.0078 0.005
for 4 years of tenure (8.26e-05)
average E–N monthly transition rate 0.0068 0.004
for 5 years of tenure (4.22e-05)
variance of log wages, var(ln(w)) 0.042 0.069
min-mean ratio, w0/w 0.739 0.881
coefficient β̂1 from regression in eq. (2.14) 0.00043 0.00041
(1.76e-06)
coefficient β̂2 from regression in eq. (2.14) -2.59e-07 -3.07E-07
(5.99e-09)
coefficient χ̂1 from regression in eq. (2.14) 0.0019 0.0015
(4.09e-06)
coefficient χ̂2 from regression in eq. (2.14) -2.18e-06 -1.73E-06
(4.47e-09)
coefficient β̂3 from regression in eq. (2.15) -4.35e-05 -2.25E-05
(3.72e-07)
coefficient π̂ from regression in eq. (2.16) -0.0021 -0.0024
(4.6e-05)
Source: Author’s calculation on the SIAB-7514 data
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2.3 – Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Description
λ0 Contact rate during unemployment 0.178
λ1 Contact rate during employment 0.064
δ Exogenous rate of job destruction 0.003
σε S.D. of H(ε) distribution 0.627
ρε Persistence of H(ε) distribution 0.735
σθ S.D. of the F (θ) distribution 0.061
s Max level of specific human capital 1.119
γ Accumulation rate of specific human capital 0.008
g Max level of general human capital 1.147
φe Appreciation rate of general human capital 0.023
φu Depreciation rate of general human capital 0.059
α Worker bargaining power 0.774
pz Unemployment payoff 1.525
Notes: The parameters are calibrated jointly using the simulated method of moments. Details




2.A.1 Model Solution Details
I solve the model numerically under the assumptions listed in Section 2.3.2. In
practice, I solve the Surplus equation (2.10) and the Unemployment value function
(2.7) jointly using a contraction mapping on a discretised space for the state
variables (θ, s, g, ε).
Given that the derivation of an explicit solution for the equilibrium wage is
intractable, I derive it numerically. I use a grid for wages and solve the value
function for employment described in Equation (2.8) by value function iteration,
given the equilibrium functions for the match surplus and unemployment. Then, I
obtain the wages by inverting this function using the bisection method to respect
the bargaining protocol rules described in section 2.2.2.
Once the model is solved, I then simulate the data at monthly frequency.
Specifically, I simulate work histories for 10,000 workers, all born unemployed,
and 2,100 periods. I then discard the first 1,500 periods to remove the effects
of initial conditions. I compute the moments needed for identification on the
remaining 600 periods (50 years). In the simulation, I allow the variables that
indicates the fixed component of the firm productivity θ and the time-varying
idiosyncratic shock component ε to take values in between the grid points, but
not above and below the minimum and maximum values on the grid. Accordingly,
I use linear interpolation to find the corresponding values on the surplus and wage
functions.
2.A.2 Optimization Details
The calibration of the parameters of interest is done by Simulated Method of
Moments. I compute the same set of moments on the true data and on the
simulated data and then chose the parameters that minimise the distance between
the two vectors, as explained in Section 2.3.3. When in the real data I control for
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unobserved firm heterogeneity, in the simulated data I explicitly control for the
state variable representing the fixed component of the match productivity, θ. The
weighting matrix used to solve the optimization problem described in Equation
(2.17) is the identity matrix.
The optimization is implemented following the global optimization algorithm
suggested in Guvenen Computational and Empirical Methods for Dynamic Eco-
nomics PhD Lecture Notes. The algorithm I use exploits parallel programming
and is made of the following steps:
(i) Set iteration i = 0;
(ii) Set an initial weight ωi ∈ [0, 1];
(iii) Generate a large number of quasi-random numbers using Sobol sequence;
(iv) Take the first N of these points as initial guesses, xj with j ∈ {1, ..., N}, and
start on N machines a local optimizer (e.g. Nelden-Mead);
(v) After the local optimizer converges on all machines, take the maximum of
all the machines z∗ and derive a linear combination of this best point and a
new quasi-random number, like x̃j = ωiz
∗ + (1− ωi)yj;
(vi) Update iteration i = i+ 1 and ωi+1 and the initial guess xj = x̃j for the new
local optimization;
(vii) Iterate until convergence.
In practice I set N = 44.
2.B Data Work Details
2.B.1 Construction of the Monthly Panel
The SIAB dataset contains information about the employment history of every
individual in the sample stored in spell format with given start and end dates that
differ for each spell and individual. In order to perform the empirical analysis, I
transform the dataset from spell format to monthly format. I do this by choosing
the 1st of the month as reference date and attributing the information of the spell
to the month if the spell starts before or on the 1st of the month. For example,
if the worker is employed full time subject to social security in the spell that goes
from the 29th of January until the 15th of March, I assign this information to




The main variables used in the empirical analysis are defined as:
1. Employment. A worker is defined to be employed in month t if he/she is
employed full time subject to social security on the first day of the month;
the worker is considered non-employed in all other cases.
2. Wages and Earnings. Wages are recorded only for employed workers, and are
considered missing for non-employed workers. Earnings are equal to wages
during months of employment and to 0 during months of non-employment.
3. Job-to-job transition (E-E). A job-to-job transition is recorded in the
following two cases:
(i) if the worker is employed in firm j in month t and in firm j′ in month
t+ 1;
(ii) if the worker is employed in firm j in month t and in firm j′ in month t+
2, and the worker is non-employed and doesn’t apply for unemployment
benefits in month t+ 1.
4. Employment-Non Employment (E-N). An Employment-Non Employment
(E-N) transition is recorded in the following two cases:
(i) when the worker is employed in month t and non-employed and applies
for unemployment benefits in month t+ 1;
(ii) if the worker is employed in month t and non-employed for at least 2
periods.
2.B.3 Construction of the Yearly Panel
Starting from the monthly dataset, I transform the employment, earnings and
wages variables in yearly observations by averaging the records across all months
during a year. I record a employment-non-employment transition (E-N) and a
job-to-job transition (E-E) in a given year, respectively, if at least one E-N or E-E
transition is observed in the monthly panel in that year. I consider the annual
employer the establishment in which the worker is employed in January of the
corresponding year. The yearly panel is made of 2,059,342 observations.
2.C Unobserved Firm Heterogeneity
To discipline firm heterogeneity, I follow the recent literature based on the work
by Lamadon, Manresa, and Bonhomme (2016) and classify firms using tools from
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machine learning. In particular, I cluster firms based on their wage distribution
using k-means algorithms and use the obtained clusters as firms’ type, which I use
as controls in the wage and job-to-job transitions regressions (2.14) and (2.15).
The idea is that variation in the firms’ wage distribution conveys information
about the permanent firm type.
In practice, I use the information on average wages paid by firm to full time
workers, reported in the establishment side of the dataset, and classify firms in
groups using k-means algorithm.20 This classification procedure is a standard






‖ĥi − h̃(ki)‖2 (2.20)
where, N represents the sample size; ki ∈ 1, ..., K represent the partitions of
the observations {1, ..., N} with 1 < K ≤ N ; ĥi is a vector of features used for
classification, which in my case is the average wage paid the establishment, and
h̃(ki) represents the vector of the selected data features for group k to which i
is assigned, whose elements are computed as averages over the group members.
The solution of equation (2.20) is a mapping of each i into a cluster k, such that
the squared Euclidean distance between the vector of characteristics ĥi and the
average characteristics in the corresponding group are minimized.
To implement this classification it is necessary to chose the number of classes.
In order to do so, I compute a measure of fit for the k-means as a function of the
number of clusters and I find that improvements in fit appear to flatten out after
about five-six clusters. This is shown in Figure 2.C.1, where I report the total
within sum of square as a function of the number of clusters. Therefore I set the
number of cluster to 5.
20More specifically, I use the residual of a regression of firms’ average wages on year dummies
to net out the time variation.
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Figure 2.C.1 – Change in k-means fit with number of clusters
Source: Author’s calculation on the SIAB-7514 data
Notes: The figure shows a measure of fit for k-means, the total within sum of squares, as the
number of clusters increases.
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Advantage and the Gender Wage
Gap
3.1 Introduction
Over the last decades, the increase in income inequality and the persistence of
wage differentials between men and women have been among the main concerns
for both policy makers and the public opinion. At the same time, globalisation
has been recognised as an important factor behind the widening of the income
distribution. While researchers have studied in isolation the determinants of the
gender wage gap (see for example Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2016, for a survey) and
the effects of trade on wage inequality, especially stemming from workers’ skills
and firms’ characteristics (see Helpman, 2018, for a survey), little attention has
been paid to the potential effects of trade on gender wage differentials.1
Our paper contributes to fill this gap by first estimating the effect of export
activity on the gender wage gap at the firm-worker level, and then by showing
that the results are consistent with gender-specific comparative advantage.
To perform the analysis, we use a uniquely rich employer-employee dataset
provided by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment
Agency (BA), matching social security data on all German private-sector workers
with survey data on firms’ establishments.2 The database provides us information
on the value of plants’ total sales, the share of export on total sales and their
1 Among the few existing exceptions are Juhn, Ujhelyi, and Villegas-Sanchez (2014), Sauré
and Zoabi (2014), and Bøler, Javorcik, and Ulltveit-Moe (2018).
2 Although our unit of observation is an establishment, henceforth, we will refer to
establishments and firms interchangeably.
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workforce, in addition to location and sector. It also includes very detailed
data on individual workers’ wages and benefit receipts, occupation, gender, age,
education and experience. The sample comprises yearly observations for over 3.6
million German workers matched with nearly 15,000 establishments from both
manufacturing and service sectors, followed from 1993 to 2007.
At the heart of our empirical exercise lies the estimation of a wage equation
where, in addition to standard firm’s and worker’s characteristics, we control
for firm’s export intensity, its interaction with a dummy for female workers and
firm-worker fixed effects.3 This specification allows us to study how the wage of any
given employee reacts to an increase in their firm’s export, and to what extent the
response is different if the employee is a woman. This tight identification strategy
purges from the coefficients any effect of export on workers’ selection within the
firm, and at the same time alleviates concerns of endogeneity of export with respect
to wages and employment composition, since it is unlikely that any single worker
may affect firm’s sales abroad. Additionally, controlling for state-time, sector-time
and (in the most demanding specifications) for firm-time fixed effects allows us to
address the potential simultaneity bias arising from confounders that may affect
both export and the wage trajectory of workers.
Our first set of results, obtained on the full sample, suggest that export does
not affect on average the wages of male and female employees. We then dig deeper
and study whether this masks heterogeneity across occupations. Interestingly, we
obtain strong evidence that an increase in firm’s export significantly reduces the
wage of female blue collar employees relative to their male co-workers (thereby
widening the gender wage gap), while it increases the wage of female white collars
relative to their male peers (thereby narrowing the gap). This result proves robust
also to controlling for firm’s sales, whose effect on the gender wage gap is quite
muted relative to that of export.
The fact that the gender wage gap reacts more to export than domestic sales
suggests that selling to foreign markets may require the firm to change the intensity
in the use of certain skills in a way that makes women relatively more demanded
in non-production tasks. This resounds with the existing evidence that women
tend to have a comparative advantage in performing white collar tasks, especially
those intensive in interpersonal relations and in the use of computers, while they
have a disadvantage in blue collar, “brawn”-intensive occupations (see for example
Spitz-Oener, 2006; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010; Borghans, Weel, and Weinberg,
2014; Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017; Cortes, Jaimovich, and Siu, 2018). If export
3As it will be clearer, we focus on the export share because our sample exhibits a substantial
within-firm variation in this variable and a very limited one in the export status.
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requires a more intensive use of “male” skills in production (e.g., because it changes
the production line in a way that calls for more “brawn”), and of “female” skills in
non-production tasks (e.g., because it takes more ability in interpersonal relations
to deal with foreign customers), an expansion in foreign activities will increase
(decrease) the demand for females in white-collar (blue-collar) occupations and
their wages.
While our evidence is consistent with this hypothesis, we further assess its
validity by proceeding in three steps. First, we estimate how export correlates
with the share of women in white collar and blue collar employees at the firm
level. Consistently, our results highlight a positive association between firms’
export and the share of female employees in white collar occupations, while no
significant correlation can be established for blue collars.
Next, we assess whether increasing export induces the firm to reward through
promotion female white collars more than their male colleagues. To this end, we
estimate a linear probability model for promotion at the firm-worker level and
show that an increase in firm’s export slightly raises the probability that any of
its female white collar be promoted compared to male employees in the same
occupations.
Finally, we take a step further and study whether the reduction in the gender
wage gap for white collar workers is driven by those performing tasks related to
female comparative advantage, such as the non-routine interactive ones. Similarly,
we investigate if the widening in the gap for blue collars is more pronounced for
those employees in female comparative disadvantage tasks, such as the routine
manual ones. In both cases, the estimation of our baseline specifications on
the sub-samples for different types of tasks corroborates the hypothesis that
gender-specific comparative advantage drives the effect of exports on wages.
In the final section of the paper, we perform robustness analysis showing that
our results are not driven by the censoring of wage data up to a social contribution
limit, or by recently hired workers, which may have been selected by the firm in
order to improve export performance.
Our paper makes a number of novel contributions. It is the first, to our
knowledge, to show that export widens the gap between male and female blue
collar workers while it reduces it among white collars. The closest paper to ours is
Bøler, Javorcik, and Ulltveit-Moe (2018), who use a similar identification strategy
on Norwegian matched employer-employee data. They find, however, that export
increases the wage differentials between men and women, without distinguishing
between white and blue collar workers. Their explanation is that export requires
flexibility in working hours, and hence it penalises women because they are
typically more constrained by family duties. This hypothesis is consistent with
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our proposed mechanism of export reinforcing female comparative (dis)advantage,
which in their case stems from time flexibility.
More importantly, we probe deeper into the mechanism behind the hetero-
geneous effects of export on the gender wage gap and study whether this is
due to female comparative advantage in tasks that are key when firms serve
a foreign market. In particular, we show comparative advantage of women in
interactive tasks to drive their wages up both in absolute term and relative to
men, while comparative disadvantage in routine manual occupations pushes female
wages down, thereby widening the gap with male co-workers. We are aware of
two papers studying how trade may affect the gender wage gap in presence of
female comparative advantage. Saure and Zoabi (2014) mainly address this issue
theoretically and provide evidence based on U.S. export to Mexico in 58 sectors
suggesting that trade may increase the gender wage gap. Juhn, Ujhelyi, and
Villegas-Sanchez (2014) use firm-level data from Mexico showing that export,
combined with technological upgrading, contributed to reduce the gap between
male and female blue collar workers. The latter work is closer to ours, although
it differs in a number of aspects, from the country of analysis to the identification
strategy (within firm instead of within firm-worker variation). More importantly,
we study more in detail comparative advantage at the task level.
This paper is related to three main strands of work in international trade and
gender economics. An established literature has shown that trade, by inducing
reallocations across sectors and firms, is in part responsible for the increase in
the skill premium (see, among others, Stolper and Samuelson, 1941; Epifani and
Gancia, 2008) and in the component of wage inequality stemming from firms’
characteristics and sorting (see, among others, Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding,
2010; Amiti and Davis, 2012; Bonfiglioli, Crinò, and Gancia, 2018). Recently,
a few papers have studied whether trade may affect inequality by widening or
narrowing the gender wage gap (see Juhn, Ujhelyi and Villegas-Sanchez, 2014,
Saure and Zoaby, 2014, and Bøler, Javorcik and Ulltveit-Moe, 2018). Yet, the
evidence is mixed and the mechanism behind this link remains largely an open
question. Our analysis contributes to the understanding of the role of gender-based
comparative advantage in trade and income inequality and identifies it at the
task level. An important implication of our results is that higher female labour
participation, may increase a country’s export because selling to foreign markets
is intensive in tasks for which women have a comparative advantage.
A growing literature in gender economics has shown that women have a
comparative advantage in occupations entailing non-routine interactive and an-
alytical tasks (see Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010; Cortes, Jaimovich, and Siu,
2018), which, combined with the structural transformation towards services and
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technological change, have contributed to reduce the gender wage gap (see Olivetti
and Petrongolo, 2016, and references therein). Our results suggest that also
globalisation, combined with female comparative advantage, may have narrowed
wage differentials between men and women, especially among non-production
workers.
Related contributions in the same literature have also documented that women
have worse career prospects than men and that over one half of the gender gap
in life-time earnings is attributable to wage dynamics within the firm (see Goldin,
2014). Several explanations to this phenomenon have been put forward, including
sorting into different type of firms, differences in productivity, bargaining power,
frictions in the labour market (Card, Cardoso, and Kline, 2015). Our results
suggest that the rise in export at the firm level may significantly contribute to the
reduction of this gap, especially for women in white collar occupations.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
employer-employee matched data used in the analysis and provides statistics on
the gender and sectoral composition of our sample. In Section 3, we explain our
empirical approach and the baseline results on the effect of export on the gender
wage gap, first in general and then by occupations, highlighting the heterogeneous
effects across white and blue collar workers. Section 4 explores the mechanism
related to female comparative advantage. In Section 5, we perform a series of
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Data Description
Our study is based on the LIAB matched employer-employee dataset provided by
the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA)
at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). The LIAB dataset combines
information on individuals, from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB)
dataset, and on establishments, from the IAB Establishment Panel.4
The data on individuals cover all workers, trainees, job-seekers and benefits
recipients, subject to social security any time in the period that goes from 1975 to
2014, excluding only civil servant and self-employed. The dataset contains detailed
information on the workers’ employment status (employed, non-employed), type
of contract (full-time, part-time), occupation category classified according to the
“Classification of Occupations 2010” (KldB2010) with 3 digit level of detail,
(daily) wages up to a contribution limit and benefit receipts. Basic biographic
4Specifically, we use the up-to-date version of the dataset, called LIAB-QM2-9314.
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information, like gender, age and education level of the workers, is also included.
Additionally, the dataset reports the record of the workers’ establishment iden-
tifier, along with some general information on the geographic location, sector of
activity classified according to the standard NACE Rev.2 classification with 3-digit
level of detail, median wage and basic employment structure characteristics (e.g
number of full-time workers, part-time workers).
The IAB Establishment Panel is constructed from a yearly longitudinal survey
based on a random sample of establishments with at least one employee liable to
social security, stratified according to industry, federal state, and firm size.5 The
survey started in 1993 in West Germany, covering 4,265 plants, which account for
0.27% of all plants in western Germany and 11% of total employment. In 1996
it was expanded to East Germany, and currently it covers approximately 16,000
establishments.6 The survey was conducted to provide the Federal Employment
Agency with information on the demand side of the labour market. For this
reason the dataset includes detailed information on the workforce composition, its
characteristics and development over time. Additionally, it has rich information
on business and investment activities, including the value of total sales and share
of export on total sales, along with general information about the plant (e.g. age,
location, industry).
The LIAB matched employer-employee data set is then created by linking
information on plants and workers through the establishment identifier, available
in both datasets. Specifically, all individuals from the IEB that have been
employed in one of the IAB Establishment Panel plants on the 30th of June are
selected to form the LIAB dataset. These individuals are followed throughout
the sample period and all their records at the 30th of June of every year is made
available. The linked dataset includes 60,124 establishment, ranging from 4,188
to 15,061 per year, and 11,581,550 workers, ranging from 1,592,874 to 2,536,470
per year.
3.2.1 Estimation Sample
In LIAB, the largest connected set of individuals and establishments with
information on the export activity refers to West-Germany in the years 1993-2007.
For this reason, we only focus our study on this area and this time span. We further
5The sample is disproportionately stratified. To correct for this issue, we follow the advice
of the FDZ data centre and use controls for industry, federal state and firm size in the panel
analysis.
6The unit of record of the dataset is the establishment. Notice that in the empirical analysis
we use the word firm and establishment interchangeably.
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restrict the sample to 18-54 years old workers and to establishments with more
than five employees. In case of multiple identical employment spells for the same
worker in the same year, we keep the episode with the highest wage, and drop
spells with wages below 10 Euros (in 2010 prices).
After applying these sample selection rules, we are left with a sample of 14,955
firms and 3,603,167 workers followed from 1993 to 2007, which we use in our
econometric analysis.
One limitation of the dataset is the lack of information on hours worked.
Following common practice, we tackle this issue by only considering workers
employed full time subject to social security as employed.
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 reports some descriptive statistics on firms’ export activity in both the
firm-level dataset (IAB Establishment Panel) and in the matched
employer-employee data (LIAB) that we use in the analysis. In line with the
national statistics, our calculations on the firm level IAB Establishment Panel,
comprising 65,180 firms in the time period that goes from 1993 to 2010, show
that 22% of the firms in the sample are exporters, and that the average fraction
of sales from export activity relative to the total sales is equal to 7%. These
statistics are much higher when computed on the LIAB matched dataset.
Specifically, in the LIAB dataset 33% of firms are classified as exporters and the
share of export on total sales is 31%, and exporting firms employ 68% of the
total workforce. This indicates that exporting firms are larger and, therefore, are
connected to more employees in the linked sample.
Furthermore, the data show that the establishment’s decision to export is a
long term one and defines the firm throughout the whole sample. In fact, only
5% of all firms switch status from exporter to non-exporter or viceversa, and on
average firms that switch status do it only 1.9 times.
Some additional basic descriptive statistics for exporting and non-exporting
firms computed on the LIAB dataset are reported in Table 3.2. Here, we also
distinguish by male and female workers.
In line with the literature, our calculations show that on average exporting
firms are larger, have higher volume of sales, and pay higher wages relative to non
exporting firms (see for example Bernard et al., 2007).
Additionally, the gender wage gap is slightly higher in non-exporting firms,
where unconditionally, women are paid 25% less than men. In exporting firms the
gap is still high and equal to 23%.
Exporting and non-exporting firms employ workers with similar characteristics,
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in terms of age and experience, and exporters employ slightly more educated
workers. We can see that the majority of workers in our sample are medium
skilled, both in exporting and non-exporting firms and that there are no striking
differences between male and female workers’ levels of education.7
When both manufacturing and service sectors are considered in the sample, the
share of white collar workers in non-exporting firms is 40% and 28% in exporting
firms. However, going beyond this table, the share of white collar workers in
non-exporting firms drops to 26% if we do not consider services. As expected, the
service sector is in fact less export oriented and it employs more female workers.
We can clearly see this in Figure 3.1 and 3.2, where we respectively report the
share of exporting firms and of female workers by sector of activity at the 2 digit
level of detail according to the NACE Rev.2 classification of activity. Industries
in the manufacturing sector are marked in blue while industries in services in
red. In fact, there is a significant disproportion between the two sectors in terms
of export activity. In particular, on average, in the manufacturing sector 74%
of firms exports, while in services only 18%. Additionally, the average share of
female workers in the manufacturing sector is 25% while in services it is 40%.
Furthermore, as expected for the German economy, the most export-oriented
sector is the motor vehicles in the group of manufacturing, while within the group
of services most of exporting firms are in engineering activities.
Considering the whole sample, non-exporting firms employ more women than
exporting firms, respectively equal to 25% and 18%. As before, this is due to the
fact that most of firms in the service sector, which employ on average more women,
are included in the sample of non-exporting firms. If we drop services from the
sample, the share of women in non-exporting firms becomes closer to the share of
women in exporting firms and specifically equal to 17%. Additionally, considering
the whole sample, most of women work in white collar occupations, where they
occupy 72% and 46% of white collar positions in domestic and exporting firms,
respectively.
As we have seen, several differences between exporting and domestic firms in
terms of workforce composition emerge mostly because of heterogeneity across
service and manufacturing industries. In spite of this evidence, in this study
we decide to use the full sample that includes both manufacturing and service
industries. This choice is motivated by our identification strategy, which is based
on exploiting variation of firms’ export activity and (relative) wages within sectors,
7We define low skill the workers with no vocational training, medium skill the workers with
vocational training and high skill the workers with university degree.
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firms and matches.8 A detailed explanation of this is given in the next sections.
3.3 Export and Gender Wage Gap: Empirical
Evidence
In this section we first explore how firm’s export activity affects wage differentials
between men and women in general, and then we investigate whether it has
heterogeneous impact on different groups of workers. We will specifically focus on
white versus blue collar workers, given that they engage in very different sets of
tasks (for example “brawn” versus “brain” intensive tasks), that can be of different
use to the firm when it decides to expand its sales on international markets.
In our main specifications, we identify the correlation between firms’ export and
gender wage gap by exploiting variation of wages for any given worker who remains
employed in the firm as its export intensity varies over time, and by controlling for
possible firm-year specific shocks that can simultaneously affect export decisions
and wages. As we will argue below, this strategy conceivably allows us to capture
the causal effect of export on the gender wage gap. Moreover, with one of our
specifications we are also able to quantify and compare the elasticities of the
gender wage gap to firms’ export sales and domestic sales.
3.3.1 The Baseline Estimation Strategy
We analyse the effects of firms’ export activity on the gender wage gap in the
German labour market by looking at the within employer-employee matches
dynamics. In doing so we depart from most empirical works that study this relation
at the industry and firm level.9 In practice, we adopt a similar approach to Bøler,
Javorcik, and Ulltveit-Moe (2018), and estimate the following wage equation:
lnwijst = β1Expjt + β2femi ∗ Expjt + C′itπ1 + F′jtπ2 + ηst + ηij + εijst (3.1)
where wijst is the gross daily wage of worker i, employed by firm j in sector s and
year t. The variable femi is a dummy variable indicating whether individual i is
female, and Expjt indicates the export activity of firm j at time t (alternatively,
the export share or the log of export value). Equation (3.1) controls for a vector
8We also perform the whole analysis restricting our sample to the manufacturing sector with
no significant differences.
9 See for example Ozler (2000), Black and Brainerd (2004), Ederington, Minier, and Troske
(2009) and Juhn, Ujhelyi, and Villegas-Sanchez (2014) among others.
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of worker’s characteristics C′it, including nationality, experience, its square, and
occupation, and for a vector of firm’s characteristics F′jt including (log of) firm
size and geographic location.
Further, we control for sector-year fixed effects, ηst, to account for systematic
variation in wages across sectors in any given year. This makes sure that
we compare wages within each industry and time, so that the estimate of the
coefficient of interest that measures the effect of export on the gender wage gap,
β̂2, is not driven by selection into industry. This could matter in case exporting
firms were more (or less) concentrated in “male-intensive” industries.
Match fixed effects are denoted by ηij, and allow us to exploit a finer source
of variation given by the change in the firms’ export activity, holding constant
the within-firm workforce gender composition. In this specification, the estimated
coefficient β̂2 captures the effect of time variation in firms’ export activity on the
relative wage of a specific female-male couple of workers employed in the firm. By
holding the firms’ workforce composition constant, the estimation of the effect of
export on gender wage gap is less likely to be biased by endogenous mobility and
assortative matching issues, which would arise if the firm selects higher ability
workers as it intensifies export (Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding, 2010). The
within-match identification also reduces possible bias due to reverse causality. It
is in fact less likely that the main driver of firms’ export is the ability of specific
workers.
Notice that in this specification we cannot quantify the total gender wage
gap, since the variable femi is collinear with the fixed effect ηij and therefore
the parameter associated to it cannot be estimated. However, the results from
estimating (3.1) with firm instead of match fixed effects, reported in Table C1 of
Appendix C, allow us to quantify the firm-level gender wage gap at around 20 per
cent.
One issue with the model above is that it doesn’t take into account the pos-
sibility of firm-specific productivity shocks that may affect both export decisions
and the demand for male and female workers. Thus, in the next specifications
we attempt to control for this possible source of bias in two ways. First, by
including the (log of) total firms’ sales and its interaction with the female dummy
as additional proxy for firm heterogeneity in productivity. Second, by controlling
for firm-year fixed effects, ηjt, to absorb elements of unobserved heterogeneity
that may drive selection of firms into exporting. These two extended models are
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specified in equations (3.2) and (3.3):10
lnwijst =γ1Expjt + γ2fem ∗ Expjt + C′itµ1 + F′jtµ2+
ν1 lnSjt + ν2fem ∗ lnSjt + ηst + ηij + εijst
(3.2)
lnwijst = δ1femi ∗ Expjt + C′it%1 + F′jt%2 + ηjt + ηij + εijst (3.3)
where the variable Sjt indicates total sales of firm j at time t.
The drawback of specification (3.3) is that it only allows us to estimate
the effect on the gender wage gap, but not on the overall wages of male and
female workers, since both time-invariant individual characteristics (such as female
dummy) and time variant firm characteristics (such as export) are subsumed by
the new fixed effect.
In order to account for correlation across workers within firm over time, we
cluster standard errors by firm in all specifications.
Results of the Baseline Estimation
The estimation results are reported in Table 3.3. Specifically, in column (1) we
report the estimated coefficients for model (3.1), while in column (2), (3) and (4)
we report the results for the model extended to include controls for firms’ sales only,
its interaction with the female dummy, and firm-year fixed effects, respectively.
Given that our baseline specifications exploit variation of export and wages
within-firm and within-match, we proxy firms’ export activity with its export share
rather than a dummy for export status, which exhibits too little time variation to
allow for identification, as shown in Table 3.1.11
The estimation of the baseline model (3.1) shows that, when the gender
composition of the workforce is held constant, an increase in firms’ export share
does not have a significant impact on workers’ wages. A one percentage point
increase in export share is associated to an increase of 0.0028% in wages of male
employees (coefficient β̂1) and to a 0.0018% increase in the relative wage of female
employees (coefficient β̂2), but these coefficients are not statistically significant.
12
Controlling for firms’ sales as a proxy for firms’ productivity further reduces the
10Since we cannot observe firms that change sector of activity within the year, the firm-year
fixed effects, ηjt, substitute the sector-year fixed effects, ηst in model (3.3).
11Precisely, the independent variable is share of export on firm’s total sales and lies in a [0, 1]
interval. Given that the model is log-linear, the correct interpretation of the coefficients of
interest is a semi-elasticity.
12Given that the model is log-linear, the coefficients β̂1 (and β̂2) represents a semi-elasticity.
Thus, it is interpreted as a unit change in the export share is associated to a β̂1 × 100 % change
in wages. Given that a unit change in export share represents a 100% change, we divide the
estimated coefficient by 100 to obtain a more meaningful interpretation.
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magnitude of these coefficients (columns (2) and (3)). An increase in firms’ sales,
however, seems to have a small but positive effect on the wages of male workers,
specifically equal to a 0.009% rise in their salary following a 1% expansion, while it
still shows no effect on the relative wages of female employees. Finally, the results
from the estimation of model (3.3) confirm the absence of a significant effect of
export on the gender wage gap.
In all specifications, the results of the estimation of the rest of the control
variables are in line with the literature. The linear and quadratic terms of
labour market experience have a significant effect on wages, which is increasing at
decreasing rates. White collar workers earn on average 2.6% higher wages relative
to their blue collar colleagues, and larger firms exhibit a wage premium of roughly
2.3%.
In conclusion, our specification reveals that firms’ export activity does not have
a significant impact on workers’ wages, once we control for the gender composition
of the workforce. In the next section we explore the possibility that this lack of
significant results may mask heterogeneity in the effects of export activity on the
gender wage gap depending on workers’ occupation as white or blue collars.13
3.3.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Occupation
In this section, we explore whether firms’ export affects the relative wage of female
blue collar workers differently from that of female white collars. We address this
heterogeneity in two ways. First, we focus on the within-match specification and
estimate model (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) described in Section 3.3.1 separately on the
sample of white collar and blue collar workers.
Then, we build a model that enables us to directly draw conclusions on the
differential impact of firms’ export on the two occupational groups of workers, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, and to test whether it is statistically significant.
Our proposed strategy is to extend the within-match specification explained in
equation (3.1) by adding a triple interaction term between a dummy variable that
defines white collar workers denoted as wci, the export variable and a dummy
variable for female workers.
13We prefer the occupation classification to the education classification of the workforce
because, as we could see in Table 3.2, in the German system there is no clear distinction between
high and low skilled workers. Most of the workers have vocational training (64%) and this allows
them to work in both white and blue collar occupations.
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The model is the following:
lnwijst =ε1Expjt + ε2femi ∗ Expjt + ε3wci ∗ Expjt + ε4femi ∗ wci ∗ Expjt+
C′itτ1 + F
′
jtτ2 + ηst + ηij + εijst
(3.4)
As in Section 3.3.1, the main source of identification is given by changes in
wages of workers that remain within the same firm as it varies its export share
throughout time. This enables us to obtain an estimate of the effect of export
on the gender wage gap across different occupation groups which is not biased by
workers’ selection into export-oriented firms.
As before, the specification described in equation (3.4) does not allow us to
estimate the total gender wage gap because the marginal effects on time-invariant
variables, like female and white collar dummies and their interaction, are subsumed
by the match fixed effects.14 Nevertheless, it gives us relevant information on the
differential effects of export on the gender wage gap for the two groups of workers.
The coefficients reported in Table C2, however return a gap of 19.1 and 19.9
percent, respectively for blue and white collar femal employees, respectively.
The most informative coefficients for our study are ε2 and (ε2 + ε4), which
give us information on the effect of export on the (complementary of the) gender
wage gap among blue collars and white collars, respectively. Additionally, relevant
information is given by the coefficient on the export variable, ε1, which is the export
wage premium for blue collar male workers, and the sum of ε1 and ε2, that give
us the (absolute) export wage premium for blue collar female workers. Similarly,
the export wage premium for white collar male workers is given by the sum of ε1
and ε3, while the sum of the four coefficients, ε1 + ε2 + ε3 + ε4, informs us about
the export wage premium for white collar female workers.
In the same spirit of what we do in Section 3.3.1, in order to make sure that
these estimates are not affected by other firms’ characteristics that may simul-
taneously affect both export decisions and wages, we also estimate model (3.4)
including additional observable and unobservable controls for firm productivity,
specifically firms’ sales and firm-year fixed effects. In the latter we are only able
to estimate the coefficient on the triple interaction term, fem ∗white ∗Exp, since
the rest of the coefficients are collinear with the fixed effects. Thus, we can only
draw conclusions on the differential impact of trade on the gender wage gap on
white collar workers relative to blue collars.
14We drop observations of workers that switch occupation throughout time to have a clearer
identification of the effect of export on gender wage for white and blue collars. The percentage
of occupation switches in the sample used for the estimation is 3%.
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As before, we use the export share of total sales to measure firms’ export
activity. This implies that the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as
semi-elasticities of the gender wage gap to variation in the firms’ export share,
holding constant the firms’ workforce composition, and firms’ total sales and firms’
unobservable characteristics in the extensions of model (3.4). Additionally, we
estimate model (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) separately on the sample of white collar and
blue collar workers and model (3.4) replacing the export share variable with (the
log of) sales from export, controlling for (the log of) domestic sales. We do this
to have a clear and direct estimate of the elasticity of wages and gender wage
gap to export and domestic sales across occupations. Since this only allows us to
look at these relations for the sub-sample of exporting firms (with positive share
of export), for comparability we also estimate the effect of export share on the
gender wage gap on this restricted sample of firms.
Export and the Gender Wage Gap by Occupation: Results
The results of the estimation of model (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) on the different groups
of blue collar and white collars are reported in Table 3.4.
The first specification reveals that one percentage point increase in the firms’
export share positively affects the gender wage gap among blue collar workers
by 0.016%, and it does not have a significant effect on the wages of blue collar
male workers. The coefficient on the interaction term Female ∗ Export remains
negative and significant at the 1% and 5% level even when controlling for (log of)
firms’ sales and for firm-year fixed effects, respectively.
Interestingly, the results are the opposite for the group of white collar workers.
White collar female workers see an increase in wages of 0.011% compared to their
male colleagues, as their employers rise their export share by one percentage point.
As in the case for blue collar workers, these results are robust to the inclusion of
additional controls for firm productivity and of firm-year fixed effects. There is a
slightly negative effect of export on the wages of white collar male workers’, which
is however only significant when controlling for firms’ sales (column (8)).
Furthermore, an increase in (total) firms’ sales has a negative effect for female
workers in blue collar occupations which is only significant in specification (3.2)
when firm-year fixed effects are not considered (column (2)), while it seems to
benefit both female and male workers in white collar occupations.
As anticipated, approximating the export intensity of firms by the firms’ export
share does not give us a direct measure of the elasticity of export on wages
and gender wage gap, but more importantly, the estimated coefficients are not
immediately comparable with the effects of an expansion in firms’ sales in domestic
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markets. For this reason, we use an alternative measure of firms’ export intensity
- (the log of) the total sales form export- to be able to compare it with the effect
of an increase in (the log) of domestic sales. Since, this only allows us to focus on
the sample of exporting firms, we also report the results focusing on this type of
firms only. In this case, the effect becomes slightly stronger, indicating that one
percentage point increase in the firms’ export share positively affects the gender
wage gap among blue collar workers by 0.017% (column (4)) and reduces it among
white collars by 0.015% (column (9)). The elasticity estimation shows that a 10%
increase in firms’ export sales increases gender wage gap by 0.028% among blue
collar (column (5)), and decreases gender wage gap by 0.047% among white collar
(column (10)). On the other hand, the effect of domestic sale is positive among
blue collar, in the sense that it reduces the gender wage gap, and non significant
among white collar.
The estimation results of the models that include a triple interaction term
between the female dummy, the export variable and the white collar dummy,
described in specification (3.4) are reported in Table 3.5. They largely confirm
the evidence from the baseline estimation on the different groups of white and
blue collar workers described above.
First, in column (1) we report the results of the estimation of model (3.4) using
the variable export share as proxy for the firms’ export activity. The coefficient
on the triple interaction term, ε̂4, reveals the presence of a strongly significant
differentiated impact of export on gender wage gap for white collar relative to blue
collar workers. Specifically, a one percentage point rise in export share induces
a divergence in the gender wage gap between white and blue collar workers by
0.027%. This seems to be due to both a rise of the gender wage differential for
blue collar workers and a reduction for white collar workers. The coefficient that
informs about the female wage premium for blue collars (ε̂2) is in fact negative
and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that a one percentage point
increase in the firms’ export share increases the gender wage gap among blue collar
workers by 0.0145%. Additionally, the estimation results show that this effect can
be attributed mostly to a drop in wages of blue collar female workers, given that
wages on theirs male colleagues are not affected by export (the coefficient ε̂1 is
close to 0 and not significant). Conversely, a one percentage point rise in firms’
export share seem to significantly reduce the gender wage gap for white collar
workers by 0.0128%.15 In this case, we can say that both white collar men and
15The total effect of export on gender wage gap for white collars is given by the sum of
coefficients ε̂2 = 0.0273 and ε̂4 = 0.0145. They are both statistically significant at 5% and 1%
level respectively.
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women benefit from trade, but the positive effect on women is stronger than for
men. In particular white collar women wages increase by 0.0245% following a unit
increase in the export share, while wages of white collar men only by 0.0117%.16
These results are further confirmed if we modify equation (3.4) to control for
observable firms’ characteristics (column (2)), firm-year fixed effects (column (3))
and when the sample is shrunk to only consider exporters (column (4)). The effect
of export on gender wage gap is significantly different for white and blue collars,
being positive and statistically significant for the former group and negative and
statistically significant for the latter. Additionally, an increase in total sales seem
to have no significant effect of the gender wage gap for blue collar workers, and
a slightly negative effect on the gender wage gap for white collar workers (see
column (2) and (3)).17
The results for the estimation of the specification that uses the alternative
measure of firms’ export intensity - (the log of) the total sales form export- and (the
log) of domestic sales are reported in column (5) of Table 3.5. They confirm that,
even when we net out the unobserved heterogeneity at the match and firm-time
level, what really matters for the gender wage gap is firms’ export activity rather
than domestic sales. Specifically, we obtain that an increase in firms’ sales abroad
reduces gender wage gap for white collar workers, while a rise in domestic sales
seem to be irrelevant for it. A 10% increase in export sales contributes to close
the gender wage gap among white collar employees by roughly 0.05%, while no
significant effects are found for blue collar workers.18 The coefficient that informs
us about it, ε̂2, is in fact non statistically significant. Furthermore, a rise in firms’
domestic sales has no significant effect on the gender wage gap neither for blue
collar or white collar female workers but, interestingly, it reduces the skill premium
for white collar male workers.
In light of the evidence shown in this section, we can conclude that firms’
export activity benefits white collar female workers and harms their blue collar
colleagues, both in absolute terms and relative to their male coworkers. This
seems a strong stylized fact for our observational sample which poses interesting
challenges for its interpretation. In the next section we take on these challenges
16The effect of export on white collar women wages is computed from the convolution of
parameters ε̂1 + ε̂2 + ε̂3 + ε̂4 = 0.0273 + 0.0117− 0.0145− 0.0006. The effect on male white collar
wages is given by ε̂1 + ε̂3 = 0.0117− 0.0006
17Similarly to interpretation of the coefficients for the export variable, the effect of total sales on
gender wage gap of white collar female workers is given by the sum of the coefficient of the triple
interaction (Femi ∗ wci ∗ ln(Sjt) = 0.0077 and the double interaction Female ∗ ln(Sjt) = 0.004
(see column (2), results are similar when firm-year fixed effects are taken into account (column
(3))).
18The total effect on gender wage gap on white collar employees is given by ε̂2 + ε̂4 = 0.0082−
0.003.
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by investigating some of the possible mechanisms that may drive these empirical
results.
3.4 Export and the Gender Wage Gap: Explor-
ing the Mechanisms
So far, we have investigated the effects of firms’ export activity on workers’ wages.
For the purpose of our identification strategy, we have mostly focused on changes
in wages of workers staying within the firm as it intensifies its exports. We have
found no significant effect on the gender wage gap in general, which masks a strong
and positive effect on white collar female workers’ wages and a negative one on
blue collar female workers. Moreover, we have shown an increase in domestic sales
to have a significantly weaker effect than an expansion in export. In this section
we try to understand the channels that may be driving these results.
The fact that the gender wage gap reacts more to export than domestic sales
suggests that selling to foreign markets may require the firm to change the intensity
in the use of certain skills in a way that makes women relatively more demanded in
non-production tasks. This is aligned with the existing evidence that women tend
to have a comparative advantage in performing white collar tasks, especially those
intensive in interpersonal relations and in the use of computers, while they have a
disadvantage in blue collar, “brawn”-intensive occupations (see Spitz-Oener, 2006;
Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010; Borghans, Weel and Weinberg, 2014, Petrongolo and
Ngai, 2014; Cortes et al., 2018). If export requires a more intensive use of “male”
skills in production (e.g., because it changes the production line in a way that calls
for more “brawn”), and of “female” skills in non-production tasks (e.g., because
it takes more ability in interpersonal relations to deal with foreign customers),
an expansion in foreign activities will increase (decrease) the demand for females
in white-collar (blue-collar) occupations. We assess this mechanism, based on
gender-specific comparative advantage following three steps.
First, we check whether labour demand responds to changes in export con-
sistently with the proposed mechanism. Unfortunately, given that we do not
observe the number of hours worked in the LIAB dataset, we can only focus on
the extensive margin of labour demand, leaving the effect on the intensive margin
to be the object of investigation in future research.
Second, given that our identification strategy focuses on changes in relative
wages of workers that stay within the firm as it exports more, we look at the effect
of export on the (relative) probability of promotions especially of female white
collar workers. As it has been recently shown by Bronson and Thoursie (2017),
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differences in promotion rates are an important determinant of the gender wage
gap, explaining most of the lifecycle wage differences between women and men.
Exploring the effect of export on promotion probabilities seems therefore a useful
exercise to shed some light on what drives the drop in gender wage gap among
white collar workers. Following Black and Brainerd (2004), we may argue that as
the firm intensifies its export activity and faces more competition, it reduces its
discriminatory practices by promoting women more. Or, similarly, it may be that
white collar female workers become particularly valuable to the firm as it exports
more, so that the firm promotes them in order to retain them.
To investigate further whether women performing specific tasks are more
valuable and more paid as the firm exports more, we also split the samples of
blue and white collar workers in groups of occupations classified according to the
intensity of tasks performed on the job. Specifically, we consider five occupational
sub-categories: manual routine, manual non-routine, cognitive routine, analytic
non-routine, and interactive non-routine. On this sub-samples we estimate the
same regressions presented in Section 3.3.1.
3.4.1 Export and Firms’ Labour Demand
In this section we explore the effects of export on firms’ labour demand. Specifi-
cally, since we observe a rise (drop) in wages of white (blue) collar female workers
relative to their male colleagues in the same occupation, we want to test whether
this effect is accompanied by an increase (decrease) in the firm relative demand for
this group of workers. Unfortunately, given that we do not observe hours worked,
we can only look at the effects of export of firms’ labour demand at the extensive
margin. Since in the wage analysis we only focused of full time workers, we do the
same here and only consider employed the workers that are employed full time.
Specifically, we estimate the following linear model at the firm-year level:
Yjt = γ1lnExpjt + F
′
jtβ1 + ηj + εjt (3.5)
where the dependent variable Yjt represents, respectively, (1) the total share of
white collar workers, (2) the total share of women among white collars and, lastly,
(3) the total share of women among blue collars.
One caveat of this specification is that it only allows to look at the correlation
between firms’ export and the total share of workers, without distinguishing
between new-comers and stayers. Thus, to fully understand if and on which
component of the workforce the firm is implementing the changes, we also estimate
model (3.5) using only the sub-sample of newly hired workers. These are defined
as workers that are employed in firm j at time t but were not employed in firm j
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at time t− 1, t− 2 and t− 3.
We use the (log of) export as proxy for firm’s export activity and we always
control for the the (log of) domestic sales as proxy for firm’s productivity.19 As a
robustness check, we also estimate the same relationship using the (log of) export
and domestic sales at time t− 1, since it is plausible that demand adjustments as
a response to changes in export may take one period to implement.
Unfortunately, in this specification we can only control for firms’ time invariant
unobserved heterogeneity, since including firm-year fixed effects would not allow
us to estimate the impact of export on the changes in the shares of workers within
the firm. We are aware that this prevents us from drawing conclusions on the
causal effect of sales from export on changes in firms’ labour demand. However,
we believe that studying correlations between firms’ export activity and workforce
composition can be informative for our analysis.
The results of the models’ estimations exploiting within-firm variation are
reported in Table 3.6. In column (1) we show firm’s export and domestic sales to
be non-significantly correlated with the share of white collar workers. Column (2),
however, suggests that as the firm exports more, it employs more female white
collars relative to male. This result holds and becomes even stronger if we keep
the share of female workers from the previous period constant. This variable is
used as a control for firm-specific factors, like hiring preferences, and it strongly
predicts gender workforce composition among white collars, as shown in column
(3). Finally, when we turn to the share of female blue collars in columns (4)
and (5), we find no significant correlation with firms’ export and a weak positive
association with domestic sales, which disappears as we control for the share of
female workers in the firm.
Results from the estimation of model (3.5) for newly hired workers are reported
in Table 3.7.20 The coefficients for the log of export are non-significanlty different
from zero across all specifications for the number of new hires and the share of
female workers in newly hired white and blue collars. We find similar results for
both the total demand and hiring patterns even when we use the lagged value of
export and domestic sales as explanatory variables (see Table 3.8 and 3.9).
In conclusion, more export activity within the firm is associated to a slightly
higher share of female white collar workers and no significant changes in the share
of female blue collar workers. No significant results are found when we check if the
19We find similar results even when we use the share of export on total sales as a measure of
firms’ export activity.
20When reading these results we have to keep in mind that in the whole dataset the share of
newly hired workers relative to the whole workforce is equal to 3%, showing that most of the
workers where already employed in the firm as the survey started.
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adjustment is happening at the hiring margin. Thus, the reduction in gender wage
gap for white collar female workers seems not to be driven by a significant increase
in the firm demand at the extensive margin for this group of workers. However,
if no additional white collar women (relative to men) are hired by the firm as it
exports more, the ones with positive tenure within the firm could also be asked
to increase their working hours to meet the firm’ rise in demand, contributing to
reduce the gender wage gap. Unfortunately, we cannot test whether the channel
of labour demand at the intensive margin is relevant, given that our data do not
have information of working hours.
3.4.2 Export and Promotions
After showing export to only slightly increase the relative demand for women in
white collar occupations, we now investigate whether white (blue) collar female
workers employed within the firm become relatively more (less) valuable as the
firm exports more. We do so by looking at the effects of export on the relative
probability of promotion of female workers for white and blue collar workers. We
use the same identification strategy of Section 3.3.2 and focus on workers that stay
within the firm as it expands its export activity. In this way we control for possible
sources of bias due to match-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved match
heterogeneity could bias the results because if the firm employs better workers as
it exports more it can also be inclined to promote them more.
To define the probability of promotion we follow Bronson and Thoursie (2017)
and record a promotion as a given discrete percentage change in an individual’s
wage compared to the rest of the co-workers in the same broad occupation category
(white collar versus blue collar). In practice, we first compute the average yearly
wage growth rate of the two groups of white and blue collar workers in the same
firm and year. Then, we consider a worker to be promoted if he or she experiences
a change in wages that is 10% higher compared to the rest of the workers within
his or her occupation category.21
Promotions are very few in the dataset: among people that stay within the
firm for at least two periods, we only observe on average 5.63% of promotions.22
This result is in line with the literature, for example for Swedish data Bronson
21As a robustness check, we also slightly modify the definition of promotion by only considering
a worker to be promoted if he or she experiences a change in wages that is 15% higher compared
to the rest of the workers within his or her occupation category.
22The percentage of promotions in the dataset is equal to 2.40% when we use the second
definition of promotions, in which we only consider a worker to be promoted if he or she
experiences a change in wages that is 15% higher compared to the rest of the workers within his
or her occupation category.
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and Thoursie (2017) find that promotions only occur two or three times maximum
in a worker’s life.
Specifically, in line with Section 3.3.1, we estimate the following linear
probability model:
Pr(promotion)ijst =ζ1Expjt + ζ2femi ∗ Expjt + ζ3wci ∗ Expjt+
ζ4femi ∗ wci ∗ Expjt + C′itυ1 + F′jtυ2 + ηst + ηij + εijst
(3.6)
where, Pr(promotion)ijst represents the probability of individual i in firm j in
sector s of receiving an increase in the salary at time t relative to time t− 1 that
is higher than 10% the average increase in salary of his/hers colleagues. Here, we
directly use the (log of) sales from export to proxy the export variable and we
control for the (log of) domestic sales as a proxy for firm productivity, to obtain a
direct measure of the elasticities of promotion to these two variables. We estimate
the model also controlling for firm-year fixed effects in order to take into account
possible sources of bias that may affect both export decision and probability of
promotion. The interpretation of the parameters follows the explanation in Section
3.3.2. We are particularly interested in the estimation of parameter ζ4, which
informs us about the extent of the gender gap in the probability of being promoted
among white collar relative to blue collar workers.
The estimation results of model (3.6) are reported in Table 3.10. In column
(1) we show the baseline results, and in column (2) the outcome of the estimation
that includes firm-year fixed effects. The baseline results show a negative and
significant effect of export on the probability of promotion of blue collar male
workers (coefficient ζ̂1) and a positive and significant effect of export on the
probability of promotion of white collar male workers (coefficient ζ̂3). We
find that the coefficient for the triple interaction term, ζ̂4, is positive but not
statistically significant signalling no differential impact of export on the probability
of promotion for white collar female workers relative to their male white collar
colleagues. Interestingly, an increase in domestic sales seems to have similar effects
of a rise in export, fostering career progressions of white collar male workers and
reducing the promotion probability of blue collar male workers. It also seems that
white collar female workers see their probability of being promoted reduced as the
firm increases domestic sales.
However, once we subsume firm’s export and domestic sales with firm-year
fixed effects, results are different: the estimates in column (2) shows a positive
and significant coefficient for the triple interaction term, ζ̂4, equal to 0.0053, which
indicates that white collar women face a higher probability of being promoted
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relative to men as the firm intensifies its exports.23
Interestingly, the effect of an expansion of domestic sales has opposite sign,
indicating that white collar men mostly benefit from this in terms of promotions.
No significant effects of both export and domestic sales are found for men and
blue collar workers.
In conclusion, we can say that the reduction in gender wage gap for white collar
workers is accompanied by a slightly higher probability of promotion for white
collar female workers, as firms intensify their export activity. This may indicate
that, as firms export more, their matches with female white collar workers become
increasingly valuable. This would be justified by the presence of a comparative
advantage of this group of workers in tasks which the firm values more as it exports
more.
3.4.3 Export, Gender Wage Gap and Occupational Task
Content
Up to now we have documented a reduction and a rise in the gender wage gap
among white and blue collar workers, respectively, associated with the increase of
firms’ export intensity. We have also shown that this is accompanied by a positive
correlation between firms’ export and share of female employees among white
collar workers (with no significant changes in hirings) and by a slight increase in
the relative female-male promotion probability among white collars compared to
blue collars.
The combination of these empirical facts seems to indicate that white collar
women employed in firms that intensify their export activity perform jobs
particularly valuable to this end. In support to this, previous research has
documented that international firms value more non-routine, interactive jobs
compared to routine ones (Becker, Ekholm, and Muendler, 2013). In parallel, a
growing body of literature documents that women have a comparative advantage
in non-routine tasks requiring interpersonal skills, whose demand has increased
in the past decades, contributing to the reduction in the gender wage gap
(Spitz-Oener, 2006; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010; Borghans, Weel, and Weinberg,
2014; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2016; Cortes, Jaimovich, and Siu, 2018).
The availability of detailed data on the content of the activities performed
on the job by workers in Germany is a powerful resource to empirically test the
validity of this channel. Specifically, we classify occupations according to their
23Results do not change significantly when we increase from 10% to 15% the threshold of
relative wage increase in the definition of promotion (see Table 3.11).
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“task content”, that is the detailed set of activities performed on the job, using
the information provided in the “Survey on qualification and working conditions”
(BiBB/IAB and BIBB/BAuA- 91/92, 98/99, 2006), and estimate the effect of
firms’ exports on the gender wage gap for each occupational sub-category. In the
econometric analysis, we use the same estimation framework described in Section
3.3.1 in models (3.1), (3.2), (3.3).
The “Survey on qualification and working conditions” consists of a repeated
cross section of a random sample of workers covering 0.1 percent of the German
labour force. It contains detailed information on workers’ attributes (age, gender,
education), earnings and occupation, as well as information on the workplace
characteristics. In particular, it provides detailed data on the set of activities
performed in each job, that allows us to classify 15 longitudinally consistent
tasks, following the methodology given in Becker and Muendler (2014). Based
on the definition of tasks, we follow Spitz-Oener (2006) and group occupations in
five sub-categories based on the activity performed more often on the job. The
five sub-categories are: 1) Manual routine, 2) Manual non-routine, 3) Cognitive
non-routine, 4) Analytic non-routine, 5) Interactive non-routine. A detailed
description of the definition of tasks and their mapping into occupation categories
is provided in Appendix 3.B. After we assign one category for each occupation
based on its task content, we link the information to the LIAB dataset using the
occupational code KldB2010 with three digit level of detail. This allows us to
obtain a unique matched employer-employee dataset with detailed information on
the activities performed by workers on the job.
We show the breakdown of occupation categories by task content for white
collar and blue collar workers in Table 3.12. In our dataset, 70% of white
collar occupations are categorized as interactive non-routine, followed by 21%
categorised as analytic non-routine, and less than 10% classified as manual.24
Among blue collar occupations, 64% are classified as manual routine, 21% as
interactive non-routine and 8% as manual non-routine.25
We perform our estimation on all sub-categories of occupations for white and
blue collar workers, but we only report the results for the most representative
ones for both groups. That is, we report the estimation results of models (3.1),
(3.2), (3.3) for interactive non-routine and analytic non-routine occupations for
white collar workers in Table 3.13, and for manual routine, interactive non-routine
24Examples of white collar manual routine jobs are: postal deliverers, railway engine drivers,
office auxiliary workers and of white collar manual non-routine jobs: nurses, social workers, care
workers.
25Some relevant examples of blue collar interactive non-routine jobs are: waiters, stewards,
domestic and non-domestic servants, Watchmen, custodians, cooks.
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and manual non-routine occupations for blue collar workers in Table 3.14. More
specifically, for each sub-group of occupations, in the first column of the results
tables, we report the estimates of baseline model (3.1), in which use the firms’
export share on total sales to proxy for firms’ export activity, and we control for
match fixed effects only (in addition to federal state, sector-year fixed effects).
In the second column, we report the estimates of model (3.2), in which we add
controls for firm productivity proxied by the firm’s total sales. In the third column,
we show the results of the estimation of model (3.3), in which we add to the
previous specification controls for firm-year fixed effects to absorb shocks at the
firm-year level that could bias the results. The fourth column of each sub-category
shows the estimated gender wage gap elasticity to export and domestic sales,
computed on the restricted sample of exporting firms.
The estimation results reported in Table 3.13 show no significant relation
between firms’ export activity and the gender wage gap for white collar workers
employed in analytic non-routine occupations. In fact, the estimates in all model
specifications are not statistically significant. On the contrary, white collar female
workers mostly performing interactive tasks, seem to benefit from firms’ export
activity significantly. More specifically, column (5) of Table 3.13, in which we
report the results of the estimation of the baseline model, shows that a one
percentage point increase in export share is associated to a 0.0071% increase in the
relative wage of female employees, statistically significant at the 5% level. The
effect on the (log) wages of male employees is also positive, but smaller in size
and not statistically significant, indicating that the reduction in the gender wage
gap is mostly attributable to a rise in wages of tenured female employees. The
correlation between export share and relative wages of female employees working
in this group of occupations stays positive and significant even when we control
for the (log of) the firms’ total sales and doesn’t vary significantly in size (column
(6)). In this case, a 1% increase in export share reduces the gender wage gap by
0.0067%. Additionally, an increase in firms’ total sales has a positive effect both on
the relative wage of female employees and on the wages of male employees. Adding
firm-year fixed effects (column (7)) doesn’t make the coefficient that captures the
relation between export share and the gender wage gap vary significantly in size,
but in this case it is no longer statistically significant. Interestingly, the relative
female-male wage elasticity to export sales is positive and significant at the 1%
level for this group of workers, indicating that a 10% increase in export sales
contributes to close the gender wage gap for this group workers by roughly 0.03%,
while the gender wage gap seem to not respond to variation in domestic sales
(column (8)).
The results for the sub-groups of blue collar workers in Table 3.14 show that
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women employed in manual routine occupations are significantly disadvantaged
by the firm’s export activity. Specifically, a one percentage point increase
in export share is associated with a 0.02% reduction in the relative wage of
female employees, statistically significant at the 1% level (column (1)), while
the (log) wage of male workers in this category seems not to be significantly
affected by export. The results are confirmed even controlling for firms’ total
sales (column (2)). Additionally, a rise in firms’ total sales is associated with
a statistically significant increase in the wage of male employees and with a
statistically significant decrease in the relative wage of female employees. Adding
firm-year fixed effects (column (3)) partly absorbs the effect of export on gender
wage gap, thereby reducing the magnitude of the coefficient representing the
relation between the two variables, but without affecting the sign nor the statistical
significance. Specifically, the estimates indicate that a one percentage point
increase in export share is associated to a 0.01% reduction in the relative wage of
female employees, statistically significant at the 1% level. Finally, the estimated
elasticity of female employees relative wage to export sales and domestic sales are,
respectively, negative and positive, but not statistically significant (column (4)).
The results for the sub-group of blue collar manual non-routine workers are in
line with the ones on the manual routine occupations, showing a negative effect
of export on the relative wages of female blue collar employees, but they are not
statistically significant for all the estimated specifications. The only exception
is the one reported in column (6), in which we estimate the model controlling
for firms’ total sales. In particular, it shows a strong and statistically significant
negative correlation between export and relative wage of female workers. Firms’
exports seem not to have any significant effect on wages of blue collar workers
performing interactive non-routine jobs. However, in contrast with the results for
the other occupational sub-categories for blue collar workers, in this case a rise in
domestic sales seems to significantly contribute to the closure of the gender wage
gap.
In light of these results, we can conclude that the total positive effect of an
increase in firms’ exports on the relative wage of white collar female workers,
discussed in Section 3.3 and reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, is likely to be driven by
increases in wages of female workers employed in occupations in which interactive
non-routine tasks are most intensively performed. Additionally, it seems that the
widening of the gender wage gap in response to firms’ exports expansion among
blue collar workers is mostly driven by manual routine occupations. However,
we have seen that the estimated gender wage gap elasticities to export are not
significant for blue collar workers in general and, specifically, for the sub-group of
manual routine workers.
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These results seem to justify the validity of the comparative advantage channel
in explaining the correlations between firms’ export expansion and reduction
in gender wage gap for (tenured) white collar workers. As the firm expands
its exports, it values more highly qualified workers performing non routine
interpersonal jobs, for which women have a comparative advantage. This induces
the firm to increase their wages, as for example to pay them for a production
bonus or simply in order to retain them, thereby contributing to the closure of the
gender wage gap.
3.5 Robustness Checks
In this section we perform some checks to make sure our results are robust to
changes to the models’ specification.
Our main concern is given by censoring in the wage variable. As explained in
Section 3.2, the information on wages provided in the LIAB dataset is censored
up to a contribution limit. Specifically, 13% of wages are censored in the whole
dataset. This issue mostly affects white collar workers, among which 33% of
observations results to be censored, while it only affects 4% of observations in
the group of blue collar workers. Additionally, among white collars, the share of
censored wages for male and female workers are respectively equal to 46.45% and
8.76%.
Therefore, if exports affected wages of men above the contribution limits, we
would not be able to see its true effect, and our results on the closing gender wage
gap among white collar workers may be biased.
The approaches in the literature to deal with this issue are essentially two, one
is to drop censored observations (see Baumgarten, Geishecker, and Görg, 2013),
and the other one is to impute a wage using a Tobit model for censored data
(see Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2007). For now, we depart from these two
approaches and deal with this problem differently.26 Specifically, we check whether
our estimation of the impact of export on wages for white collar workers is mostly
captured by the censored observations. In practice, we estimate the following
26Given that our analysis focuses on the differential effects of trade on white and blue collar
workers, and that a high share of wages of white collar workers is censored, we prefer not
to drop these observations in order to not lose relevant information and estimation power.
Additionally, we do not perform wage imputation because we would have to take into account in
the procedure firms’ export, given that it represents the focus of the analysis. Schank , Schnabel
and Wagner (2007) have a similar problem and imputes wages of white collar workers by draws
of a random variable using a truncated distribution, by also considering firm level fixed effects
in the imputation procedure. He finds a slightly higher effect of export on wages when using
imputed wages.
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linear model on the sub-sample of white collar workers:
lnwijst =ζ1Expjt + ζ2femi + ζ3(femi ∗ Expjt) + ζ4censi,t−1+
ζ5(femi ∗ censi,t−1) + ζ6(censi,t−1 ∗ Expjt)+
ζ7(femi ∗ Expjt ∗ censi,t−1) + C′itχ1 + F′jtχ2 + ηst + ηij + εijst
(3.7)
where, censi,t−1 is a dummy variable indicating whether the wage observation was
censored at time (t− 1).
The model mimics specification (3.4), and the source of identification follows
the main estimation strategy, which exploits variation of wages for workers staying
within the same firm as it varies its exports throughout time. Similarly to what
we do in Section 3.3.2, we estimate equation (3.7) first approximating the firm’s
export activity with the export share and then with the log of export. We also
estimate the model including firm-year fixed effects.
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 3.15. In column (1) we
show the estimates of the baseline estimation, in column (2) the estimates of the
model specification with firm-year fixed effects, in column (3) we report the results
only for the sample of exporting firms and in column (4) we report the estimates
the relative wage elasticity to export and domestic sales obtained by using the log
of export and of domestic sales.
In all specifications, we find a positive and significant coefficient ζ̂3, which
implies that export is associated with a reduction of the gender wage gap for
workers that are not affected by wage censoring. Additionally, we find a small and
positive effect of export on wages for women affected by censoring and an slightly
negative effect on men in the same category.27
The fact that we find an effect of export on gender wage gap for workers not
affected by censoring that is in line with the main results, provide some confidence
for the validity of our estimations, at least from a qualitative point of view.
To further validate our results we perform some additional robustness checks.
In Table 3.16 we report the results of the estimation of model (3.4) for the
differential impact of export on blue collar and white collar workers using the (one
period) lagged value of export instead of the current value. We may in fact think
that wages adjustment relative to changes in firms’ export are not immediate and
could take some time to implement, so that the current value export is a biased
measure which is picking up some other factor. The results confirm the predictions
of the main specification showing a drop in the gender wage gap for white collar
27The effect of export on censored wages of female workers is given by the sum of coefficients
ζ̂1, ζ̂3, ζ̂6 and ζ̂7; while the effect on censored wages for male workers if given by ζ̂1 + ζ̂6.
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workers. However, the results for blue collar workers are not significant.
We also run the same model on the sub-sample of high-tenure workers (with
more than three years of continuous employment within the same firm). The
results are reported in Table 3.17, and confirm that export has a negative effect
on the gender wage gap for white collar workers, independently of whether these
are recent hires.
Finally, to gauge the importance of adopting our idenfication strategy, based on
within firm-worker variation, and for better comparability with previous works, in
Appendix C, we estimate the main specifications of Tables 3 and 4 exploiting only
within-sector and within-firm variation. The results show export to be associated
to a reduction in the gender wage gap for both blue and white collar workers.
This, compared to the evidence in Section 3 indicate the key importance of the
sorting between firms and workers in driving the results.
3.6 Conclusions
International trade has long been considered as one of the main causes of the
increase in income inequality, by favouring some workers and penalizing others.
At the same time, the investigation of the forces driving the gender wage gap -
declining in the recent years, but still existent - has attracted the attention of
academic economists and policy makers. However, the relationship between these
two important trends has received little attention.
We contribute to filling this gap in the literature by investigating the role of
firms’ export activity on the gender wage gap, using matched employer-employee
data on Germany for the 1993-2007 period. The structure of the dataset allows us
to observe the changes throughout time in export sales of the single firm and the
evolution of wages of all the workers employed by that specific firm. We exploit
this feature of the data to estimate what we believe is the causal relationship
between exports and the gender wage gap. Specifically, we focus on the same
pair of female-male workers employed in the firm and look at the changes in their
relative wages as the firm expands its export activity. This specification is likely
to reveal the causal effect of export on the gender wage gap because it takes into
account the possible sources of bias related to individual and firm characteristics,
sorting and reverse causality issues.
Our first baseline estimates reveal no effect of export on the gender wage gap
on average. However, when we split the sample by workers’ occupation, we find
that an increase in export reduces the gender wage gap among white collar workers
and increases it by a similar amount among blue collar workers.
When probing deeper into the mechanism behind this result, we find evidence
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supporting the hypothesis that export reinforces female comparative advantage in
tasks considered more important by international firms, such as the non-routine
interactive ones. In particular, we show that the results on the closing gender
wage gap for white collar workers are mostly driven by the sub-group of workers
that perform more interactive non-routine jobs.
A limitation of our data is the lack of information on the number of hours
worked by each employee. Availability of this variable would allow us, in future
work, to estimate the effect of export on the intensive margin of the demand for
labour at the worker-firm level and hence to further assess our proposed mechanism
through gender comparative advantage.
The evidence in this paper provides some important insights. First, it
highlights the role of trade as an opportunity for the reduction of the gender
wage gap among non-production workers, but also as a threat especially for
women in occupations for which they have a comparative disadvantage. Besides
underscoring a so far overlooked determinant of gender disparities in earnings,
this is relevant for policy makers, since it suggest for instance how to structure
re-training programmes in such a way that globalisation helps to reduce the wage
gender gap for more women. Second, it contributes to the understanding of the
sources of comparative advantage in trade models. An interesting implication of
our resuts is that variation in female labour force participation may help explaining
the differences in export performance across countries (see Bonfiglioli, Crinò, and
Gancia, 2019) and over time. Linking our micro evidence to aggregate outcomes
seems therefore an interesting avenue for future research.
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3.7 Figures
Figure 3.1 – Average Percentage of Exporting Firms by Sector in West Germany,
1993-2007
Notes: All numbers refer to average share of exporting firms operating in West-Germany during
the years 1993-2007 by sector of activity classified according to the NACE Rev.2 system. The
x-axis represents the sector of activity.
The data source is the LIAB dataset for years 1993-2007.
Figure 3.2 – Average Percentage of Female Workers by Sector in West Germany,
1993-2007
Notes: All numbers refer to average share of female workers in West-Germany during the years
1993-2007 by sector of activity classified according to the NACE Rev.2 system. The x-axis
represents the sector of activity.
The data source is the LIAB dataset for years 1993-2007.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1 – Firm Export Activity in West Germany, 1993-2007
IAB LIAB
Establishment panel MEE data
Share of exporting plants 22% 33%
Share of exports on total sales 7% 31%
Employment share of exporting plants 68%
Share of firms switching export status 5%
Average number of switches of
export status per firm 1.9
Notes: All numbers refer to averages of the indicated variables for the sample of establishments
operating in West-Germany during the years 1993-2007. The data sources are IAB Establishment
panel and LIAB dataset.
Table 3.2 – Exporters vs Non-Exporters Characteristics by Gender
Non Exporting Firms Exporting Firms
All Male Female All Male Female
Ln(Firm size) 6.38 7.52
Ln(Total sales) 18.18 19.64
Female share or labour force 0.25 0.18
Log daily wage 4.47 4.53 4.28 4.58 4.62 4.39
Experience (years) 15.99 16.56 14.35 16.19 16.50 14.80
Age 38.43 38.95 36.92 38.68 39.00 37.26
Education
1. low skill 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.32
2. medium skill 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.60
3. high skill 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.08
Occupation
1. White collar 0.41 0.31 0.72 0.28 0.23 0.46
2. Blue collar 0.59 0.72 0.28 0.72 0.77 0.54
Notes: All numbers refer to average values of the indicated variables for the sample of
establishments operating in West-Germany during the years 1993-2007 and are computed on
the linked dataset (LIAB). Firm size represents the average number of full time employees in
the firm. The establishments total sales and daily wages are expressed in real values, converted
in (Euro) 2000 prices using the German CPI index.
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Table 3.3 – GWG and Exports: All Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Export share 0.0028 -0.0007 -0.0005
(0.004) 0.005 (0.005)
Female* Export share 0.0018 0.0007 0.0001 0.0049
(0.005) 0.006 (0.006) (0.005)
Ln(total sales) 0.0090*** 0.0090***
0.002 (0.002)
Female*ln(total sales) -0.0015 0.0004
(0.002) (0.001)
Experience/10 0.2513*** 0.2452*** 0.2467*** 0.3647***
(0.02) 0.02 (0.021) (0.023)
Experience sq./100 -0.0442*** -0.0444*** -0.0444*** -0.0452***
(0.001) 0.001 (0.001) (0.001)
White Collar 0.0268*** 0.0279*** 0.0279*** 0.0268***
(0.002) 0.002 (0.002) (0.002)
Ln(firm size) 0.0297*** 0.0231*** 0.0230***
(0.004) 0.004 (0.004)
Federal State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes No
Match FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Year FE No No No Yes
Observations 9,283,280 8,024,723 8,025,555 8,024,165
R-sq. 0.947 0.947 0.946 0.951
Notes: The dependent variable is log wages in real values. Note that including firm-year fixed
effects in the estimation makes sector-year fixed effects redundant, since firms do not change
sector of activity in the estimation sample. The data source is the LIAB dataset for years
1993-2007.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
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Table 3.4 – GWG and Exports: Blue Collar vs White Collar
Blue Collar White Collar
Elasticities Elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Expjt 0.00516 0.00268 -0.0019 -0.0056*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Female * Expjt -0.0161** -0.0211*** -0.0123** -0.0171** -0.0028*** 0.0115*** 0.0137*** 0.0117** 0.0152** 0.0047***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001)
Ln(Sjt) 0.0102*** 0.0044***
(0.002) (0.001)
Female * Ln(Sjt) -0.0038* -0.0018 -0.0022 0.0020** 0.0040** 0.0040** 0.0079*** 0.0003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience/10 0.1989*** 0.1894*** 0.3057*** 0.2959*** 0.2948*** 0.3997*** 0.4082*** 0.5558*** 0.5104*** 0.5084***
(0.019) (0.02) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.032) (0.047) (0.054) (0.054)
Experience sq./100 -0.0375*** -0.0377*** -0.0392*** -0.0382*** -0.0382*** -0.0607*** -0.0612*** -0.0611*** -0.0631*** -0.0631***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Ln(firm size) 0.0421*** 0.0334*** 0.0142*** 0.0114***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Federal State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Match FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,429,934 5,580,870 5,578,197 4,274,680 4,264,457 2,821,512 2,417,122 2,412,202 1,547,613 1,541,925
R-sq. 0.936 0.935 0.943 0.939 0.939 0.954 0.953 0.956 0.948 0.948
Sample Blue Collar, Blue Collar, Blue Collar, Blue Collar, Blue Collar, White Collar, White Collar, White Collar, White Collar, White Collar,
All firms All firms All firms Only Exporters Only Exporters All firms All firms All firms Only Exporters Only Exporters
Notes: The dependent variable is log wages in real values. The results reported in columns
(1)-(2)-(3)-(4)-(5) refer to blue collar workers and those in columns (6)-(7)-(8)-(9)-(10) to white
collar workers. In column (1)-(2)-(3)-(4) and (6)-(7)-(8)-(9) we use export share on total sales
to approximate firms’ export activity Expjt, and the firms’ total sales to approximate the term
lnSjt. In column (5) and (10) we use the logarithm of sales from export to approximate firms’
export activity Expjt, and domestic sales to approximate the term Sjt. Notice that including
firm-year fixed effects in the estimation makes sector-year fixed effects redundant, since firms do
not change sector of activity in the estimation sample. The data source is the LIAB dataset for
years 1993-2007.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
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Table 3.5 – GWG and Exports: The differential Effect on Blue and White Collar
Workers
Elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expjt -0.0006 -0.0048
(0.005) (0.007)
Female * Expjt -0.0145** -0.0193** -0.0120** -0.0158** -0.0030
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002)
White Collar * Expjt 0.0117* 0.0156* 0.0135* 0.0241*** 0.002
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002)
Female * White Collar * Expjt 0.0273*** 0.0337*** 0.0280*** 0.0342*** 0.0082***
(0.008) (0.01) (0.008) (0.01) (0.002)
Ln(Sjt) 0.0110***
(0.002)
Female * ln(Sjt) -0.0040 -0.0019 -0.0031 0.0014
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
White collar * ln(Sjt) -0.0068*** -0.0050** -0.0071** -0.0075***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Female * White Collar *ln(Sjt) 0.0077** 0.0060** 0.0109*** -0.0018
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Experience/10 0.2518*** 0.2467*** 0.3784*** 0.3486*** 0.3493***
(0.02) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Experience sq./100 -0.0435*** -0.0436*** -0.0443*** -0.0431*** -0.0431***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(firm size) 0.0300*** 0.0234***
(0.004) (0.004)
Federal State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes Yes No No No
Match FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,962,723 7,737,149 7,735,686 5,646,549 5,620,203
R-sq. 0.948 0.947 0.952 0.95 0.948
Sample All All All Only Exporters Only Exporters
Notes: The dependent variable is log wages in real values. In column (1)-(2)-(3)-(4) we use
export share on total sales to approximate firms’ export activity Expjt, and the firms’ total
sales to approximate the term lnSjt. In column (5) we use the logarithm of sales from export
to approximate firms’ export activity Expjt, and domestic sales to approximate the term Sjt.
Notice that including firm-year fixed effects in the estimation makes sector-year fixed effects
redundant, since firms do not change sector of activity in the estimation sample. The data
source is the LIAB dataset for years 1993-2007.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
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Table 3.6 – Firm Demand
Share of White Collar Share of Female White Collar Share of Female Blue Collar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(Export) -0.0011 0.0027*** 0.0035*** -0.0007 -0.0005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(Domestic Sales) -0.0005 0.0028 0.0018 0.0017* 0.0006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Female Share(t−1) 0.8549*** 0.6300***
(0.015) 0.009
Federal State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector - Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,916 15,414 15,412 15,286 15,285
R-sq 0.968 0.895 0.917 0.962 0.973
Notes: The share of white collar workers in column (1) is computed as the ratio between full-time
white collar workers and all full time workers. The share of female white collar workers in column
(2)-(3) is computed as the ratio between full-time female white collar workers and white collar
workers. The share of female blue collar workers in column (4)-(5) is computed as the ratio
between full-time female blue collar workers and blue collar workers. The data source is the
LIAB dataset for years 1993-2007, collapsed at the firm level.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
Table 3.7 – Hiring Patterns
Dep. Vars.: Ln(1+New Hires) New Hired White Collars New Hired Female White Collars New Hired Female Blue Collars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Export) 0.0147 0.0033 0.0041 0.0023 -0.0011 -0.0018
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011)
Ln(Domestic Sales) 0.0420*** 0.0031 0.0107 0.0111 0.0064 0.0067
(0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013)
Female Share(t−1) -0.6331** -0.2645
(0.276) (0.19)
Federal State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectory-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,916 5,844 3,627 3,627 4,256 4,256
R-sq 0.652 0.523 0.469 0.47 0.625 0.625
Notes: Newly hired workers are defined as workers employed in firm j at time y but not in t−1,
t − 2, t − 3. The share of newly hired white collar workers in column (2) is computed as the
ratio between newly hired full-time white collar workers and all newly hired full time workers.
The share of female white collar workers in column (3)-(4) is computed as the ratio between
newly hired full-time female white collar workers and newly hired white collar workers. The
share of female blue collar workers in column (5)-(6) is computed as the ratio between newly
hired full-time female blue collar workers and newly hired full-time blue collar workers. The
data source is the LIAB dataset for years 1993-2007, collapsed at the firm level.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
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Table 3.8 – Firm Demand and Export Dynamics
Share of White Collar Share of Female White Collar Share of Female Blue Collar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(Export)(t−1) -0.0015 0.0021 0.0021** -0.0007 -0.0003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(Domestic Sales)(t−1) 0.0031 -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0013
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Female Share(t−1) 0.9277*** 0.6742***
(0.019) (0.012)
Federal State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,367 11,049 11,049 10,966 10,966
R-sq 0.969 0.904 0.927 0.966 0.976
Notes: The share of white collar workers in column (1) is computed as the ratio between full-time
white collar workers and all full time workers. The share of female white collar workers in column
(2)-(3) is computed as the ratio between full-time female white collar workers and white collar
workers. The share of female blue collar workers in column (4)-(5) is computed as the ratio
between full-time female blue collar workers and blue collar workers. Export and domestic sales
are one period lagged. The data source is the LIAB dataset for years 1993-2007, collapsed at
the firm level.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
Table 3.9 – Hiring Patterns and Export Dynamics
Ln(1+New Hires) New Hired White Collars New Hired Female White Collars New Hired Female Blue Collars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Export)(t−1) -0.0010 0.0022 0.0160 0.0148 -0.0018 -0.0020
(0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014)
Ln(Domestic Sales)(t−1) 0.0063 0.0304* -0.0153 -0.0147 -0.0119 -0.0112
(0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017)
Female Share(t−1) -0.3183 -0.3574
(0.395) (0.308)
Federal State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,367 4,175 2,524 2,524 3,020 3,020
R-sq. 0.73 0.533 0.474 0.474 0.631 0.631
Notes: Newly hired workers are defined as workers employed in firm j at time y but not in t−1,
t−2, t−3. The share of newly hired white collar workers in column (2) is computed as the ratio
between newly hired full-time white collar workers and all newly hired full time workers. The
share of female white collar workers in column (3)-(4) is computed as the ratio between newly
hired full-time female white collar workers and newly hired white collar workers. The share
of female blue collar workers in column (5)-(6) is computed as the ratio between newly hired
full-time female blue collar workers and newly hired full-time blue collar workers. Export and
domestic sales are one period lagged. The data source is the LIAB dataset for years 1993-2007,
collapsed at the firm level.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
115






White Collar*ln(Export) 0.0034* 0.0010
(0.002) (0.002)




Female*ln(Domestic sales) 0.0024 0.0009
(0.002) (0.002)
White Collar*ln(Domestic sales) 0.0036* 0.0010
(0.002) (0.002)
Female*White Collar* ln(Domestic sales) -0.0069** -0.0051*
(0.003) (0.003)
Federal State FE Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes No
Match FE Yes Yes
Firm-Year FE No Yes
Observations 3,699,541 3,699,428
R-sq. 0.274 0.283
Notes: The dependent variable is probability of promotion. Promotions are identified as episodes
of wage growth of workers that are 10% higher than the average wage growth of their colleagues
within the firm and occupation group (white versus blue collar). The average probability of
promotion in the whole dataset is equal to 5.36%. The data source is the LIAB dataset for years
1993-2007.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
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White Collar*ln(Export) 0.0013 0.0002
0.001 0.001




Female*ln(Domestic sales) 0.0002 0.0002
0.001 0.001
White Collar*ln(Domestic sales) 0.0020 0.0006
0.001 0.001
Female*White Collar* ln(Domestic sales) -0.0023 -0.0021
0.002 0.002
Federal State FE Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes No
Match FE Yes Yes
Firm-Year FE No Yes
Observations 3,699,264 3,699,148
R-sq 0.2740 0.2810
Notes: The dependent variable is probability of promotion. Promotions are identified as episodes
of wage growth of workers that are 15% higher than the average wage growth of their colleagues
within the firm and occupation group (white versus blue collar). The average probability of
promotion in the whole dataset is equal to 2.40%. The data source is the LIAB dataset for years
1993-2007.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
Table 3.12 – Occupations by Task Content
Occupational Tasks Content (%) White Collar Blue Collar
Manual Routine 3.02 64.38
Manual Non Routine 5.36 8.15
Cognitive Routine 0 0.16
Analytic Non Routine 21.54 6.07
Interactive Non Routine 70.07 21.24
100 100
Notes: The breakdown of white and blue collar occupations according to their tasks content is
based on the definition of Task Intensity given in Appendix 3.B. The statistics are based on the
LIAB dataset for years 1993-2007, matched to the occupation task content information obtained
from the “Survey on qualification and working conditions”.
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Table 3.13 – Export and Gender Wage Gap by Task Intensity: White Collar,
Analytic and Interactive Jobs
White Collar: Analytic Non Routine Interactive Non Routine
Elasticities Elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Expjt 0.00145 -0.00476 0.00153 -0.00022
0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
Female* Expjt 0.0057 0.0081 0.0055 0.0004 0.0071** 0.0067* 0.0058 0.0032***
0.005 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.001
Ln(Sjt) 0.0024** 0.0033***
0.001 0.001
Female *ln(Sjt) 0.0011 -0.0007 0.0005 0.0055*** 0.0044** 0.0024
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Ln(firm size) 0.0089*** 0.0078*** 0.0146*** 0.0127***
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
Federal State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Match FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Year FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 631,130 569,444 568,494 428,580 1,828,040 1,521,720 1,516,515 960,278
R-sq 0.962 0.962 0.964 0.962 0.962 0.96 0.963 0.951
Sample All All All Only Exporters All All All Only Exporters
Notes: The dependent variable is log wages in real values. Column (1)-(2)-(3)-(4) refers to the
sub-sample of workers employed in white collar, analytic non-routine occupations, while columns
(5)-(6)-(7)-(8) refers to workers employed in white collar interactive non-routine occupations. In
columns (1)-(2)-(3)-(5)-(6)-(7) we use export share on total sales to approximate firms’ export
activity Expjt, and the firms’ total sales to approximate the term lnSjt. In columns (4) and
(8) we use the logarithm of sales from export to approximate firms’ export activity Expjt,
and the logarithm of domestic sales to approximate the term lnSjt. Other sets of controls
include experience and experience squared. The data source is the LIAB dataset for years
1993-2007, combined with the Survey on qualification and working conditions by occupation
code (Kldb2010) at 3 digit level of detail.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
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Table 3.14 – Export and Gender Wage Gap by Task Intensity: Blue Collar,
Manual and Interactive Jobs
Blue Collar: Manual Routine Manual Non-Routine Interactive Non Routine
Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Expjt 0.00387 0.00188 0.01043 0.00812 0.00188 0.00045
0.006 0.007 0.01 0.009 0.005 0.006
Female* Expjt -0.0204** -0.0224** -0.0130* -0.0029 -0.0119 -0.0243** -0.0125 0.0023 -0.0004 -0.0129 -0.0077 0.0013
0.008 0.009 0.007 0.002 0.01 0.01 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.002
Ln(Sjt) 0.0090*** -0.0001 0.0069**
0.002 0.003 0.003
Female * ln(Sjt) -0.0051* -0.0022 0.0027 0.0058 0.0010 0.0061 0.0096 0.0091* 0.0063**
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 (0.006) 0.006 0.005 0.003
Ln(firm size) 0.0475*** 0.0404*** 0.0350*** 0.0328*** 0.0392*** 0.0323***
0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.01 0.008
Observations 4,167,086 3,619,521 3,616,644 2,752,094 374,669 329,727 326,195 205,853 1,207,781 1,020,565 1,015,909 710,474
R-sq. 0.922 0.92 0.932 0.929 0.965 0.963 0.968 0.947 0.959 0.959 0.964 0.953
Federal State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Match FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Year FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Sample All All All Only Exporters All All All Only Exporters All All All Only Exporters
Notes: The dependent variable is log wages in real values. Column (1)-(2)-(3)-(4) refers to
the sub-sample of workers employed in blue collar, manual routine occupations, while columns
(5)-(6)-(7)-(8) refers to workers employed in blue collar manual non-routine occupation and
columns (9)-(10)-(11)-(12) refers to workers employed in blue collar interactive non-routine
occupations. In columns (1)-(2)-(3)-(5)-(6)-(7)-(9)-(10)-(11) we use export share on total sales
to approximate firms’ export activity Expjt, and the firms’ total sales to approximate the term
lnSjt. In columns (4)-(8)-(12) we use the logarithm of sales from export to approximate firms’
export activity Expjt, and the logarithm of domestic sales to approximate the term lnSjt.
Other sets of controls include experience and experience squared. The data source is the LIAB
dataset for years 1993-2007, combined with the Survey on qualification and working conditions
by occupation code (Kldb2010) at 3 digit level of detail.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
119
Table 3.15 – Robustness Checks: Wage Censoring
Elasticity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expjt 0.0073
(0.003)
Female * Expjt 0.0081** 0.0069* 0.0124* 0.0051**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002)
Censored wage at (t− 1) 0.0174*** 0.0133*** 0.0195*** 0.0224*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012)
Female * Censored wage at (t− 1) 0.0009 0.0027 0.0075* 0.0154
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.021)
Censored wage at (t− 1) * Expjt -0.0226*** -0.0176*** -0.0283*** -0.0048***
(0.004) (0.003) 0.005 (0.001)
Female * Censored wage at (t− 1) * Expjt 0.0134** 0.0107** 0.0049 0.0017*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001)
Female * Sjt 0.0016
(0.002)
Censored wage at (t− 1) * Sjt 0.0039***
(0.001)
Female * Censored wage at (t− 1) -0.0019*
(0.001)
Experience/10 0.3523*** 0.5008*** 0.4475*** 0.4397***
(0.035) (0.051) (0.059) (0.058)
Experience sq./100 -0.0480*** -0.0482*** -0.0501*** -0.0500***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Ln(Firm size) 0.0117
0.002
Federal State FE Yes No No No
Sector-Year FE Yes No No No
Match FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,583,254 1,578,584 983,636 916,983
R-sq 0.961 0.964 0.954 0.955
Sample White Collars White Collars White Collars White Collars
All All Only Exporters Only Exporters
Notes: The results are obtained from estimating model (3.4) on sub-sample of white collar
workers only in the LIAB dataset for years 1993-2007 buy replacing the variable white collar
with censored wages at time t−1. The dependent variable is log wages in real values. In Column
(1)-(2)-(3) we use export share on total sales to approximate firms’ export activity Expjt,. In
Column (4) we use the logarithm of sales from export to approximate firms’ export activity
Expjt, and the logarithm of domestic sales to approximate the term lnSjt.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
120





Female * Expt−1 -0.0070 -0.0095 -0.0024
(0.009) (0.008) (0.002)
White Collar * Expt−1 0.0186** 0.0164** 0.0027
(0.009) (0.008) (0.002)




Female * St−1 -0.0053* -0.0027 0.0005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
White Collar * St−1 -0.0029 -0.0018 -0.0046**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Female * White Collar * St−1 0.0094** 0.0065** -0.0033*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Federal State FE Yes No No
Industry-Year FE Yes No No
Match FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,022,162 5,021,014 3,736,806
R-sq. 0.949 0.954 0.952
Sample All All Only Exporters
Notes: The results are obtained from estimating model (3.4) on the LIAB dataset for years
1993-2007. The dependent variable is log wages in real values. In Column (1)-(2)we use export
share on total sales to approximate firms’ export activity Expj,t−1,. In Column (3) we use the
logarithm of sales from export to approximate firms’ export activity Expj,t−1, and the logarithm
of domestic sales to approximate the term lnSj,t−1. Controls for experience, experience squared
and (log of) firm size are also included.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
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Female* Expt -0.0185** -0.0099 -0.0024
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002)
White Collar * Expt 0.0122 0.0103 0.0001
(0.009) (0.008) (0.002)




Female * St -0.0051* -0.0022 0.0005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
White Collar * St -0.0091*** -0.0075** -0.0080***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Female * White Collar * St 0.0106*** 0.0087*** -0.0006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Federal State FE Yes No No
Industry-Year FE Yes No No
Match FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,325,589 6,323,303 4,708,571
R-sq. 0.946 0.952 0.95
Notes: The results are obtained from estimating model (3.4) on the sub-sample of high-tenure
workers only in the LIAB dataset for years 1993-2000. The dependent variable is log wages in real
values. In Column (1)-(2)we use export share on total sales to approximate firms’ export activity
Expj ,. In Column (3) we use the logarithm of sales from export to approximate firms’ export
activity Expj , and the logarithm of domestic sales to approximate the term lnSj,t. Controls for
experience, experience squared and (log of) firm size are also included.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
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Appendix
3.A Classification of Sectors of Activity
Table 3.A.1 – Sector of Activity (NACE Rev. 2)
Description
10 Manufacture of food products
11 Manufacture of beverages
12 Manufacture of tobacco products
13 Manufacture of textiles
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel
15 Manufacture of leather and related products
16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork,
except furniture manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
24 Manufacture of basic metals
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
31 Manufacture of furniture
32 Other manufacturing
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
36 Water collection, treatment and supply
37 Sewerage
38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery
39 Remediation activities and other waste management services
41 Construction of buildings
42 Civil engineering
43 Specialised construction activities
45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
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46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines
50 Water transport
51 Air transport
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation
55 Accommodation
56 Food and beverage service activities
58 Publishing activities
59 Motion picture, video and television programme production,
sound recording and music publishing activities
60 Programming and broadcasting activities
61 Telecommunications
62 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities
63 Information service activities
64 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding
65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities
68 Real estate activities
69 Legal and accounting activities
70 Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities
71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis
72 Scientific research and development
73 Advertising and market research
74 Other professional, scientific and technical activities
75 Veterinary activities
77 Rental and leasing activities
78 Employment activities
79 Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation service and related activities
80 Security and investigation activities
81 Services to buildings and landscape activities
82 Office administrative, office support and other business support activities
84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
85 Education
86 Human health activities
87 Residential care activities
88 Social work activities without accommodation
90 Creative, arts and entertainment activities
91 Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities
92 Gambling and betting activities
93 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities
94 Activities of membership organisations
95 Repair of computers and personal and household goods
96 Other personal service activities
97 Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel
98 Undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of private households for own use
99 Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies
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3.B Task Content of Occupations
The second source of information used in our analysis, in addition to LIAB, is
the “Survey on qualification and working conditions” carried out by the German
Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BIBB) and the Research Institute of
the Federal Employment Service (IAB). The dataset consists of a repeated cross
section of a random sample of workers covering 0.1 percent of the German labour
force. It was conducted in 1979, 1986, 1992, 1999, 2006 and 2012 and we use it to
classify occupations into groups according to their tasks’ content.
The detailed information on tasks performed in each job allows us to classify
15 longitudinally consistent tasks relating to what the worker does on the job
following the methodology given in Becker and Muendler (2014). Once the tasks
are correctly defined, each occupation is classified according to the following
five categories defined by Spitz-Oener (2006), based on the intensity of activity
performed on the job: 1) Manual-routine, 2) Manual non-routine, 3) Cognitive
routine, 4) Analytic non-routine, 5) Interactive non-routine. The correspondence
between occupation category and task is reported in Table 3.B1.
We follow Antonczyk, Fitzenberger, and Leuschner (2009) and define the steps
to classify each occupation by its task intensity as follows. First, we define a
certain level of intensity of performance of activities belonging to task category c
for individual i (employed in occupation k) at time t, by taking the ratio between
the sum of all the activities performed by i that belong to category c and the sum
of all activities performed by i across all categories. This represents an indicator




a (tasks a in category c)ikt∑
a (all tasks a)ikt
Then, to obtain a measure of the intensity with which a certain category of
tasks is performed within each occupation, we just average the Intensity Indexcikt
across all individuals employed in occupation k. Formally, we obtain the following
index:






Finally, we consider occupation k to belong to category c if the maximum value
of Task Index c,k,t across all categories is attached to category c.
In Table 3.B2 we provide an example of the values of the Task Indices defined
above, Task Index c,k,t, for two occupations, teacher and baker. We can see that in
each year of the survey teacher belongs the interactive non-routine category and
baker to manual routine. We can also notice that within strongly manual routine
occupations, like baker, there is a substantial reduction of intensity of manual
routine tasks throughout time, indicating the role of automation (see for example
Cortes, Jaimovich, and Siu (2018)).
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Table 3.B.1 – Tasks and Occupation Classification
Category Task
Manual Routine Manufacture, Produce Goods
Transport, Store, Dispatch
Oversee, Control Machinery and Techn. Processes
Manual Non Routine Repair, Maintain
Entertain, Accommodate, Prepare Foods
Nurse, Look After, Cure
Cognitive Routine Measure, Inspect, Control Quality
Analytical Non Routine Gather Information, Develop, Research, Construct
Program a Computer
Apply Legal Knowledge
Interactive Non Routine Purchase, Procure, Sell
Advertise, Promote, Conduct Marketing and PR
Organize, Plan, Prepare (others’ work)
Consult and Inform
Train, Teach, Instruct, Educate
Table 3.B.2 – Tasks and Occupation Classification
Task Index c,k,t Teacher Baker
1992 1999 2006 1992 1999 2006
Manual routine 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.73 0.37 0.31
Manual non-routine 0.01 0.22 0.14 0.03 0.16 0.13
Cognitive routine 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.12
Analytical non-routine 0.11 0.15 0.24 0.05 0.04 0.13
Interactive non-routine 0.82 0.54 0.47 0.19 0.31 0.30
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3.C Export and Gender Wage Gap: Additional
Specifications
In the main body of this paper we have shown that an increase in firms’ export
activity does not have any significant effect on the gender wage gap in total, but
that it is associated to a significant increase in relative wages of female white
collar workers and to a significant decrease in relative wages of female blue collar
workers.
These results are obtained exploiting within firms and within worker-firm
matches variation of export and relative wages. We mainly focus on this level
of detail because we want to capture the (closest to the) true causal relationship
between these two variables. We believe that only looking at changes in the
relative wages of a specific male-female pair of workers employed by the same firm
as it increases its export activity eliminates important sources of bias related to
firm heterogeneity in productivity or hiring process and workers’ heterogeneity in
innate ability.
However, to the best of our knowledge, most of the existing literature, with the
exception of Bøler, Javorcik, and Ulltveit-Moe (2018), uses sector and firm-level
data, which only allows to exploit sector and firm level variation to investigate
the relationship between export and gender wage gap. For example, Black and
Brainerd (2004) and Saure and Zoabi (2014), using sector level data on the US,
find contrasting results on the role of international trade in the gender wage gap.
In Black and Brainerd (2004) trade liberalization is interpreted as an increase
in competition on the labour market which, under the assumption that firms
operate in a non competitive market and adopt a costly discriminatory behaviour
against female workers, leads to a reduction in the gender wage gap. On the
contrary, Saure and Zoabi (2014) show that trade liberalization widens the gender
wage gap. They motivate their findings by modelling the labour market under
the assumption of a strong complementarity between female labour and capital
intensive technology. After a trade shock, the capital sector expands, attracting
male workers from the labour intensive sector, thereby reducing the capital-labour
ratio and increasing the gender wage gap. Additionally, Ozler (2000), exploiting
firm level data on Turkey, finds a positive correlation between firm level demand
for female workers and export activity. Ederington, Minier, and Troske (2009)
further confirms that the demand for female workers increases in firms that
operate in industries that experience more relevant tariff reductions in Colombia.
Finally, Juhn, Ujhelyi, and Villegas-Sanchez (2014) show that women in blue collar
occupations in Mexico experience an increase in their relative wages after a cut in
tariffs, while white collar women remain largely unaffected by such policy.
To be able to compare our results to the existing literature, in this section
we estimate the relation between export and gender wage gap exploiting only
within-sector and within-firm source of variation in the data. Specifically, we
estimate on the whole sample and then on the sub-samples of blue and white
collar workers the following linear regression models:
lnwijst = β0femi + β1Expjt + β2femi ∗ Expjt + C′itπ1 + F′jtπ2 + εijst (3.8)
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lnwijst = β0femi + β1Expjt + β2femi ∗ Expjt + C′itπ1 + F′jtπ2 + ηst + εijst
(3.9)
lnwijst = β0femi + β1Expjt + β2femi ∗ Expjt + C′itπ1 + F′jtπ2 + ηst + ηj + εijst
(3.10)
where, wijst represents the wage of individual i in firm j in sector s at time t; femi
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker is a woman and Expjt represents the
share of exports on total sales of firm j at time t. Matrix Cit contains vectors of
individual characteristics of individual i at time t, such as education, experience
and its square, a dummy variable for white collar and German citizenship. Matrix
Fjt contains a vector of firms’ characteristics, like the (log of) the number of
firms’ employees, and fixed effects for the federal state in which the establishment
is located. Specification (3.9) further includes a set of fixed effects for sector-year
denoted as ηst and in specification (3.10) we add firm fixed effects ηj.
The results of the estimation of the three models for the whole sample are
reported in Table 3.C1, respectively in column (1), (2) and (3).
The estimation of specification (3.8) shows that women are paid on average
25% less than men, and that firms that export more pay their male employees
higher wages and are characterised by a lower gender wage gap.
This specification compares the size of the gender wage gaps in firms with
different export shares that operate in different sectors of activity. The estimation
of the correlation between the gender wage gap and export is then likely to be
biased by sector-level heterogeneity. For example, if export-oriented firms are
concentrated in sectors that systematically employ more female workers, it will
also reflect the difference in the gender composition of the workforce in addition
to the true effect of export.
This possible source of bias is taken into account in specification (3.9), in which
sector-year fixed effects are included. In this case, the estimation of the gender
wage gap exploits within sector (and year) variation of firms’ export activity.
Specifically, it allows us to compare the gender wage gap of different firms with
different export shares that operate within the same sector of activity.
The results of this specification are reported in column (2) and show that being
employed in a firm that has a 1 percentage point higher export share is associated
to a 0.028% increase in salary for male workers, and to a 0.09% reduction in the
gender wage gap. If we compare this result to the one in column (1) we notice that
the relative female-male wage response to an increase in export is lower when we
control for sector-year fixed effects, confirming the (upward) bias in the coefficient
estimated in the first specification.
The results of model (3.10), in which we add firm fixed effects to the baseline
specification, are reported in column (3), and confirm the estimation results of
model (3.8) and (3.9), showing a negative correlation between export and gender
wage gap. The coefficient of interest, β̂2, in this case is smaller than in specification
(3.9), indicating an additional source of bias, possibly due to the different gender
workforce composition between firms within sectors.
The estimation results for the sub-samples of blue collar (columns (1)-(2)-(3))
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and white collar (columns (4)-(5)-(6)) workers are reported in Table 3.C2. It is
interesting to notice that, in contrast with the results we found in the main text,
when exploiting only within sector and within firm source of variation in the data,
both blue collar and white collar female workers see their relative wages increase
in conjunction with a rise in firms’ export.
These results confirm what was found in previous papers (e.g. Juhn, Ujhelyi,
and Villegas-Sanchez (2014)) but also, when compared to the results obtained in
this work using the main identification strategy that exploits within match source
of variation, indicate the key importance of workers’ characteristics in driving
the results. When these characteristics are taken into account, the correlation
between relative female-male workers’ wages and export is in fact much smaller
and becomes negative in the case of blue collar workers (see Table 3.4). This
result provides some evidence for the assortative matching theory, which states
that firms select higher ability workers as they intensify export and pay them
higher wages (Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding, 2010).
Table 3.C.1 – Export Share and Gender Wage Gap: Other Specifications
(1) (2) (3)
Female -0.2588*** -0.2333*** -0.2037***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Export Share 0.0967*** 0.0285*** -0.0085*
(0.012) (0.009) (0.005)
Female * Export Share 0.1390*** 0.0928*** 0.0616***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.01)
Experience/10 0.2337*** 0.2380*** 0.2182***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Experience sq./100 -0.0412*** -0.0446*** -0.0411***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
White Collar 0.1734*** 0.1805*** 0.1603***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
German 0.0245*** 0.0188*** 0.0233***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Medium Skill 0.1333*** 0.1217*** 0.1060***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
High Skill 0.3507*** 0.3239*** 0.2842***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Log (Firm Size) 0.0439*** 0.0363*** -0.0013
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Federal State FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 10,560,478 10,560,478 10,560,198
R-sq 0.479 0.524 0.634
Notes: The dependent variable is log wages in real values. The variable Expjt represents the
firms’ export share (relative to total sales). The variable Ln(Sjt) represents the (log of) the
firms’ total sales. The data source is the LIAB dataset for years 1993-2007.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
129
Table 3.C.2 – Export Share and Gender Wage Gap for Blue and White Collar
Workers: Other Specifications
Blue Collar White Collar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.2826*** -0.2455*** -0.1911*** -0.2413*** -0.2253*** -0.1996***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Export Share 0.0970*** 0.0350*** -0.0024 0.0891*** -0.0010 -0.0122**
(0.013) (0.01) (0.006) (0.015) (0.011) (0.005)
Female * Export Share 0.1609*** 0.0963*** 0.0429*** 0.1520*** 0.1146*** 0.0548***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.01) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Experience/10 0.2142*** 0.2132*** 0.1945*** 0.2829*** 0.2892*** 0.2699***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Experience sq./100 -0.0359*** -0.0381*** -0.0356*** -0.0545*** -0.0580*** -0.0533***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
German 0.0236*** 0.0185*** 0.0238*** 0.0148** -0.0004 -0.0018
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Medium Skill 0.1410*** 0.1244*** 0.1034*** 0.0653*** 0.0652*** 0.0710***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
High Skill 0.4163*** 0.3950*** 0.3418*** 0.2884*** 0.2635*** 0.2433***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Ln(Firm Size) 0.0462*** 0.0363*** 0.0077 0.0389*** 0.0397*** -0.0074**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Federal State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 7,245,763 7,245,757 7,245,195 3,314,715 3,314,707 3,313,860
R-sq. 0.415 0.482 0.616 0.472 0.516 0.627
Notes: The dependent variable is log wages in real values. The results reported in columns
(1)-(2)-(3) refer to blue collar workers and in columns (4)-(5)-(6) to white collar workers. The
data source is the LIAB dataset for years 1993-2007.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively. Standard errors are in brackets
and are clustered at firm level.
130
References
Amiti, Mary and Donald Davis (2012). “Trade, Firms, and Wages: Theory and
Evidence”. In: Review of Economic Studies 79.1, pp. 1–36.
Antonczyk, Dirk, Bernd Fitzenberger, and Ute Leuschner (2009). Can a
Task-Based Approach Explain the Recent Changes in the German Wage
Structure? ZEW Discussion Papers 08-132. ZEW - Leibniz Centre for
European Economic Research.
Baumgarten, Daniel, Ingo Geishecker, and Holger Görg (2013). “Offshoring, tasks,
and the skill-wage pattern”. In: European Economic Review 61.C, pp. 132–152.
Becker, Sascha O., Karolina Ekholm, and Marc-Andreas Muendler (2013). “Off-
shoring and the onshore composition of tasks and skills”. In: Journal of
International Economics 90.1, pp. 91–106.
Becker, Sascha O. and Marc-Andreas Muendler (2014). Trade and Tasks: An
Exploration over Three Decades in Germany. CESifo Working Paper Series
5122. CESifo Group Munich.
Bernard, Andrew B., J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding, and Peter K. Schott
(2007). “Firms in International Trade”. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives
21.3, pp. 105–130.
Black, Sandra and Elizabeth Brainerd (2004). “Importing Equality? The Impact
of Globalization on Gender Discrimination”. In: ILR Review 57.4, pp. 540–559.
Black, Sandra E. and Alexandra Spitz-Oener (2010). “Explaining Women’s Suc-
cess: Technological Change and the Skill Content of Women’s Work”. In: The
Review of Economics and Statistics 92.1, pp. 187–194.
Bøler, Esther Ann, Beata Javorcik, and Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe (2018).
“Working across time zones: Exporters and the gender wage gap”. In: Journal
of International Economics 111.C, pp. 122–133.
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